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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Consider the Pill: Pharmacentric Readings of Post-WWII American Literature 
 
by 
 
Rhett William Farinholt 
Doctor of Philosophy in Literature 
University of California San Diego, 2019 
 
Professor Michael Davidson, Co-Chair 
Professor Meg Wesling, Co-Chair 
 
 This dissertation explores the impact of psychopharmacological discourses on Post-
WWII American literature.  I argue for a “pharmacentric” reading practice that foregrounds the 
role of pharmaceuticals in both the production and consumption of American literature across  
the period, tracing the rise of a new ontological construction in the cultural imagination I call the 
“neurochemical self.”  This view of the self as an expression of chemical interactions in the brain 
emerges from the period’s scientific, medical, and advertising industries to become the 
dominant understanding of American selfhood by century’s end, and remains under-examined 
in existing literary scholarship.  In making the case for the rise and importance of the 
x 
 
neurochemical self, I identify and examine the development of literary language and techniques 
indebted to popular and scientific discourses around pharmaceuticals, a phenomenon I call 
“pharmaceutical literacy.”   
 In organizing this analysis of the neurochemical self and pharmaceutical literacy, I turn to 
three distinct eras in post-WWII American literature, identifying three signal pharmaceuticals 
within and the literary works they engaged with.  I argue for the importance of amphetamines, 
specifically Benzedrine, to the work of the Beat writers Jack Kerouac and Allen Ginsberg in the 
first decade after the war.  Next, I look at America’s “Age of Anxiety,” identifying tranquilizers as 
the dominant psychopharmaceuticals from the late 1950s through the 1980s, reading the 
confessional poetry of Robert Lowell and Anne Sexton through the resulting pharmacentric 
perspective.  Lastly, I argue for the importance of neurochemical selfhood and pharmaceutical 
literacy to the discourses provoked by the advent and run-away success of SSRI 
antidepressants, specifically within the work of 1990s depression memoirs by Elizabeth Wurtzel 
and Meri Nana-Ama Danquah.  Finally, I argue for an extension of literary studies that accounts 
for these psychopharmaceutical developments and offers valuable perspective on the tensions 
between scientific and humanistic understandings of identity.     
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Introduction 
 
 
 Looking for a fun parlor game or third date conversation?  Try to identify which popular 
drugs exemplified a given era and why.  The 1980s in the U.S.?  Easy. Cocaine: a brash, 
cocksure stimulant, full of artificial confidence, and ostentatiously expensive. The 1920s?  While 
bromides had their adherents, my vote would be for alcohol: celebratory and convivial, but 
promising a hangover to come.  Victorian England?  Probably Laudanum: a soporific opiate, 
deadening dangerous feelings, particularly in women.  With a bit of stretching, perhaps the 
Medieval period could be exemplified by medicinal leeches: bloody, violent, informed largely by 
tradition and mythology, not scientific research.  Though it is too early to reasonably speculate, 
it is certainly possible that the next period of U.S. culture could come to reflect the attributes of 
the attention deficit drugs widely prescribed to American millennials, though cutting edge gene 
therapies or the increasing horrors of opioid abuse could well predominate.   
 While it is little more than a conversation starter, this game carries a kernel of something 
deeper, hinting at a profound connection between the substances we ingest and how we see 
ourselves.  It would be silly to suggest that a popular drug or medication is the perfect avatar for 
something as overwhelmingly broad and constantly shifting as an entire society in a particular 
era, but the fit can often be close enough to recontextualize the way we look at that culture.  
Obviously, drugs and their popularity can tell us a great deal about cultural understandings of 
the body and disease.  They can reflect common medical consensus, chart the progress of 
scientific research, or map the shadowy terrain between the laboratory and the street.  They can 
tell us about the cultural anxieties of a particular historical moment.  Which fears required 
chemical mediation?  What were the particular forms of deviation from “normal” minds and 
bodies that necessitated pharmaceutical intervention?  Moreover, what impact did the relative 
popularity of certain drugs have upon artistic production and reception in the era? The answers 
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to these questions illuminate more than simply “drug culture”; they expose larger cultural 
currents by way of drugs. 
 This dissertation makes the case for a trio of representative drugs--amphetamines, 
tranquilizers, and antidepressants--as they came to embody specific eras in post-WWII 
America.  Moreover, I contend that these drugs and the discourses that drove their transient 
popularities directly affected the literature produced during their periods of ascendancy, 
influencing authors and their audience in profound and under-examined ways.  In this 
dissertation’s first chapter, I look at the immediate post-WWII decade and argue for the 
representative role of amphetamines like Benzedrine on the work and style of the Beat writers 
Jack Kerouac and Allen Ginsberg.  Chapter 2 explores the years after Benzedrine’s fall, arguing 
that the period from the mid-1950s to the late-1960s was defined largely by the pharmaceutical 
influence of tranquilizers like Miltown that colored the literary output of the confessional poets 
Robert Lowell and Anne Sexton.  Lastly, the third chapter here nominates SSRI antidepressants 
like Prozac as drug exemplars of the 1990s, exploring pharmaceutical function within the 
depression memoirs of Elizabeth Wurtzel and Meri Nana-Ama Danquah.  Read together, these 
three eras and the pharmaceutically relevant literature they produced tell the story of a vital half-
century in American letters, and, I argue, the comprehension of this era’s literature, whether it 
was written by someone on a prescription drug or not, is incomplete without attending to the 
churning political, industrial, scientific, and philosophical discourses mobilized around 
pharmaceuticals across the period.   
More specifically, this dissertation will use these three examinations to define and 
unpack two important additions I offer to the vocabulary of twentieth century literary studies: the 
“neurochemical self” and “pharmaceutical literacy.”  Originally coined in the field of sociology, 
the “neurochemical self” is a term for a new conception of selfhood that emerges after WWII and 
sees identity as, at least in part, an expression of biochemical interactions in the brain.  Tracing 
the rise of this newborn identity category, this dissertation follows a variety of mechanisms 
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throughout the works of this time period that redefine who we are and how we feel in light of 
developing scientific and popular discourses connecting feelings, emotions, and mental 
experience to electrical brain states, synaptic neurotransmissions, and “chemical imbalances.”  
Though this view of the self holds the promise of a dispassionate, purely quantitative 
understanding of identity, the neurochemical self will ultimately be seen to repackage existing 
associations of gender, race, disability, and class as it navigates from the laboratories of 
pharmaceutical companies to the pages of American literature.  The ascent of the 
neurochemical self through American society is enabled by a concomitant rise in the under-
examined phenomenon of “pharmaceutical literacy,” my term for the competence in, and 
knowledge of, pharmaceutical discourses evident in the exchange between writers and readers 
of literature.  In addition to exposing the manifold configurations of the neurochemical self to 
emerge in the late twentieth century, pharmaceutical literacy also helps track the evolving 
anxieties and attitudes of Americans in response to seismic shifts in industry, science, politics, 
and society across the period.  An increase in drug brand name fluency, shared suppositions 
regarding pharmaceutical action, and the use of psychopharmaceutical metaphor all represent 
significant changes to the expressive arsenal of twentieth century authors and poets, and in 
demonstrating the ascent of this pharmaceutical literacy offer valuable avenues for inquiry into 
the role of drugs in American literature. 
Before proceeding to these arguments, some clarification is in order regarding the drugs 
under discussion.  Firstly, this dissertation does not focus on the impact of illegal street drugs, 
nor the numerous ways the black market drug trade and America’s “War on Drugs” have 
influenced conceptions of American identity.  These are fascinating and worthy examinations, 
and they have provided the material for a number of critical and popular studies.  Indeed, there 
are many who argue for the generative effect that illegal drugs have had on artistic production in 
the U.S.  It is a commonplace observation, for example, that many post-WWII Jazz musicians 
explored the effects of heroin in their music, in much the same way psychedelic rockers of the 
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1960s turned to LSD.  However, there has been a surprising lack of attention paid to the effect 
of prescription medications on post-war American artistic production, despite the fact that the 
distinctions between illegal and prescription drugs are largely bureaucratic,1 and that the latter 
category of drug use far exceeds the former.  In order to address this inequity in analysis, the 
focus of this dissertation is drugs developed in aggressively commercial pharmaceutical 
laboratories in the U.S. and Europe, and obtained (mostly) legally through the socially and 
politically sanctioned channels of medical prescriptions and pharmacies.  Though all of the 
drugs in this dissertation have been abused outside of these official channels--indeed the Beat 
writers consumed legal-at-the-time amphetamines in dosages that would normally be reserved 
for veterinary applications--my interest lies less in recreational uses of drugs and more in clinical 
applications as they expose larger cultural values of acceptable treatment and use. The 
fluctuations of what is defined as “acceptable” treatment and use tells a related story by defining 
a specific moment via the complex interaction between scientific research, commercial 
marketing both to doctors and to patients, political pressures, and popular sentiment as 
reflected in periodicals, entertainment, and art. Moreover, this dissertation looks specifically at 
“psychopharmaceuticals,” or drugs whose primary action is intended to alleviate emotional 
distress whose etiology is thought to begin in the brain.    
In making the claim that these psychopharmaceuticals have contributed to American 
identity formation in unexamined and potentially problematic ways, this dissertation must 
necessarily engage in extended criticism of these drugs and the channels through which they 
have legitimated their conquest of American minds and bodies.  Pharmaceutical companies, 
and in particular their advertisements which seek to create a need where none existed, come in 
                                                           
1 Cultural distinctions between prescription drugs and narcotics on Controlled Substance Schedules are often 
arbitrary and illogical.  SSRIs, for example, raise levels of serotonin in the brain by limiting the brain’s ability to 
metabolize it.  MDMA (“ecstasy” to people of a certain age, “molly” to their children) increases serotonin directly.  
As Lennard Davis points out in The End of Normal (2013), “[t]he difference between Ecstasy . . . and an SSRI is a 
difference of mechanism only” (54).   
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for a particularly focused critique in these pages, as do the psychiatric and healthcare 
professionals whose work contributes to the production of these psychopharmacological and 
neurochemical discourses.  I should make clear up front that the problems discussed in this 
dissertation should not be read as polemic attacks on the people working to help those that 
suffer from psychiatric pain.  I believe that the people employed in the psychiatric, medical, and 
pharmaceutical research fields are crucial to the well-being of society and primarily motivated by 
a commendable desire to help those in distress.  That these people can be, and as history has 
shown, often are, implicated in large-scale promotions of damaging misinformation or 
campaigns of harmful treatment platforms that reimpose existing conditions of oppression 
should not be understood as assaults on the motives of these individual actors.  Indeed, I am 
not interested in making the case that these drugs are good or bad, or that the psychiatric 
profession should be fundamentally reorganized, or that the pharmaceutical industry should be 
abolished.  Though some of the critics in the following chapters make these claims, I am far 
more interested in exploring how these psychopharmacological discourses circulate, what effect 
they have on how Americans view themselves, and the language through which we express 
these ideas in literature.   
In order to examine these psychopharmaceutical discourses of the neurochemical self 
and pharmaceutical literacy at work after WWII, this dissertation will have to reach beyond the 
boundaries of literature and literary scholarship, engaging with a colorful cast of characters from 
a variety of disciplinary backgrounds.  Pharmacological historians play a valuable part in 
establishing the scientific and cultural contexts that these drugs were developed in, as do the 
chemists, students, and scientific researchers that discovered or modified these culturally 
significant molecules along the way.  Psychologists and psychiatrists are important to the story 
too, as figures on the front lines of patient treatment and interaction, but also as targets for 
marketing and industrial forces seeking to shape these conversations, and as sources of 
authority seeking to bolster their own credentials in dealing with American psychic distress.  
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Other voices contribute to this cultural chorus from pharmacies, doctor’s offices, magazines, 
and television commercials, from the sanatorium to the psychiatrist’s couch, from the halls of 
Congress to the battlefields of a World War.  The story of psychopharmaceuticals in post-WWII 
American literature is complex and messy, drawing not just from these various cultural sources 
but also from a promiscuous mix of theoretical voices as well, with scholars from neurology, 
philosophy, sociology, history of science, gender studies, critical race studies, and disability 
studies joining the authors, poets, and literary scholars one would expect to find in a traditional 
dissertation on American literature. 
One such voice belongs to sociologist Nikolas Rose whose work on identity in relation to 
scientific developments provides one of the foundational elements of the literary readings to 
come.  In his 2003 paper “Neurochemical Selves,” Rose posed a series of provocative 
questions that sought to establish this particularly modern conception of identity in relation to 
neurochemistry:   
How did we become neurochemical selves? How did we come to think about our 
sadness as a condition called “depression” caused by a chemical imbalance in 
the brain and amenable to treatment by drugs that would “rebalance” these 
chemicals?  How did we come to experience our worries at home and at work as 
“generalized anxiety disorder” also caused by a chemical imbalance which can 
be corrected by drugs?  (46) 
 
To answer these questions, Rose posits that scientific and industrial advances in the latter half 
of the twentieth-century directly contributed to a “recoding of everyday affect and conducts in 
terms of their neurochemistry [that] is only one element of a more widespread mutation in which 
we in the West, most especially in the United States, have come to understand our minds and 
selves in terms of our brains and bodies” (46).  Rose proceeds with his inquiry by identifying 
“neurochemistry” as a primary vector for these shaping forces, particularly “the belief that 
variations in neurochemistry underlie variations in thought, mood and behavior, and that these 
can be modulated with drugs” (46).  Applying the tools of the sociologist, Rose explores the 
history of “chemical solutions to psychiatric problems” (46) from the 1950s to the end of the 
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century, identifying the U.S. and U.K. as “psychopharmacological societies” whose health care 
practices have increasingly relied on the pharmaceutical industry, especially in the fields of 
psychiatry and mental health.  Rose highlights the enormous popularity and profitability of new 
drugs in such societies, articulating a process where older somatic and psychiatric practices 
yielded to the commercial, litigious, and cultural power of psychopharmaceutical interests, 
where modern conceptions of individuality and freedom were pathologized along neurochemical 
lines to stigmatize “lack of energy, [and] an inability to perform the tasks required for work or 
relations with others,” (53) and where the typical cause-and-effect logic that began with a 
disease and sought to find a chemical cure for it became replaced by the simultaneous “co-
production of the disease, the diagnosis and the treatment” (54).2  Though he is careful not to 
demonize “this new medico-industrial complex” (58), Rose argues for the importance of 
expanding Foucault’s reading of biopolitics to include issues of “bioethics” and “bioeconomics” 
since “developments in psychiatric drug use are merely one dimension of a new set of relations 
between ideas of health and illness, practices of treatment and prevention of bodily 
malfunctions, and commercially driven innovation, marketing and competition for profits and 
shareholder value,” where “human capital is now understood in a rather literal sense--in terms of 
new linkages between the politics, economics and ethics of life itself” (58).  This confluence of 
sociological factors ultimately leads Rose to observe that “individuals themselves are beginning 
to recode their moods and their ills in terms of the functioning of their brain chemicals, and to act 
upon themselves in light of this belief,” concluding that psychopharmaceuticals “are becoming 
central to the ways in which our conduct is determined to be problematic and governed, by 
                                                           
2 Developmental psychiatrist Gary Greenberg has been especially vocal about the problems of this “co-production” 
process of disease and treatment where a psychiatric drug is developed first, and then a disorder is created around 
the symptoms that drug alleviates.  For more, see Greenberg’s criticism of The American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in The Book of Woe (2013) and Manufacturing 
Depression (2010).  For an insider’s criticism of this process in the DSM, see also, Allen Frances’s Saving Normal 
(2014). 
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others, and by ourselves--to the continuous work of modulation of our capacities that is the life’s 
work of the contemporary biological citizen” (59).    
 Rose’s work in the field of sociology puts a specific name to this important conception of 
selfhood--of “biological citizenship”--as increasingly deriving from modulatable chemical states 
in the physical brain.  In addition to the foundational work of Nikolas Rose, this dissertation 
further draws its understanding of the neurochemical self from cultural and psychiatric studies 
that amend and complicate Rose’s definition by bringing this approach to neurochemistry and 
ontology into other fields.  Looking at antidepressant use in Australian women, interdisciplinary 
sociologist Simone Fullagar argues in “Negotiating the neurochemical self: anti-depressant 
consumption in women’s recovery from depression” (2009) that “[t]he problem of depression, 
the emergence of molecular science and the push for pharmacological solutions are contributing 
to the discursive formations of new subject positions--such as the neurochemically deficient self” 
(389).  Fullagar focuses on how the emergence of this scientific, neurochemical vision of 
selfhood contributes to a conflation between deficiencies in brain chemicals and deficiencies in 
character that is rooted in mobilizations of biopower and affects women acutely.  According to 
Fullagar’s interpretation, taking antidepressants comes to represent a mandatory and moral 
obligation for the depressed woman, who must embrace antidepressants as “a normalized 
pathway to successful recovery,” and who must therefore view her abnormal mental state as 
symptomatic of “the biologically deficient and morally failing self” (389).  Fullagar does not 
discuss literature in her work, but much of my focus in chapter 3 regarding memoir and 
antidepressant effects on women draws from formulations enabled by her work.  
 9 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Mid-century advertisements for psychiatric drugs, like this one for Mellaril 
(thioridazine) (a cousin of Thorazine from the phenothiazine family of first generation, or “typical,” 
antipsychotics) often represented women in domestic situations, frequently set against a paternal 
image implying control, such as a male doctor in a white coat or, as seen here, an enormous, 
imposing hand. Source: procon.org, 1965. 
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Psychiatrist and cultural studies scholar Bradley Lewis follows Nikolas Rose’s move to 
invoke Foucault in these debates by looking at “human ‘power’ dimensions of representation” 
(xi) in championing the “Postpsychiatry” movement.3  Lewis criticizes contemporary psychiatry 
as it “tends to focus on neurochemical and genetic explanations, to place technological 
solutions over ethical and human considerations, and to use forced treatment methods to 
resolve clinical controversy” (x).  In criticizing these trends in modern psychiatry, Lewis avoids 
lapsing into nostalgia for Freudian psychoanalysis, or cheerleading in partisan debates over 
“realist” or “constructivist” understandings of science, instead proposing a theoretically grounded 
approach to psychiatry that contributes much-needed perspective from the humanities and 
social theory to the way modern psychiatry should conceive and treat selfhood.  Lewis sees 
neurochemical selfhood as a limiting and potentially dangerous conception within the psychiatric 
field in that it presumes, through diagnostic schema and mandatory treatment interventions, a 
reductive, mechanistic approach to identity.  Lewis argues for an understanding of selfhood that 
accounts for one’s neurochemistry within a larger context of human experience, and this 
dissertation offers readings that highlight many of the problems arising from purely scientific 
views of selfhood divorced from the humanistic and social perspectives Lewis promotes.    
Further perspective on the tensions between scientific and humanistic views of selfhood 
come from cultural studies of psychiatry that trace, and sometimes resist, the narrative of 
psychiatry’s transition from predominantly psychoanalytic, Freudian roots to its current 
manifestation that privileges a biological understanding of emotional dynamics congenial to 
pharmaceutical interests and conceptions of value related to productivity.  Paula Gardner has 
studied “prominent consumer depression manuals” in both scientific and popular formats, 
finding that “[d]epression researchers, State policymakers and mental health advocacy groups,” 
                                                           
3 “Postpsychiatry” is not Lewis’s invention. He is indebted to the work of U.K. psychiatrists Patrick Bracken and 
Philip Thomas who coined the term in their 2001 article “Postpsychiatry: A New Direction for Mental Health.”  
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(105) as well as constrained mass media, have contributed to a discourse of confidence in 
depressive etiology that presumes a biological source of emotional distress, and “how 
biotechnical treatments were successfully sold to consumers as an appropriate response” (106).  
Gardner argues that “depression literature and the mass media increasingly report depression 
epidemiological and lab findings in easy-to-digest soundbites that package a range of emotions 
(from sadness, to lack of motivation and hopelessness) as severe disease symptoms of a 
biological depression which, therefore, require a pharmaceutical cure” (124, italics in original), 
thus contributing to the framing of an ideal “citizen-consumer” who constantly monitors the self 
for signs of biological depression and its attendant diminution of productive labor that 
necessitates psychopharmaceutical intervention.  For Gardner, this process creates an “affinity 
between economic and mental health [that] is naturalized by the discourse of neuroscience, 
which, repeated across cultural spheres, appears reasonable and natural to consumers” (125).  
As I discuss in chapter 3, this affinity between economic and mental health is especially 
complex when considerations of gender and race are added to the equation.   
Another useful cultural study of psychiatry analyzing consumer literature is Jonathan 
Metzl’s 2003 book, Prozac on the Couch, which looks at psychiatric marketing and outreach 
campaigns to argue that psychiatry’s putative switch to biopsychiatry has not freed the 
profession from the problematic gender dynamics that provoked feminist criticisms of 
psychoanalysis.  Looking at what he calls “neurochemical subjectivity” (171), Metzl argues that 
revolutionary developments in the understanding of brain chemistry have changed merely the 
treatment platform, but not the underlying logic of psychiatric practice that continues to 
pathologize resistance to heteronormative and patriarchal social conditions.  The biggest clinical 
difference between 1950 and 2000, according to Metzl’s reading of psychiatric advertisements, 
is that the emergence of “neurochemical subjectivity” now mandates pharmaceutical treatment 
instead of talk therapy.  Like Gardner, Metzl also ties these latent, neurochemically significant 
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gender dynamics to the primacy of productivity inherent in industrial capitalism, and, as this 
dissertation will argue, the particularly American fixation with the value of hard work.   
 
Figure 1.2: An early ad for the “major tranquilizer” Thorazine (chlorpromazine) featured a close 
up of a severe looking woman whose facial expression and menopausal body represented 
threats in need of “over-all management” to relieve anxiety and tension.  Source: Procon.org, 
1956. 
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Another cultural study of psychiatry that illuminates the process by which the 
neurochemical self has emerged and spread comes from anthropologist Joseph Dumit.  In his 
ethnography of images Picturing Personhood (2004), Dumit writes of the increasing reliance on 
brain imaging technologies, like MRIs and PET scans, arguing that such visual representations 
of the brain have, through “virtual communities” from medical science, popular culture, personal 
experience, and economics, become internalized as fundamental aspects of identity.  Dumit 
outlines a process he calls “objective self-fashioning” where “objective facts” like brain images 
reconfigure notions of identity around obvious visual differences of different brains.  Though 
brain imaging technology cannot depict neurotransmitters, or specific chemical states, this 
“objective self-fashioning” contributes to broader configurations of “normal” from which the 
biological logic of “depressed” brains draws a distinction.  As Dumit puts it, “[o]bjective-selves 
always pull at issues of normality” (8) since a “normal” brain image set against an image labeled 
as a “depressed brain,” for example, raises a host of contextual and definitional questions 
related to how we choose to view aberration from an average and who or what gets to make 
that distinction.  This dissertation does not directly comment on brain imaging, but Dumit’s 
reading of “objective self-fashioning” and the influence of “virtual communities” on popular 
understandings of the brain’s relationship to “normal” identities highlights the particular 
mechanisms through which neurochemical understandings of the self have grown to 
predominate in the last seventy years.    
Dumit’s invocation of “normality” in his vision of “objective self-fashioning” is important to 
read alongside the work of disability scholar Lennard Davis who has rigorously interrogated the 
concept of normalcy throughout his career, and who offers a compelling reading of the uniquely 
American aspects of the neurochemical self in relation.  In Enforcing Normalcy (1995), Davis 
offers harsh, historical criticism of ableist discourses and seeks to recalibrate understandings of 
disability and the body away from oppressive preconceptions of what is “normal.”  In his more 
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recent work, The End of Normal (2013), Davis expands this argument to discussions of the 
mind, particularly as it applies to depression, mental disability, and acutely American pharmaco-
industrial influences on identity.  In examining what constitutes “normal” emotional states, Davis 
observes the specifically American history of happiness and how American society has 
somewhat illogically linked happiness and normalcy.  Indeed, Davis notes that Thomas 
Jefferson baked this idea into the Declaration of Independence, pointing out that no other 
country in history was founded on the premise of establishing “inalienable rights” to the “pursuit 
of happiness.”4  Such a background contributes to an American ideology that views any feeling 
other than happiness as abnormal, providing the philosophical--and even patriotic--justification 
for efforts to legislate and medicate away different emotional states.  For Davis, this attitude 
participates in a larger process of obscuring forces of structural oppression within tidy narratives 
of medicalization that benefit pharmaceutical industrial interests and pathologizing rational 
responses to depressing social conditions.  Like Metzl and Lewis, Davis locates a critical 
moment in the development of this process as the mid-twentieth century, arguing that 
depression was stripped of its communal sense and attributed to the individual brain when 
“biological explanations associated with the chemical-imbalance theory of depression . . . 
eliminated the Freudian family web and went for the sole proprietorship of the individual brain” 
(47).  This foundational move, established with the imprimatur of scientific, medical authority, 
legitimized the view of neurochemical selfhood that this dissertation takes as its ontological 
grounding and coded previously rational feelings of distress as problems within an individual’s 
neurochemistry that mandated psychopharmaceutical treatment.  In the wake of this mid-
century move, Davis argues that important social questions are abandoned, sacrificed at the 
                                                           
4 Jefferson’s famous phrase also gives philosopher Mark Kingwell the name of his 1998 book, In Pursuit of 
Happiness: Better Living from Plato to Prozac, that seeks to define happiness in relation to a variety of 
philosophical and pharmaceutical forces, including the author’s amateur, off-label experiment taking unprescribed 
Prozac. 
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altar of scientific, medical “progress.”  “Depression is never seen as a consequence of the 
multilayered exigencies of life in the post-war United States” (47) Davis writes, before offering a 
disconcerting litany of statistics regarding social problems in the U.S., concluding, “the point is 
that there is not a lot to be happy about, and deep sadness and distress could well be the 
appropriate response to a world rife with inequality in which powerful forces control the lives of 
many citizens” (48).   
As Davis argues, this pathologization of rational emotional response to a depressing 
social environment draws its scientific, medical authority from biological discourses rooted in 
disease models of mental health and promoted by pharmaceutical forces who have a clear 
financial interest in the treatment that such views mandate.  Davis makes the case that this 
socially and politically fraught debate over the definition of “normal” emotional response 
participates in a longer history of eugenic strategies regarding the “correction of abnormalities in 
the human race” (61).  Citing World Health Organization definitions of depression so broad that 
they include 25 percent of the world’s population, Davis identifies the creation of a “psychosocial 
eugenics” around this biologically justified understanding of a brain’s putative chemical 
responses to distress.  “We are no longer necessarily trying to breed a better human,” Davis 
writes, “but we are trying to enforce through diagnosis and chemical intervention a new, more 
perfect emotional life.  Sadness, sorrow, and pain have little room in that brave new world” (61-
62).5  Drawing from the social model of disability studies, Davis concludes that these 
“psychosocial eugenic” strategies, reliant on a conception of neurochemical selfhood, operate 
as a clear form of oppression and social control, contribute to economic inequality by funneling 
                                                           
5 Betraying his pedigree as a professor of literature, Davis is clearly referencing Aldous Huxley’s dystopian 1932 
novel Brave New World here.  Though that novel predates neurochemical conceptions of selfhood, it does feature 
a fictional proto-psychopharmaceutical called Soma that chemically induces happiness and distracts people from 
social realities.  In an irony that proves especially poignant for this dissertation, Soma is also the trade name for a 
real-world drug, carisoprodol, that, as Davis points out later, is virtually identical to meprobamate, the drug in 
Carter-Wallace’s blockbuster tranquilizer Miltown.    
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resources toward pharmaceutical corporations, and actively disable substantial portions of 
society through the construction of a disease entity around rational sadness.  Putting it 
succinctly, Davis claims, “[t]he medicalization of emotional states . . . is a disabling move” (63).  
One of the variety of strategies employed by this dissertation will be to examine how this 
disabling medicalization of emotional states operates both in around the production of literature 
in post-WWII America.      
In addition to these critical voices from sociology, cultural studies, and disability studies, 
this dissertation leans heavily on the work of pharmaceutical historians to establish the 
particular drug contexts that reveal the neurochemical self in American literature.  One such 
voice belongs to David Herzberg, whose book Happy Pills in America (2009) opens with a clear 
articulation of the neurochemical self’s penetration into American culture by the end of the 
twentieth century.   
The notion that pills could restore selfhood had become commonplace, 
pervading popular as well as medical culture.  Advertisers were not the only ones 
spreading the gospel of neurochemistry, the idea that consciousness and 
selfhood were manifestations of biology, and therefore both knowable and 
controllable.  According to this gospel, brains were like other parts of the body, 
capable of malfunctioning and leaving their owners painfully “not themselves.” (1)   
 
Herzberg’s description of “pills that could restore selfhood” offers a clear expression of the logic 
pressed into popular service over half a century that took the self’s neurochemical nature as the 
basis for radical shifts in psychiatry, definitions of disability, drug prescribing practices, and, I will 
argue, configurations of identity in important works of American literature.  As the title of his 
book suggests, Herzberg is particularly interested in the way these psychopharmaceutical shifts 
altered representations of happiness, especially within the post-WWII period referred to as “the 
wonder-drug era” (198).  Though he is careful to point out that advertisers and other “message-
carriers of the consumer culture had sanctified happiness as a central goal of human striving 
before,” the wonder drug era was significant in that “professional medicine devoted significant 
resources to providing happiness, making its pursuit both more accessible and more obligatory, 
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especially for those who could afford access to doctors” (198).  Highlighting the 
psychopharmaceutical trends that animate chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation, Herzberg 
argues that “[a]s tranquilizers and eventually antidepressants came to be standard 
appurtenances of middle-class life, happiness itself came to be part of a new psychological 
standard of living--a disciplinary marker of status one was obliged to achieve” (198).  In an 
observation on economic privilege and neurochemistry that echoes Gardner and Davis above, 
Herzberg identifies the ways in which “[u]nhappiness in affluent quarters took on some of the 
qualities of an illness, even if it continued to be interpreted as a sensible attitude on the part of 
less fortunate populations” (198).   
 Herzberg also expresses deep reservations about the narratives of dispassionate 
objectivity and progress built around the psychopharmaceutical colonization of happiness in 
American culture.  Highlighting “progressive” technologies that Lennard Davis might define as 
“psychosocial eugenic strategies,” Herzberg writes, “[p]sychiatric medicines are only one of 
many new commercial technologies like genetics, cloning, cosmetic surgery, and prosthetics 
that promise to fix human problems directly by changing who we are” (202).  “Psychiatric 
medicines” in this context act upon “who we are” specifically because selfhood has been 
sufficiently linked to neurochemistry amenable to medication, and thus the neurochemical self 
promises a scientific, quantitative adjustment of identity.  As Herzberg sees it, “these 
technologies seem wondrous because they offer a shortcut through experience, transforming 
people regardless of their social, political, or cultural contexts,” but in actuality “these 
technologies are deeply enmeshed in the very social and economic realities from which they 
promise escape” (202).  Due to powerful commercial and institutional agendas, these promised 
neurochemical transformations do not occur in a contextless vacuum.  According to Herzberg, 
“instead, they create new arenas where economic, political, and cultural struggles take place.  
These struggles do not bring politics to essentially neutral scientific discoveries; they are the 
essence of those discoveries” (203).  Thus, a more complex vision of neurochemical identity 
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emerges here, one that resists easy narratives of “progress” or “neutrality,” and that is 
ineluctably woven into the cultural, industrial, scientific, and commercial interests that contribute 
to the construction of American identity after WWII. 
The critical voices above limn the outlines of the neurochemical self that this dissertation 
will identify and examine within literary works of the post-WWII period.  In chapter 1, the works 
of the Beat poets Jack Kerouac and Allen Ginsberg will be seen to engage with discourses 
related to early industrial pharmaceutical influence on visions of selfhood related to 
amphetamines and their popularity in the years immediately after WWII.  Chapter 2 charts the 
changes enabled by the explosion of minor tranquilizers in the mid 1950s that directly 
contributed to specific visions of neurochemical selfhood in the confessional poetry of Robert 
Lowell and Anne Sexton.  Lastly, this dissertation will examine the vital issues of neurochemical 
identity blossoming in the 1990s, as read through the particularly focused context of the 
depression memoirs of Elizabeth Wurtzel and Meri Nana-Ama Danquah.  These three chapters 
cohere around the theoretical examinations of neurochemical selfhood articulated above and 
literary responses to the evolving discourses they identify.  Though each chapter looks at 
different drugs and different literary genres, read together they confirm an American 
appreciation of selfhood beholden to neurochemistry and the psychopharmaceutical methods by 
which emotional distress has been channeled across the period. 
In order to argue for the importance of understanding the neurochemical self in literary 
production across the latter half of the twentieth century, this dissertation models a 
“pharmacentric” reading practice that prioritizes the role of pharmaceuticals in literary works.  By 
looking first at the function of drugs within and around a variety of texts, the readings offered 
here expose obscured lines of examination, broadening the potential of literary scholarship and 
clearing the space for a distinctly American, thoroughly modern form of literary engagement.  
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Though this pharmacentric method owes some clear historical debts,6 it is largely enabled by 
cultural developments since the end of WWII.  The broad historical influences of this period in 
American history are clear: the successful end of the war in Europe and the Pacific, the jubilant 
return of soldiers from abroad to a radically altered industrial home, the resulting turbo-charged 
consumerist economy, suburban sprawl, and the putative domestic tranquility of a newly 
ascendant global superpower.  It might be easy to paint this post-victory moment in such 
triumphant terms, were it not for the McCarthyist tensions of the Cold War with the USSR, the 
long term physical and psychological damage brought home by American GIs, the violence and 
upheaval involved in the Civil Rights movement, rapidly shifting gender dynamics at home and 
in the workplace, and the blossoming counter-culture movement of bohemian hedonism that 
pushed back against the era’s prevailing ethos of conformity.  To my reading, the discourses of 
psychopharmacology offer a uniquely valuable tool for unlocking the psychological complexities 
of this curiously ambivalent period, a moment in American history of tremendous, victorious 
highs and deep, simmering unrest.   
Firstly, I contend that in their opposing physical effects, stimulants and then sedatives 
provide a useful, bidirectional model for charting the shifting anxieties, priorities, and influences 
of American culture and its literature from the end of WWII to the rise of the counter-culture 
movement of the 1960s.  The stimulants of the era, most significantly the racemic amphetamine 
marketed by Smith, Kline, and French under the trade name Benzedrine, both enacted and 
inspired a type of euphoria, that was often tied to nationalism, productivity, creativity, and 
optimism in the authors and characters that ingested them.  Like most highs though, these 
seemingly beneficial therapeutic boons gave way to the crash of Cold War era paranoia and 
anxiety that sedatives, such as Miltown, America’s first blockbuster psychotropic medication, 
                                                           
6 In his 1968 paper “Plato’s Pharmacy,” Jacques Derrida offers a pharmacentric deconstruction of the pharmakon 
in several of Plato’s works, notably Phaedrus, identifying pharmaceutical-literary connections in some of the oldest 
texts of Western philosophy. 
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sought to alleviate.  Set against the confident, martial image of Benzedrine and its generative 
high, Miltown and its tranquilizing descendants quietly moved billions of pills for pharmaceutical-
industrial interests, proving to be far more economically and culturally powerful than the uppers 
of the 1940s and 1950s, despite their literally unexciting associations with domesticity, 
femininity, and passivity. After the inevitable backlash against such tranquilizers, SSRI 
antidepressants like Prozac emerged in the ensuing decades to treat many of the same 
symptoms as Benzedrine and Miltown, this time under the auspices of treating a disease entity 
called depression.  Across these three drugs and the years of their ascendance, the notion that 
everyday troubles could--and should--be corrected with pharmaceutical interventions took hold, 
ultimately leading to fundamental changes in conceptions of selfhood.  These three signal 
pharmaceutical compounds--amphetamines, tranquilizers, and antidepressants--comprise the 
focus of this dissertation’s analysis of the period, and, in combination, tell a compelling story of 
how Americans viewed themselves and their psychic maladies. 
 In following this story, this dissertation adds a second term to the vocabulary of twentieth 
century American literary studies: “pharmaceutical literacy.”7  As a logical outcome of the trends 
articulated above, American society developed a sophisticated understanding of pharmaceutical 
drugs in the years after WWII that directly impacted how literature was created and how it was 
consumed.  As Americans increasingly viewed themselves and their troubles in relation to brain 
chemicals and the drugs used to treat them, significant shifts in literary expression surfaced, 
capitalizing on new potentialities for symbolism, characterization, and inspiration.  The pill 
became not just an economic or philosophical force, but also a literary tool.  This can be seen 
through expanding marketing and diagnostic methods, and a resulting drug brand awareness 
                                                           
7 “Pharmaceutical Literacy” as I define it here is my own formulation, but the term does exist in medical practice, 
specifically related to interview guidelines for pharmacists.  The recently-developed protocol for Recognizing and 
Addressing Limited PHarmaceutical literacy (RALPH) uses the term to identify patients who might be under-
informed about the appropriate use of medications. 
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wherein formerly obscure compounds are seen to take on a sort of celebrity, obtaining cultural 
importance and an ability to concisely communicate a constellation of ideas around widely 
understood drug effects and drug reputations.   
 Several factors enabled this pharmaceutical literacy to thrive across the latter half of the 
twentieth century, particularly in the U.S.  The most obvious source of the communicative power 
of drugs and their brands during this period is the overwhelming economic success of the 
pharmaceutical industry, a phenomenon that has inspired its own small library of critical 
attention.  Pharmaceutical historians like Andrea Tone, Elizabeth Siegal Watkins, Nicolas 
Rasmussen, Mickey C. Smith, and others, have produced detailed accounts of the rise in 
industry and marketing of pharmaceutical drugs in America in the post-WWII era, and, though 
they frequently examine different individual drugs, agree that the role of pharmaceuticals in the 
daily life of Americans experienced a radical amplification over the period.  These histories 
frequently draw from pharmaceutical marketing and advertising practices,8 exposing the ways in 
which pharmaceutical corporations drove medical-institutional and public perceptions of the role 
of drugs in daily life, creating an environment where American culture, including the writers and 
readers within, could be understood--at least partially--through the language of pharmaceuticals.  
This dissertation takes the trajectories detailed in these pharmaceutical histories and maps 
them onto the intersection of literary production and reception, locating the space for an 
exploration of what I am calling pharmaceutical literacy.   
What follows is a dissertation that tracks the development of the neurochemical self and 
pharmaceutical literacy through fifty years of American literature.  The three chapters to come 
each follow a similar structure.  They begin by offering a brief history of the chapter’s focal 
pharmaceutical with particular attention paid to the social and market forces that established the 
                                                           
8 It should be noted that this advertising is almost uniquely an American phenomenon.  As mentioned in many of 
the above works, as well as C. Lee Ventola’s specific study, Direct-To-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising 
(DTCPA) is only legal in two countries: the U.S. and New Zealand.   
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drug’s research interest.  Within these brief science-histories can be found an evolving sense of 
American anxieties that drove pharmaceutical innovation.  This scientific background leads each 
chapter to a relevant discussion of the critical conversation both around psychopharmaceuticals 
of the time and the production of adjacent literature.  This bespoke synthesis of scientific, 
cultural, and literary criticism exposes the interdependent nature of pharmaceutical and literary 
discourses, and supports this dissertation’s claim that readings of twentieth-century American 
literature are enriched by the application of pharmacentric reading practices and theory.  Each 
chapter then concludes with pharmacentric readings of especially useful texts from that 
chapter’s period, identifying the rise of neurochemical understandings of selfhood in American 
culture and the related function of pharmaceutical literacy. 
The first chapter here analyzes the nascent neurochemical discourse around the 
development and brief cultural relevance of amphetamines, in particular the compound 
marketed as Benzedrine by the early pharmaceutical leader Smith, Kline, and French.  
Benzedrine offered writers and readers in the immediate post-WWII moment a drug that 
promised to deliver relief from daily worries as well as both mental and physical lassitude, 
building a reputation for productivity in an era where flourishing post-war American industry 
drove individuals to view themselves in relation to their own productivity.  After unpacking the 
historical background and cultural context from which Benzedrine emerged, this dissertation’s 
first chapter argues for the importance of these amphetamines to the work of two major writers 
in the Beat movement: Jack Kerouac and Allen Ginsberg.  Looking at their use of Benzedrine, 
both in their lives and within their works, this chapter finds a previously unexamined vision of 
neurochemical selfhood in Kerouac’s personal life, his prose style, his fictional-autobiography 
Visions of Cody (1972), and his seminal novel On The Road (1957).  Set against the 
Benzedrine-fueled amplitude of his Beat comrade, Allen Ginsberg offers this reading a valuable 
inverse, producing poetry indebted to similar chemical stimulants, but employing 
pharmaceutically literate techniques to explore the “angry fix” of despair in coming down.  In his 
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most famous poem, “Howl” (1956), as well as quite possibly his best poem, “Kaddish” (1961), 
Ginsberg produced a sort of amphetiminic poetics that relied on stimulants for composition, and 
required a pharmaceutically literate readership to fully appreciate.  Reading Kerouac and 
Ginsberg together, this dissertation’s first chapter draws on emerging neurochemical ontologies 
and pharmaceutically literate techniques to support a new and vital way to read these 
established texts. 
 24 
 
Figure 1.3: Though they most directly influenced American literature by way of Beat writers, 
amphetamines like Smith, Kline and French’s Benzedrine first entered the American mainstream 
pharmacopeia via wide-spread use in the armed forces during WWII. Source: JAMA, 1943. 
 
The second chapter here follows the transition in American pharmaceutical interest in 
the 1950s toward a new class of drugs: tranquilizers.  As amphetamines like Benzedrine 
receded into the cultural background, saddled with a reputation for addiction and enmeshed in a 
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legal battle to confine them to prescription-only status, tranquilizers materialized as a compelling 
alternative for Americans seeking to mitigate feelings of daily despair in the “age of anxiety.”  
Lead by Carter-Wallace’s flagship drug, Miltown, tranquilizers brought chemical treatment of 
anxious mental states to the mainstream of 1950s America, driving unprecedented 
pharmaceutical sales and penetrating deep into popular culture.   Miltown became the first 
“blockbuster” psychotropic drug, and, as this second chapter argues, helped establish 
pharmaceuticals as a vital component of how Americans sought to navigate issues of identity.  
Miltown flourished, at least in part, because Americans grew increasingly comfortable with the 
idea that some portion of who they were resided in chemical reactions in the brain that could be 
manipulated via pharmaceutical intervention.  Better living through pills became a thriving 
ideology during this period, and the poetry created by the era’s “confessional poets” drew 
directly from this phenomenon.  Chapter 2 looks at two such poets, Robert Lowell and Anne 
Sexton, arguing that a pharmacentric reading of their poetry exposes the impact of these 
neurochemically significant forces on identity in the period’s literature, and examines the ways 
that pharmaceutical literacy enabled these poets to communicate these neurochemical 
expressions of selfhood to their readers.   
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Figure 1.4: This image of an anxious man’s head as a computer punch card positioned Miltown as a 
solution for men feeling career pressures in a technological age.  This visualization of man as machine 
presages many of the mechanistic metaphors of psychopharmacological discourses that would emerge in 
the decades to come.  Source: JAMA, 1967. 
 
The final chapter here looks at the pharmaceutical heir to the tranquilizer’s throne: the 
antidepressant.  Though they were initially met with rapturous praise and commensurate sales, 
tranquilizers eventually succumbed to the inevitable backlash regarding fears of addiction and 
side effects that pharmacological historian Mickey C. Smith suggests catch up to all “wonder 
drugs” eventually.  By the late 1980s, tranquilizers relinquished their dominance over American 
psychic states, yielding to the emergence of Prozac and other SSRI antidepressants which, like 
the blockbusters before them, rode the promotional promise of new pharmaceutical control over 
the self to enormous financial success.  Marketed alongside a tidy narrative of scientifically 
engineered, neurochemical specificity and a disease-modeled etiology of “chemical imbalances” 
in the brain, SSRIs became the dominant psychopharmaceuticals of the 1990s, driving twelve-
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digit revenues for pharmaceutical corporations and attaining the kind of brand name recognition 
typically associated with mainstream consumer goods like shoes or soda.  The era of the 
antidepressant left no doubt that a significant portion of America viewed the brain and its 
chemicals as the source of the self that medications could, and indeed should, alter to alleviate 
“abnormal” emotions.  Chapter 3 traces the result of this view through a peculiar micro-genre of 
American literature: the depression memoir of the 1990s.  Responding to a pharmaceutically 
literate reading audience, a number of interesting writers in the decade wrote of their depression 
and pharmaceutical experiences, capitalizing on interest in this specific neurochemical cultural 
moment and offering clear literary expressions of a neurochemical selfhood.  Chapter 3 
conducts pharmacentric readings of two such works, Elizabeth Wurtzel’s 1994 bestseller Prozac 
Nation and Meri Nana-Ama Danquah’s 1998 memoir Willow Weep for Me, finding in these 
books a reliance on pharmaceutical literary techniques and an underlying understanding of 
identity indebted to popular discourses of neurochemistry.  Though part of the advertised appeal 
of SSRIs was their putative neutrality, their ability to alleviate emotional distress at a molecular 
level that ignores gender, race, disability, or class, the third chapter here concludes by exposing 
how neurochemical identity fails to break free from these existing mechanisms of oppression 
and ultimately serves to reimpose existing social structures under the auspices of a seemingly 
dispassionate scientism. 
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Figure 1.5: Though they seem to promise a disinterested, objective chemical intervention into 
emotional distress, drugs like the Prozac advertised here reinscribed many existing structures of 
oppression.  The smiling professional woman here, whose “compliance” appeals to her 
prescribing psychiatrist, embodies the “hyperthymic” traits of productivity and happiness SSRIs 
were imagined to deliver. Source: American Journal of Psychiatry, 1995. 
 
These three chapters together illustrate the value of pharmacentric reading practices to 
post-WWII American literature, and unearth understandings of American identity that have not 
been adequately examined in literary studies.  The existing critical work around identity has 
made great strides in unpacking discourses of race, gender, class, and disability in this period’s 
literature, and to these thriving conversations this dissertation adds the complexities of 
neurochemical selfhood.  Read through the evolving popularities of twentieth-century wonder 
drugs and literary works produced contemporaneously, neurochemical selfhood exposes much 
more than an easy narrative of scientific progress and a solution to ontological uncertainty.  
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Instead, examining the discourses of neurochemical selfhood illuminates the complex web of 
cultural, industrial, scientific, medical, and political forces that compete for primacy in the 
determination American identity, and the language used to express it.  Paired with a rigorous 
examination of pharmaceutical literacy, this dissertation offers a new and important technique 
for tracing and understanding these debates and identifying how they function within literary 
texts.  This process ultimately raises a crucial ontological question for the study of post-WWII 
American literature: how do we know who we are?  The following chapters coalesce to articulate 
a potential path to an answer, and this dissertation’s pharmacentric imperative: consider the pill.  
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Chapter 1 - The Benzedrine Beat: Jack Kerouac, Allen Ginsberg, and the Literature of 
Amphetamines 
 
  
“I stopped talking, embarrassed again, but then had to laugh, feeling freer than I ever could 
remember, less afraid each moment, but unable to control the push of a million thoughts, all of 
which seemed so terribly necessary to communicate at once.”  
 -Carolyn Cassady (Rasmussen 97) 
  
 Carolyn Cassady’s recollection of her first experience with Benzedrine in 1947, what her 
future husband Neal Cassady and friend Allen Ginsberg advertised to her as “eight hours of 
transporting delights” (Rasmussen 96), displays many of the hallmark traits of amphetamine 
intoxication: manic speech, feelings of freedom and fearlessness, and an urgency to sort and 
communicate “the push of a million thoughts.”  These feelings, as well as the traits of the 
savage come down to follow, would in many ways define important aspects of the immediate 
post-war period’s cultural and literary production.  As these drugs surged in popularity across 
the middle of the twentieth century, they delivered this harried urgency to a variety of poets and 
authors, inspiring and shaping a particular literary style. They also affected the soldiers, 
students, homemakers, dieters, musicians, and working men and women whose knowledge of--
and attitudes toward--pharmaceutical drugs would shape the course of identity formation in the 
Cold War era.  
 Among the many Americans who regularly turned to stimulants like Benzedrine after 
WWII were a group of young, bohemian artists and writers in New York who would eventually 
be called the “Beat generation.”  Like any label of literary classification, the “Beat generation” is 
necessarily inexact, and scholars have long debated exactly which writers, and precisely what 
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aesthetic characteristics, comprise the term,1 but there can be no doubt that two of the primary 
figures in any Beat definition must be Jack Kerouac and Allen Ginsberg.  These two men, more 
than anyone else,2 came to represent the Beat generation, and this chapter begins by locating a 
historical and pharmaceutical-industrial context for their works and lives in the decade and a half 
after WWII.  Tracing Kerouac and Ginsberg’s personal, stylistic, and thematic engagement with 
stimulants like Benzedrine, I then develop a pharmacentric reading of their work: a reading that 
foregrounds the influence of pharmaceuticals on their writing, from composition to reception.  By 
applying such a reading practice, I argue that uppers play a vital role in how we should 
understand these texts, the culture they were written in, and the audience who read them.   
In the works of Jack Kerouac, I suggest that stimulants, primarily the popular 
amphetamine marketed under the trade name Benzedrine, contributed to the particular--and 
particularly American--conception of the self-made man operating in Kerouac’s semi-
autobiographical texts, as well as his own literary persona.  Moreover, I argue for Benzedrine’s 
importance to Kerouac’s sense of comradery in Beat social life, its generative effect on his 
prose style, and its contribution to his impromptu compositional ethos.  Despite the seemingly 
beneficial relationship implied by these claims, by the time Kerouac was established as a literary 
celebrity, he rejected his association with Benzedrine.  Ultimately, I argue that this rejection 
reflects a discomfort driven by Kerouac’s perception of the increased public knowledge of drugs 
and their effects after WWII, a phenomenon I have called “pharmaceutical literacy.”   
This increase in pharmaceutical literacy can also be tracked in the contemporaneous 
work of Allen Ginsberg, whose poetry I read pharmacentrically as a sort of poetry of the come 
                                                           
1 For representative discussions, see William Lawler’s “Were Jack Kerouac, Allen Ginsberg, and William S. 
Burroughs a Generation?”, or Regina Weinreich’s “Locating a Beat Aesthetic”.   
2 Certainly an argument could be made here for looking at the work of William S. Burroughs as he was the most 
notoriously drug-drenched writer affiliated with the Beat generation.  While Burroughs certainly used Benzedrine 
to excess, I would argue that his greater chemical influences were drawn from illegal street drugs, like the heroin 
that animates Junkie (1953), or from the fantastical, like the horrifying “black meat” in Naked Lunch (1959).    
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down.  Within this reading I will demonstrate the importance of stimulants to Ginsberg’s own 
literary project, as well as map its intersection with larger cultural discussions regarding mental 
health, its treatment, and an inchoate tension between older metaphysical conceptions of the 
self and an emerging, scientific conception I call “the neurochemical self.”  Exploring the 
presence of stimulants in Ginsberg’s life and work exposes the prevalence, and complexities, of 
this new and significant departure from previous conceptions of identity. This particular vision of 
the self as neurochemically based would rise to prominence in tandem with pharmaceutical 
uppers in the wake of WWII, but would far outlast the popularity of those stimulants to which I 
link its initial ascent.     
In reading Jack Kerouac and Allen Ginsberg together against this backdrop of 
stimulants, increased pharmaceutical literacy, and the blossoming of neurochemical selfhood, I 
argue that a thorough understanding of post-WWII American literature must account for the 
prominence of pharmacology in the culture of the period.  To ignore the presence of 
pharmaceuticals in the lives and works of these authors is to overlook a fascinating and 
important story of the shifting identity of post-war America--a story that begins by getting high on 
amphetamines.   
 
Benzedrine Rises 
 
 Drugs have shaped the era of their popularity for a long time, but amphetamines in 
particular were a rather recent historical development.  Unlike say opium or cocaine, which are 
derived from naturally occurring plants and have been used in some form for centuries, 
amphetamines are entirely artificial and must be synthesized in a lab.  The first amphetamine 
was synthesized by the Romanian Chemist Lazăr Edeleanu in 1887 at the University of Berlin,3 
                                                           
3 Edeleanu’s discovery of amphetamines is not even his biggest contribution to the field of chemistry as he later 
developed the “Edeleanu Method” for refining crude oil, which remains the fundamental process for high quality 
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though its pharmacological significance would lay dormant for several decades.  The early years 
of the twentieth century saw another drug, ephedrine, emerge as a profitable treatment for a 
range of ailments including asthma, colds, and allergies, and by the late 1920s drug makers like 
Merck and Eli Lilly were collecting a tidy profit from its sale.  Looking for an easily synthesized 
competitor to ephedrine, Los Angeles chemist Gordon Alles tested Edeleanu’s amphetaminic 
compound on himself and saw its potential for medical application as well as noting the “feeling 
of well being” (qtd. in Kamienski 104) he experienced.4  Alles obtained several patents in 1932 
for the discovery and medicinal application of amphetamine sulfate and amphetamine 
hydrochloride and approached Philadelphia’s Smith, Kline, and French (SKF) about a 
partnership.  SKF already produced the Benzedrine inhaler, an amphetamine product also 
patented in 1932, and with the addition of Alles and his patents, SKF had cornered the incipient 
amphetamine market.   
 By 1937 SKF controlled the two central formulations of what would become the world’s 
first prescription psychoactive drug in their own Benzedrine inhaler and Alles’s newly-christened 
“Benzedrine Sulfate” pills.  SKF marketed Benzedrine as a useful cure-all medication, and it was 
eventually used to treat “almost 40 afflictions, such as schizophrenia, low blood pressure, 
narcolepsy, epilepsy, Parkinson’s disease, seasickness, obesity, chronic hiccups, and 
dependence on morphine and caffeine” (Kamienski 104-105).  As Benzedrine’s popularity in the 
medical community spiked, so too did hostilities in Europe, and it was hard not to notice the 
drug’s ancillary effects of energizing the body, enhancing focus, and staving off sleep: all traits 
that would be helpful to soldiers at war.   
                                                           
oil production to this day.  Though the legacies of amphetamines and refined fossil fuels are questionable, 
Edeleanu’s legacy as a chemist is emphatically not.   
4 Like many wildly successful medical researchers, Alles benefited from a massive dose of good luck.  Alles 
“discovered” amphetamines independently, unaware of either Edeleanu’s work or Japanese chemist Akira Ogata’s 
synthesis of methamphetamines in 1919.  Alles’s unique contribution was to immediately apprehend the medicinal 
and marketing potential of the drug and obtain its patents, to his enormous profit.   
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Despite their public opposition to the use of drugs (Rauschgifte), the Nazis were the first 
to embrace this idea,5 giving Wehrmacht soldiers and Luftwaffe pilots nearly unfettered access 
to Pervitin, a methamphetamine cousin of Benzedrine produced by Berlin’s Temmler Werke. In 
his recent book on the subject, Blitzed: Drugs in the Third Reich (2017), German writer Norman 
Ohler points out that in the spring of 1940, 35 million tablets of Pervitin were sent to the Western 
campaign, contending that methamphetamine abuse was common, not just among soldiers on 
the ground, but throughout everyday German society at home, and all the way up the Nazi 
military high command.  Theodor Morell, Adolf Hitler’s most trusted physician, would routinely 
inject the famously hypochondriac Führer with a cocktail of drugs, amphetamines among them, 
perhaps contributing to the Nazi leader’s unhinged mania.6  On the other side of the war, Allied 
soldiers, especially RAF and U.S. pilots, regularly used SKF’s Benzedrine Sulfate pills--
”bennies” to U.S. servicemen--to stay alert. Some estimates suggest as many as half a billion 
pills were purchased by the U.S. military during the war, and one military hospital investigation 
reported that “89 percent [of patients] had regularly taken [Benzedrine] during their tour of duty” 
(Kamienski 122).    
The widespread use of amphetamines on both sides of WWII had several effects on 
Benzedrine’s position in post-war literature, and U.S. culture more broadly.  Firstly, 
amphetamines were both introduced and normalized to an enormous population of soldiers who 
would bring their pharmacological attitudes back to life at home.  A soldier who had regularly 
                                                           
5 Though not the last by any means: widespread recent reporting has suggested that ISIS fighters in Syria abuse the 
stimulant Captagon for similar reasons.  Captagon is a codrug of amphetamine and theophylline, a stimulant one 
branch over on the xanthine family tree from caffeine, though its energizing effects are mere tremors compared to 
the CNS-rattling effects of methamphetamines like Pervitin. 
6 Ohler’s book has been rightly criticized for overemphasizing the role of methamphetamines in Nazi decision 
making, abdicating some measure of moral responsibility for Nazi atrocities onto the chemicals Nazis ingested.   
While Ohler does not do enough to address this important critique, his book does an excellent job of proving the 
prevalence of methamphetamines in Nazi culture.  It is important to note that while the drugs don’t absolve the 
Nazis of their actions, they would shape the recollections and post-war identity formations of those who used 
these drugs as well as the soldiers who fought against them. 
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used Benzedrine in combat would be familiar with the variety of beneficial effects the drug had 
on productivity, energy, and mood.  Furthermore, the many soldiers who returned home with 
combat-related anxieties, what psychologists now call PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder), 
could probably recall the “feeling of well-being” Gordon Alles initially described while on 
amphetamines.  These men could have turned to Benzedrine as a sort of proto-antidepressant: 
a medical indication encouraged by SKF as far back as 1937 when it sent mailings to some 
90,000 AMA physicians, claiming that “the main field of Benzedrine Sulfate will be its use in 
improving mood” (Hicks).  The war also altered the industrial landscape of U.S. manufacturing, 
radically expanding the production capacity of many industries, including U.S. pharmaceutical 
companies.  After ramping up production to meet the demands of the armed forces and their 
need for half a billion doses of Benzedrine, a company like Smith, Kline, and French would need 
to expand its post-war marketing and diagnostic practices if it were to keep up its new and 
expensively developed production capacity.   
Thus the compound that boosted focus and lifted morale in the foxholes of WWII, found 
itself after the war being advertised to all sectors of U.S. society in ways that differed greatly 
from the drug’s bellicose history.  A relevant advertising image from 1944 shows how SKF tried 
to bridge the gap between combat aid and everyday pick-me-up.   
 36 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Benzedrine’s advertising images sought to establish affiliations among various forms 
of American productivity.  Source: College of Physicians of Philadelphia, 1944. 
 
The image shows a large Benzedrine inhaler laying open in the foreground, flanked by four 
vaguely abstracted figures holding inhalers to their noses.  The erect postures of the figures, as 
well as their jaunty poses mid-stride, evoke the “pep” American patients often reported in 
amphetamine’s early clinical trials,7 as well as those of Benzedrine.8  Though the figures are 
abstracted, there is no mistaking the variety of social positions SKF intends to link in the ad.  In 
the lower left, a working man in overalls carries a lunch pail in front of a brick wall.  Above him a 
                                                           
7 As Nicolas Rasmussen observes in On Speed: The Many Lives of Amphetamines (2008), one could easily predict 
the national origin of a trial patient based on which aspect of the amphetamine high the respondent focused on.  
In the U.S., patients recounted enhancements to drive and motor activity--“pep” and “energy” were the common 
words--whereas in the less career-focused U.K., patients focused on talkativeness and confidence.  In the 
industrious culture of 1930s Germany, amphetamine ads promised the experience of “joy in work” (88).  Though it 
is a commonplace observation in sociology, it is important to note that we can start to understand a culture not 
just by the popularity of a drug at a certain time, but also by which aspect of that drug’s action is seen as primary, 
and which aspects are relegated to “side effects.”   
8 A representative survey of Benzedrine’s earliest clinical trials appeared in the pages of the Post-Graduate Medical 
Journal in August, 1946, indicating research on the drug’s effect related to 39 different indications, though some, 
like “Malingering” and “Problem Children” would be unlikely to conform to today’s research protocols.  
Troublingly, the clinical trial review concludes by dismissing concerns regarding Benzedrine’s addictive properties 
by blaming certain patients, quoting a report that “[d]espite popular fears, addiction is very rare and only occurs in 
the severe psychopath who would have probably become addicted to some drug or other anyway” (217).   
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soldier walks along a partial city skyline, his only visual detail, a sergeant's three-chevron rank 
insignia at his shoulder.  To the right of the image’s focal Benzedrine inhaler walks a well-
dressed woman carrying a handbag in front of a row of flowers.  The intended effect on the 
viewer is clear: everyone is taking Benzedrine.  This is not simply a drug for soldiers or the sick.  
Working men and domestic women can benefit too.  Many ads from the period sought to 
broaden Benzedrine’s market appeal beyond its martial image, some featuring a smiling child 
holding an inhaler to her cherubic nose (“For Children and Adults”!) or a menopausal woman 
standing at a set-table, grinning maniacally into her flower arrangement.   
 
Figure 2.2: Mid-century Benzedrine advertisements worked to extend the appeal of 
amphetamines, positioning the drug as a useful cure for childhood colds (left) or menopausal 
symptoms (right), among a variety of other indications.  Source: Peter Watts, twitter (left), 
Psychosomatic Medicine, 1946 (right).  
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That a pharmaceutical company would want to broaden its product’s market appeal is no 
surprise, and Benzedrine’s advertisements targeting domestic women were one obvious sign 
that SKF was looking to expand beyond the masculine, military associations the drug carried 
back from its tours of duty in WWII.  Building upon Benzedrine’s established reputation for 
combating fatigue, advertisers conceived of a new type of “tiredness,” not the “result of 
overexertion,” for which the only prescription was rest, but “psychogenic tiredness--the result of 
overworry, of monotonous routine, or frustrating circumstance” (“Tired”).9  The “monotonous 
routine” and “frustrating circumstance” of domestic tedium opened up a brand new, distaff 
market for amphetamine sales.  The dull repression of bored housewives now had a cure.  In 
inventing “psychogenic tiredness,” SKF marketers had essentially pathologized resistance to 
homemaking, and submitted Benzedrine as its solution.  The unspoken logic driving this 
marketing approach was that the domestic woman’s role in the home was natural and normal, 
and that restless feelings otherwise were abnormal indications of dysfunction that should be 
medicated away.  This logic of 1950s domesticity underpins some of the psychic conflict women 
experienced in the Cold War era, but drugs could not cure the root inequality of that conflict, and 
so were positioned to dull or erase the resulting symptoms instead.10   
                                                           
9 Though this dissertation assesses the institutional rise of post-war psychology and psychiatry more directly in the 
next chapter, it should be noted here that the language employed in “psychogenic tiredness” clearly trades on the 
newfound authority offered by the psychiatric discourses competing for control of American emotional states.  In 
her 1980 book, How Sex Changed, theorist Joanne Meyerowitz identifies the National Mental Health Act of 1946 
which established the National Institute of Mental Health as a key moment in psychiatry’s ascent to “new levels of 
prominence and cultural authority” (105) in the U.S.  The story of the NIMH as it relates to psychopharmaceuticals 
is complex, in that its earliest forms, according to Meyerowitz, defended environmental theories of mental health, 
such as those conceiving of transsexuality as a mental illness resulting from childhood trauma, only to switch to 
biological, neurochemical theories of mental health later in the century, as discussed in chapter 3.   
10 In his work on the history of amphetamines, Nicolas Rasmussen has identified several vectors for this 
psychopharmaceutical intervention into the psychic conflicts of 1950s domestic women.  One clear trend 
articulated in the data Rasmussen looks at is the role of amphetamine-based diet pills which were almost 
exclusively prescribed to women, and clearly engaged in the process of using drug discourses to discipline female 
bodies (see also the debate among Jonathan Metzl, Jacqueline Zita, and Blum and Stracuzzi discussed in Chapter 
3).  Even removing the influence of diet pills and that women were more likely to seek medical treatment than 
men, Rasmussen points out that by the end of the 1950s, “a woman was twice as likely as a man to receive an 
amphetamine prescription to adjust her mental state” (977).    
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To runaway success it should be noted.  Amphetamine use after the war among both 
men and women grew dramatically.  SKF’s marketing prowess and savvy understanding of 
Benzedrine’s variety of beneficial effects established real demand for amphetamines among a 
wide segment of the population.  Amphetamines hit the mainstream.  Not just the drug of Nazi 
soldiers and U.S. GIs, and no longer consigned to the cultural fringes of jazz-playing hipsters,11 
amphetamines became embedded into the fabric of workaday 1950s America.  “Housewives, 
truck drivers, students, and professionals used amphetamines and methamphetamine to 
promote wakefulness, improve mood or attention, and lose weight” (Vearrier et al 41).  This 
widespread acceptance of amphetamine use, particularly for applications relating to mood and 
attention, marked a significant change in how the culture viewed medications.  Medications no 
longer required an illness to treat; unpleasant everyday feelings were now the purview of 
pharmaceutical intervention.  Tiredness, “psychogenic” or not, went from the expected result of 
a hard day’s work, to a symptom in need of medicating.   Distraction became evidence of 
dysfunction.  Feelings of boredom, restlessness, or frustration became treatable.  Industrial and 
cultural forces converged to offer pharmacological solutions to everyday problems.  The life 
problems of the working man, returning soldier, or homemaker are not systemic, spiritual, or 
philosophical, these drugs seemed to say, they are chemical.   
Thus the pharmacological era was born.  No longer anchored to illness and the sick, 
drugs could--and should--be used to treat the healthy.  This shift, inaugurated in the post-war 
period, and due in no small part to attitudes toward amphetamines like Benzedrine, would have 
                                                           
11 Charlie “Bird” Parker and John “Dizzy” Gillespie, the twin titans of Jazz’s fast-and-free 1940s variant, “bebop,” 
pioneered the use of amphetamines (and other drugs including heroin, cocaine, and marijuana) in their search for 
new, creative expression.  Parker in particular used such massive quantities of Benzedrine inhalers that “after a 
night of playing, the floor around him would sometimes be covered by so many white plastic empties that it looked 
like snow” (Rasmussen 92).   
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monumental effects on the pharmaceutical industry and the global economy more broadly,12 
cultural and artistic production, and the fundamental vision of the self as chemically malleable 
that would obtain over the latter half of the twentieth century. 
Benny for your Thoughts 
 
“I got so high, with her, on Benzedrine . . . that I didn’t know where I was.”  
 -Jack Kerouac, Visions of Cody (229) 1952 
 
 Benzedrine’s ascent from minor cold remedy to partial exemplar of an era, coincided 
with the growth of the literary development with which it is most closely associated: the Beat 
movement.  Originally composed of a small coterie of Bohemians living in Manhattan after 
WWII, the Beats are now safely ensconced in the U.S. literary canon, frequently cited as the 
twentieth century’s artistic connective tissue between the end of modernism and the start of 
hippie counter-culturalism.  Allen Ginsberg’s poem “Howl” (1956) is a fixture on American 
Literature course syllabi. Jack Kerouac’s novel, On The Road (1957), routinely makes “top 100 
Novels” lists in mainstream publications from the Modern Library to Time Magazine.  Today’s 
mainstream appreciation of the Beats would have come as a surprise to the post-war 
establishment who greeted the Beats’ work with derision and accusation.  For staid academics 
and political conservatives in the 1950s, the Beats were emblematic of the threats to social 
order many believed were lurking in the margins of society.  After all, the Beats often wrote with 
passion about subjects considered taboo in Eisenhower America: petty crime, prostitution, drug 
use.  “Howl” was famously targeted by an obscenity trial in 1957, and William Burroughs’ Naked 
Lunch (1959) was prosecuted on similar grounds in 1965.  At the 1960 Republican National 
                                                           
12 For a more detailed reading on the use of drugs to treat health, and the resulting effects on the healthcare 
industry, see Joseph Dumit’s Drugs for Life: How Pharmaceutical Companies Define Our Health (2012).   
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Convention, FBI director and ambulatory avatar of 1950s paranoia and repression, J. Edgar 
Hoover, identified “Beatniks” as one of three menaces to American society.13  Early critics from 
more literary backgrounds were particularly harsh.  In a 1960 Saturday Review article 
provocatively titled “Epitaph for the Dead Beats,” John Ciardi wrote “that what offered itself as 
intellectual refreshment has turned out to be little more than unwashed eccentricity” (11).  Ciardi 
detested the improvisational, in-the-moment ethos of Beat literature, “this insistence on the 
holiness of the impromptu” (13), derisively singling out Jack Kerouac as “a high school athlete 
who went from Lowell, Massachusetts, to Skid Row, losing his eraser en route” (13).  Other 
critics decried the chemical and sexual decadence of the Beat generation, their mangling of 
Eastern philosophy, or their youth.14  These reservations among mid-century literary 
gatekeepers, the august New Critics and New York Intellectuals who sometimes viewed the 
transgressive literature of the Beat generation as a threat to the ideals of the liberal consensus 
of American democracy, would remain long after the movement’s zenith, as seen in Kerouac’s 
1969, New York Times obituary: “Mr. Kerouac’s admirers regarded him as a major literary 
innovator and something of a religious seer, but this estimate of his achievement never gained 
wide acceptance among literary tastemakers” (Lelyveld).   
 Like many literary movements before them, the Beats were initially regarded with 
suspicion by established social and cultural forces before eventually being embraced by the 
intellectual and academic communities that shape literary history.  The Beat movement and its 
various authors have been the subject of numerous literary histories and critical analyses in the 
                                                           
13 The other two: “eggheads” and communism (Watson 260).  One wonders if Hoover recognized the irony of 
vilifying the Beats (the distinction between “Beats” and “beatniks” was surely inconsequential to him) and 
“eggheads” together, since many Beat writers, particularly in the late 1950s, were themselves so critical of the 
academic establishment, and vice versa.   
14 Diana Trilling, wife of Lionel Trilling, the eminent literary critic and Columbia professor of several Beat 
luminaries, notably Allen Ginsberg and Lucien Carr, dismissively described the Beats and their followers as 
“children in a progressive kindergarten” (qtd. in Kirsch 120). 
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years since Kerouac’s obituary.  The New York Times was perhaps a bit premature in its 
proclamation regarding the Beat legacy among “literary tastemakers.”  Recent studies by Erik 
Mortenson, Regina Weinreich, Ronna C. Johnson, Polina Mackay, A. Robert Lee, Todd F. 
Tietchen and others, have offered useful readings of Beat literature, placing Beat poetics and 
aesthetics within important critical conversations regarding gender, sexuality, race, and 
transnational identities.  While many of these discuss the impact of drugs generally, and 
amphetamines like Benzedrine specifically, on the production and reception of Beat literature, 
none connect the neurochemical sense of self that emerges from the middle of the century to a 
pharmacentric reading of the period’s literature.  Such a reading not only fills an important gap 
in existing scholarship but also provides a new, chemical context for the post-war period’s spin 
on self-fashioning, the theme that many have argued is central to American literature more 
broadly.  The artists and writers of the late 1940s and 1950s reconfigured this resolutely 
American ideal of the self-made man for the pharmacological era, and few did so more 
thoroughly than the man who christened the Beats, Jack Kerouac.      
 Kerouac’s personal history with Benzedrine is particularly instructive, given its overlarge 
influence on the self-fashioning at work in both the production and reception on his oeuvre.  
According to biographer Gerald Nicosia, Kerouac probably first tried Benzedrine during his 
explorations of the Harlem jazz scene while still attending Horace Mann Academy in 1940, but 
his exposure to heavy-duty Benzedrine abuse came a bit later.  In 1945, at the 115th St., New 
York apartment that became the epicenter of early Beat social life, Kerouac met Vicki Russell, 
“a towering hooker and member of the Joan Vollmer ‘commune’” (Dittman 24),15 who taught the 
young writer how to crack open a Benzedrine inhaler to get at the amphetamine soaked 
accordion strip of paper inside.  By soaking the paper strip in coffee, or just swallowing it whole, 
                                                           
15 Vollmer herself had a catastrophic Benzedrine habit.  By the time of her death she was rumored to be downing 
as many as three Benzedrine inhalers a day and taking Benzedrine pills in between.   
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a person could get a massive dose of amphetamine,16 delivering a rabid high that would forever 
alter Kerouac’s life, and the trajectory of the particular literary style and culture with which he 
became so strongly associated.  As biographer Michael Dittman put it, “[a]lthough Jack always 
had a large experimental appetite for drugs, legal and illegal, he took to Benzedrine like no 
other” (24).  Kerouac immediately embraced the surging energy of the Benzedrine high as well 
as a sense of community and fellow-feeling inspired by the drug.  Recalling that day spent with 
Russell and William Burroughs, on his first massive Benzedrine high, Kerouac writes in his 
fictional-autobiographical novel Visions of Cody (1972):  
I got so high with her on Benzedrine that I didn’t know where I was, and I said 
‘Are we in St. Petersburg, Russia?’ . . . She says: ‘You’re buzzing, ba-by!’ We get 
in the [subway] train . . . and we’re all standing, holding onto the straps, talking 
and you know we are all buzzing and she’s explaining to us what it is to be high 
and all the time we are digging everybody in the car, with all those bright lights, 
and she’s telling us how to dig them. (qtd. in Rasmussen 94) 
 
It is hard to ignore the similarities between Kerouac’s account of the Benzedrine high here and 
Carolyn Cassady’s recollection, with both emphasizing the drug’s loquacious effect on them. 
Kerouac’s surfeit of parallel verbs, “buzzing,” “talking,” “buzzing” again, “explaining,” “digging,” 
“telling,” reinforce, in both content and form, the extreme talkative nature of the amphetamine 
high that would become a hallmark of Kerouac’s style.   
Moreover, the camaraderie of friends exploring “what it is to be high,” and “how to dig” 
“everybody in the [subway] car” offers a glimpse into an alternative sense of community that 
brought together the marginal outcasts that Kerouac would later call the “Beat generation.”  In 
his book, Guys Like Us (2004), theorist Michael Davidson looks at masculinity in Cold War 
poetics, and the Beats in particular, and finds a “compulsory homosociality” (16) that governed 
                                                           
16 A single pill of SKF’s Benzedrine Sulfate contained 5mg of amphetamine.  By 1945, the oily strip in the 
Benzedrine inhaler contained 250 mg of amphetamine (down from 325 mg in the 1930s)--fifty times more potent 
than a single pill.  Consuming the entire strip’s dose, as was common practice for the Beats and affiliated jazz 
musicians, amounted to swallowing an entire bottle of Benzedrine pills.    
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many of the complex interactions among their artistic and social lives.17  Davidson points out 
that despite the presence of numerous homosexuals in Kerouac’s milieu, the dominant “social 
semiotic was based on a heterosexual model of heavy drinking, hard living, fast cars, sports, 
and sexual excess” (16).  We might focus Davidson’s “hard living” here to refer to the drug use 
that was such a central component of the Beat social environment.  Kerouac’s memorable 
Benzedrine experience on the subway would seem to sanction this extension of Davidson’s 
social semiotic reading, since Burroughs and Kerouac encountered Russell on an errand to 
score drugs (Burroughs, remembered as “Bull” in Visions of Cody, was looking to cop heroin in 
Times Square), and Kerouac would go on to pursue some serious “sexual excess,” “spending 
twenty-four passionate hours in bed with Russell” (Rasmussen 95).   
Benzedrine’s utility in building fraternal bonds among the Beat community made its way 
into the fiction in other ways as well.  In a notable moment from On the Road, Kerouac’s fictional 
alter-ego, Sal Paradise, arrives in Denver to find his friends, Dean Moriarty and Carlo Marx, 
characters based on Neal Cassady and Allen Ginsberg respectively, engaging in marathon 
dialogues, attempting to communicate on a deeper, more authentic level than conventional 
homosocial bonding.  Marx tells the narrator that he and Moriarty “are embarked on a 
tremendous season together.  We’re trying to communicate with absolute honesty and 
completeness everything on our minds.  We’ve had to take Benzedrine” (41).  Marx’s comment 
here reads like a mission statement for Kerouac’s Beat project more broadly: to facilitate a 
deeper human connection, to communicate purely and honestly, one has to take Benzedrine.  
The phrasing of “had to take Benzedrine” is particularly interesting, given the charge of honest 
communication at issue.  Marx’s diction suggests that he and Moriarty had no alternative to 
                                                           
17 Davidson’s term here is a useful combination of Eve Sedgwick’s “homosociality” that he uses to explore “the 
ways same-sex relationships were mandated in the 1950s and in which misogyny was often component” (16) and 
Adrienne Rich’s “compulsory heterosexuality” that informs his claim that these relationships “whether genitalized 
or not, are nevertheless obligatory for social formation and power” (16). 
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Benzedrine if they wanted to “communicate with absolute honesty and completeness,” which, if 
read alongside Kerouac’s own statements about writing fiction detailed below, suggests a self-
conscious and intentional use of amphetamine to escape the oblique symbolism and 
disillusionment many Beats found endemic in certain strains of the previous generation’s 
modernist literature.  Moreover, Marx and Moriarty’s attempts to express “everything on our 
minds” is itself a kind of amphetaminic task, in that capturing, much less expressing, the entirety 
of one’s mental experience at any given moment is impossible, and yet the exhilarating, 
talkative effects of the Benzedrine high hinted at just such a possibility. 
After his thrilling introduction to the drug with Burroughs and Russell, Kerouac was sold 
on the use of Benzedrine despite its deleterious effects on his health.  Just a few months after 
his introduction to cracking open Benzedrine inhalers, Kerouac had to be admitted to the VA 
Hospital in New York, his body ravaged by Benzedrine (and alcohol) abuse.  The virile young 
writer, formerly a football player at Columbia, and a man handsome enough to have his image 
used to sell khakis for the Gap some 45 years later,18 had begun losing his hair and his legs had 
swollen up so badly with thrombophlebitis that he couldn’t walk.  Such was the price of 
accessing the creative energies in the Benzedrine inhaler. Despite these initial physical 
problems with the drug, Kerouac would continue to use Benzedrine, on and off, for the rest of 
his life, as it proved particularly useful to his unique approach to composition.  In November 
1945, Kerouac wrote to his friend Allen Ginsberg: “Benny [Benzedrine] has made me see a lot.  
The process of intensifying awareness naturally leads to an overflow of old notions, and voila, 
new material wells up like water forming its proper level, and makes itself evident at the brim of 
consciousness.  Brand new water!  The art of my past is all farce, or at least mostly” (Selected 
Letters 101).  It is clear from Kerouac’s letter that he valued Benzedrine primarily for the 
                                                           
18 In the foreword to her memoir, Minor Characters (1983), Joyce Johnson writes compellingly about the 
marginalization of women in the Beat era, analyzing the removal of her own image from this photo in the 1993 ad.   
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generative effect it had on his art.  Echoing Carolyn Cassady’s “push of a million thoughts,” 
Kerouac’s conceptions of Benzedrine’s ability to “intensify awareness,” “overflow old notions,” 
and “well up new material” were such a revelation for him that he distanced himself from his 
previous work, divorcing himself from his past and focusing his energies on the present. 
The Jack Kerouac that emerges from this “brand new water” after 1945 is an especially 
idiosyncratic writer, and one whose peculiarities of both format and content make him perhaps 
the ideal writer with which to examine the American tradition of the “self-made man” at the start 
of the pharmacological era.  Kerouac’s fiction is notoriously autobiographical, his protagonists 
barely-disguised versions of himself, his novels’ plots often little more than remembered 
personal history.  In a very direct sense, Kerouac makes himself in his fiction.  In the previous 
generation, American authors had grappled with the inescapability of the past, complicating the 
genesis of the self-made man with inescapable historical specters.  With one of the most iconic 
lines in American literature, F. Scott Fitzgerald famously concludes his self-fashioning 1925 
novel, The Great Gatsby, with “[s]o we beat on, boats against the current, borne back 
ceaselessly into the past” (180).   Though Kerouac’s writing is undoubtedly dependent upon 
personal history for its subject, Kerouac’s technique is far too invested in exploring the present 
moment to be “borne back” into the past.  Both Kerouac and Fitzgerald are essential figures in 
any examination of American literature’s twentieth-century treatment of the self-made man, but 
the different forms of water imagery they invoke expose the evolution of the concept from the 
modernist period to the start of the pharmacological period: for Fitzgerald, water acts as a 
current, pushing him back and exposing the past; for Kerouac, water wells up to push out the 
past, exposing what is “current.” 
Scholars largely agree that Kerouac’s work, and that of the Beat generation he came to 
represent, evoked a naked fascination with experiencing the present moment.  Critics trained to 
appreciate the work of an older, historically-indebted tradition would point to this obsession with 
the present as evidence of the ephemeral or childish nature of Beat literature.  Recall John 
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Ciardi’s condemnation of the Beat “insistence on the holiness of the impromptu” above, or his 
refusal to believe Allen Ginsberg’s claims not to have performed revisions on “Howl.”19  Or 
consider Truman Capote’s oft-quoted and brutal dismissal of Kerouac’s work: “[t]hat’s not 
writing, that’s typewriting” (qtd. in Hunt xxxv).20  Kerouac inadvertently encouraged some of this 
recrimination with his efforts at detailing his own creative process in short essays like “Belief and 
Technique for Modern Prose,” a curious list of 30 compositional imperatives, originally sent in a 
letter to Donald Allen in 1958, and “Essentials of Spontaneous Prose” (1953), a more thorough 
examination of Kerouac’s process, composed in response to a request from Allen Ginsberg and 
William Burroughs in the wake of the revelation that The Subterraneans (1958) had been written 
entirely in three nights.  Though ostensibly written for private correspondences, both these 
documents shed light on the self-fashioning mindset at work in Kerouac’s spontaneous writing 
process.  Among the “list of essentials” in “Belief and Technique for Modern Prose,” Kerouac 
embraces spontaneity, writing “Remove literary, grammatical and syntactical inhibition,” 
(Portable 483) and “Composing wild, undisciplined, pure, coming in from under, crazier the 
better,“ (483) as well as advice for self-belief like “You’re a Genius all the time” (484).  It is easy 
to see why critics and readers from an older tradition, steeped in the deeply refined mythos of 
interwar modernism, the restrained compression of Hemingway, say, or the manicured inter-
textuality of Eliot or Joyce, would have laughed off such “undisciplined” “crazy” pretensions to 
literary “Genius.”  But of course a central tenet of Kerouac’s project was to ignore the debt of 
                                                           
19 Again, from “Epitaph for the Dead Beats,” Ciardi writes “I also find it impossible to believe . . . that any man 
could put together without revision as tight a catalogue as I find there [in ‘Howl’]. . . . Perhaps [Ginsberg] is simply 
making a claim for effect.  All I can do here is record both my doubts that the catalogue was entirely impromptu, 
and Ginsberg’s insistence that it was” (13).  
20 Capote originally uttered this attack on David Susskind’s Open End in Winter 1959, but the exact phrasing has 
been lost in the echo chamber of widespread use and citation.  Some sources have Capote saying “typing,” others 
“typewriting.”  What is not in dispute is the comment’s essential pithiness, nor its venomous cattiness.   
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history, to find inspiration in the present moment, not like a modernist poet but something much 
closer to a jazz trumpeter improvising on stage.21  
Kerouac makes explicit his affiliation with the instantaneous creativity of jazz music in a 
section of “Essentials of Spontaneous Prose” titled “Procedure”: “Time being of the essence in 
the purity of speech, sketching language is undisturbed flow from the mind of personal secret 
idea-words, blowing (as per jazz musician) on subject of image” (Portable 484, italics in 
original).  For all his skill in experimental fiction, Kerouac displays a less than stellar faculty for 
clear explanation of his method.  His sprawling, propulsive prose here lacks the marks of 
sustained examination required of critical exegesis, serving as merely an example of the 
spontaneous method he purports to articulate.  As Tim Hunt puts it, these critical exercises 
merely “imitate the process they supposedly gloss” (xxxvii).  And yet within these rudimentary 
methodological meditations, at what Kerouac himself might have called the “jewel center of 
interest” (Portable 485), lies a bold and compelling claim about the inherent dishonesty of 
literature written with forethought, and refinement, and the perfectly tuned artifice of the 
canonical literature of the time.  Kerouac was not a gifted critic, and works like “Essentials of 
Spontaneous Prose” gave credence to those who argued that he was a writer well out of his 
intellectual depth, but perhaps some of the ridicule occasioned by his various ars prosicae was 
less a reaction to Kerouac’s left-handed heuristic method, and more a reaction to the implied 
condemnation of literary history it contained.  Kerouac steadfastly refuses to be “borne back 
ceaselessly into the past,” writing of a prose that “runs in time and to laws of time . . . to speak 
                                                           
21 It should be noted that Kerouac’s ability to “ignore the debt of history,” is exclusively a privilege afforded to 
white writers.  The racial dynamics of Kerouac’s work, particularly his co-opting of jazz influences and some of the 
romanticized, primitivist stereotypes of black characters in On The Road, have been extensively debated by 
scholars as well as his contemporaries.  James Baldwin’s 1961 essay “The Black Boy Looks at the White Boy 
Norman Mailer” offers a congenial but pointed critique of Kerouac’s (and, obviously, Norman Mailer’s) racially 
antique, hipster appropriation of black culture.  As I argue more thoroughly in chapter 3, though brain science 
might seem to presume some sort of immunity to racial bias--brain chemicals don’t have race after all--racial 
discourses are impossible to extricate from the industrial, medical, and psychological fields that I argue shape 
cultural understandings of the neurochemical self.   
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now in own unalterable way or forever hold tongue--no revisions” (Portable 485, italics in 
original).  “If possible,” Kerouac urges, “write ‘without consciousness’ in semi-trance . . . allowing 
subconscious to admit in own uninhibited interesting necessary and so ‘modern’ language what 
conscious art would censor, and write excitedly, swiftly, with writing-or-typing-cramps, in 
accordance (as from center to periphery) with laws of orgasm” (Portable 485).  Hidden in the 
scurrying, jazzy language here is an attack on refined literature as a form of censorship.  The 
act of revising, Kerouac’s argument goes, is an unnatural, inhibiting intrusion into a text that is 
more authentic when captured at the orgasmic moment of conception.  The raw text that such 
attitudes produce is necessarily less coherent, but in a way is much braver, allowing 
“subconscious” input to expose the author, in a manner of confession, and the vulnerable or 
incriminating truths at “the brim of consciousness.”  This interest in spontaneous prose has 
obvious technical effects on the resulting text, but the success of Beat literature’s focus on 
spontaneity as artistic mode would also contribute to a particular, dehistoricized understanding 
of the self that would long outlive the Beat generation, becoming a core attribute of the 
neurochemical vision of selfhood that would dominate U.S. cultural ontology in the decades to 
come. 
This focus on the present directly informed how Kerouac composed his work, as he was 
famous for all-night writing sessions, typing as fast as he could, as if trying the capture the 
feeling and rhythms of the spoken word or the jazz solo on the page.  Kerouac scholar Tim Hunt 
has called this technique “type-talking” (xxxi) and it requires a few attributes from the writer that 
we might recognize as traits enhanced by amphetamines: mental endurance, prolonged focus, 
intense loquaciousness.  Within the growing body of Beat hagiography, these traits are 
celebrated, particularly with regards to the composition of Kerouac’s breakthrough novel, 1957’s 
On The Road, the biggest totem of Beat literature and an important, if complicated, example of 
American literary self-fashioning.  According to popular myth, Kerouac sat down to his typewriter 
in April 1951, and in three weeks wrote the entire novel as a single, enormous, unpunctuated 
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paragraph, on a 120 foot roll of teletype paper, guzzling coffee and Benzedrine to stay awake 
through the furious nights of typing.   This legendary April 1951 typing session is easily the most 
famous typing session in literary history; one struggles to even conceive of another writer with 
whom the basic act of typing is more closely associated.  Much of the Kerouac myth surrounds 
this heroic typing feat and the resulting “scroll,” a term that in its very use contributes to the 
image of Kerouac as a “religious seer” engaged in a spiritual journey, composing the original 
manuscript.  But like most myths, the sketch above falls some distance short of the truth.   
Despite Kerouac’s professed beliefs in spontaneity, and his numerous statements to the 
contrary, On the Road was not composed entirely in April 1951.  As Matt Theado points out in 
“Revisions of Kerouac,” his definitive study of the On the Road typescripts, “Kerouac worked 
from notes and other materials as he drafted this novel.  For instance, numerous passages 
match up word-for-word with the ‘Rain and Rivers’ journal, begun January 31, 1949” (16).  
Though Kerouac’s style of spontaneous prose would evolve in later works, On the Road was at 
least partially crafted from existing materials in a rather traditional--if greatly accelerated--
manner.  Another apocryphal aspect of the On the Road legend concerns the punctuation, or 
putative lack thereof, on the original scroll--a myth maintained by Kerouac himself in a widely 
read, 1959 interview with Alfred Aronowitz in the New York Post: “[i]t took me 21 days to write 
‘On the Road.’  I wrote it on one long roll of paper with no periods, no commas, no paragraphs, 
all single-spaced” (qtd. in Theado 21).  Here again we see Kerouac’s curious take on the self-
made man, fashioning his literary persona in the press, desperate to impress upon the New 
York Post’s readers his unique and spontaneous method, despite the comment’s numerous 
falsehoods.  While the original scroll indeed had no paragraphing, it was conventionally 
punctuated with commas and periods, a fact that Kerouac obviously would have known.  
Moreover, the “single roll of paper” on which On the Road was typed, was not a roll of teletype 
paper as Kerouac implied to thirty million viewers on the Steve Allen Show in November, 1959, 
nor was it stolen from Lucien Carr’s office as Bruce Cook suggested in his 1971 book, The Beat 
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Generation.  Kerouac would go on to write much of his later fiction on such rolls,22 but Theado’s 
study of the original scroll confirms that the On the Road manuscript is composed of 295 sheets 
of unlined paper, taped end-to-end and trimmed along one side to fit properly in Kerouac’s 
typewriter.   
 Kerouac’s numerous petty deceptions and half-truths regarding the composition of On 
the Road--the book that made him in ways figurative, literal, and literary--might go some way to 
explaining Kerouac’s attitude regarding the most pharmacologically significant aspect of the 
enduring Kerouac legend: his reliance on amphetamines for inspiration.  For decades after the 
book’s release, coverage of Kerouac’s three-week typing binge would make pointed note of his 
Benzedrine habit; the phrase “Benzedrine-fueled” was a common refrain.  Recent research into 
Kerouac’s correspondence has cast doubt on such claims.  Just after finishing On the Road, 
Kerouac wrote to Neal Cassady, claiming “I wrote that book on COFFEE . . . remember said 
rule.  Benny, tea, anything I KNOW none as good as coffee for real mental power kicks” (qtd. in 
Theado 15).  Kerouac undoubtedly consumed a great deal of coffee during the writing of all his 
work, and the common practice of soaking the strip from a Benzedrine inhaler in coffee raises 
some suspicion as to exactly what “COFFEE” means here, but it is clear in his letter that 
Kerouac wanted Cassady to see the distinction between “benny” (Benzedrine) and a cup of joe, 
when it came to artistic inspiration.  Later, after Allen Ginsberg had told the Village Voice that 
Kerouac’s typing of On the Road had been enhanced by Benzedrine, Kerouac wrote his friend, 
stating flatly, “Road was not written on benny, on coffee” (qtd. in Theado 15).   
                                                           
22 Again, according to Matt Theado’s indispensable work on Kerouac’s original typescripts, Kerouac would later 
write The Dharma Bums (1958), Big Sur (1962), and Vanity of Duluoz (1968) on teletype rolls--though if any of 
these were stolen from the various workplaces of Lucien Carr, one can only guess.  
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Whether Kerouac was actually on Benzedrine during the writing of On the Road is 
actually immaterial.23  What is more interesting and relevant for my argument that uppers like 
Benzedrine shaped cultural discourse and altered the space wherein the myth of the American 
self-made man was enacted after WWII, is the widespread belief that Kerouac was on 
Benzedrine while typing with such abandon in April 1951.  Kerouac’s statements to Cassady 
and Ginsberg to the contrary only reinforce Benzedrine’s importance to the public act of self-
making in 1950s American literature.24  Through its widespread use, its recent history in WWII, 
and its savvy post-war marketing, Benzedrine had developed a large enough cultural footprint 
for its name and effects to become instantly recognizable and significant, whether in a Village 
Voice interview with Allen Ginsberg, or in word-of-mouth gossip regarding the publication of a 
popular novel.  Kerouac’s clear desire to distance his work from Benzedrine reflects this cultural 
increase in drug brand awareness, this form of pharmaceutical literacy, and exposes his fear 
that his own “brand” would be tainted from the association.  Everyday, all-American coffee was 
not freighted with the artificial, bellicose, and illicit connotations of Benzedrine, and Kerouac’s 
urge to align himself with coffee can be read as a response to the criticisms of his spontaneous 
prose style made possible by the public’s increasing knowledge of specific drugs, their effects, 
and their reputations.  The trepidation in evidence in Kerouac’s disavowal of amphetamines 
exposes his desire to control how his writing was perceived, to make himself on his own terms, 
in a culture that was becoming increasingly pharmaceutically literate.        
This growing public awareness of specific drug brands, this pharmaceutical literacy, 
marked a significant turn in cultural attitudes toward chemical intervention in everyday life, and 
                                                           
23 Kerouac may have privately disputed whether On the Road was written on Benzedrine, but we have no reason 
to doubt that many of his other works were.  
24 These statements should be considered alongside Kerouac’s numerous misrepresentations detailed above.  
Kerouac clearly abused Benzedrine both before and after April 1951, and while it is possible that Kerouac did not 
use any amphetamine while writing On the Road, it is indisputable that when it came to shaping his own literary 
reputation, the author had what might be charitably described as a complicated relationship with the truth.     
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Kerouac must have sensed this trend as he made efforts to distance himself from Benzedrine.  
That Kerouac was aware of the increasing pharmaceutical literacy of his era is clear in his 
fiction.  Recall the comment from On the Road made by Ginsberg-as-Marx above: “We’ve had 
to take Benzedrine.”  This line requires that the reader has some previous understanding of 
Benzedrine, its effects, and its reputation, to comprehend why Marx and Moriarty have “had” to 
turn to it for help communicating with “absolute honesty.”  To properly understand this new 
pharmaceutically literate function, it might be helpful to read Kerouac against Fitzgerald again. 
Consider the language early in Tender is the Night (1934), when Violet McKisco witnesses 
Nicole Diver’s shocking breakdown in a bathroom.  After Violet is overcome by what she has 
seen, she “collapsed and Mrs. Abrams took her to her room and gave her a bromide whereupon 
she fell comfortably asleep” (44).  Published just two decades earlier, Tender is the Night 
assumes a readership with a far less sophisticated understanding of pharmaceuticals than 
Kerouac’s work.  Violet McKisco is given “a bromide” to calm down,25 a generic term for any 
number of sedatives that might be at hand.  Violet McKisco’s panic is treated in a world where 
pharmaceutical medicine is in its infancy.  No national ad campaigns, marketing strategies, 
popular literature, or word-of-mouth gossip have positioned bespoke chemical formulations as 
immediately legible brands of treatment.  Given the paucity of pharmaceutical knowledge in the 
culture, then, it would make little sense for a writer like Fitzgerald to reference real-world 
drugs,26 or perhaps invent a drug brand,27 for Violet McKisco to ingest, as later twentieth-century 
                                                           
25 The use of bromides, primarily potassium bromide, as tranquilizers in the early twentieth century fell out of 
fashion as safer, more efficient sedatives like barbiturates emerged after WWII.  Their early popularity though, 
retains a calming legacy in English usage, as “a bromide” now refers to “a trite and unoriginal idea or remark, 
typically intended to soothe or placate” (Google definitions).  
26 “Bromo Seltzer” was a semi-popular, effervescent drug containing sodium bromide that would have been 
available in Fitzgerald’s period, but it clearly lacked the cultural relevance and name recognition a drug like 
Benzedrine would carry twenty years later.   
27 Bromidicil™? 
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writers might.  The distance from Fitzgerald to Kerouac, from bromides to Benzedrine, is not so 
long chronologically, but the difference between the function and type of drugs they reference 
indicates a substantial and significant change in the pharmaceutical literacy of those they wrote 
for.      
 
What Goes Up . . .  
 
“The amphetamine gives a peculiar metaphysical tinge to things.”  
 -Allen Ginsberg, Essential (289) 1965 
 
The popular myth that Benzedrine was some kind of clean-burning “fuel” for Beat 
creativity downplays the cost of such a literary practice, and this line of Beat pharmaceutical 
hagiography conveniently ignores the shopworn but relevant cliché that what goes up, must 
come down.  While Kerouac’s reading of the growing pharmaceutical literacy of 1950s America 
may have caused him to flinch at his association with Benzedrine, many of his Beat 
contemporaries were more direct in their engagement with stimulants, and here it might be 
instructive to turn to Allen Ginsberg whose work could be partially understood as a sort of 
“poetry of the come down.”  Ginsberg’s most widely-read work, of course, is “Howl,” his 1956 
poem that opens with the famous lines, “I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by 
madness, starving hysterical naked,/ dragging themselves through the negro streets at dawn 
looking for an angry fix” (Essential, 14).  In many ways, Kerouac had celebrated the jazzy, 
“buzzing” excess of the Benzedrine high, but Ginsberg’s work here opens with a much darker 
formulation of drug use, the “destroyed minds” of a generation “dragging themselves” to find an 
“angry fix.”  Though the “angry fix” one would have to comb the “negro streets” to find would not 
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have been Benzedrine, since it was an over-the-counter medication until as late as 1959,28 the 
poem’s opening does foreground the destructive effects of drug use on the Beat generation.  
The remainder of the poem’s part I provides a litany of descriptions of this destroyed generation, 
offering a variety of refrains that color the initial position.  Among these refrains, Ginsberg 
describes those “who chained themselves to subways for the endless ride from Battery to holy 
Bronx on benzedrine until the noise of wheels and children brought them down shuddering 
mouth-wracked and battered bleak of brain all drained of brilliance in the dear light of Zoo” 
(Essential 14).  The reference to SKF’s amphetamine brand here not only completes the first 
alliterative triplet of “Battery,” “Bronx,” “benzedrine,” but also establishes the chemical high from 
which the “best minds” would be “brought . . . down shuddering.”  The line’s second alliterative 
triplet, “battered bleak of brain,” recalls and reverses the high of the first triplet, completing the 
trip,29 leaving the riders “drained of brilliance.”  It should be noted that the “brilliance” Ginsberg 
imagines here is not presented as some kind of divine gift, natural blessing, or even the result of 
rigorous intellectual work, as it is sometimes portrayed.  Instead, “brilliance” is configured as a 
sort of natural resource of the “brain.”  Perhaps recalling Kerouac’s fluid image of brilliance that 
“wells up” when on Benzedrine, Ginsberg’s commentary in “Howl” details the consequences 
when that “brand new water” is “drained,” hinting at a nascent vision of the self as a fluctuating 
balance of chemical reserves. 
Though Ginsberg’s portrayal of the come down in “Howl” may have conflicted with 
Kerouac’s chemically optimistic tone, Ginsberg himself was still deeply influenced by his Beat 
comrade’s philosophy of spontaneity and openness to chemical inspiration.  Reflecting on his 
early works in an essay titled “Meditation and Poetics” (1987) Ginsberg recalls that “Kerouac 
                                                           
28 The U.S. FDA (Federal Drug Administration) changed the classification of Benzedrine to a prescription-only drug 
in 1959, and the drug became a staple in illicit, black-market street trade after that.   
29 As it were. 
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[had] urged me to be more spontaneous, less worried about my poetic practice.  I was always 
worried about my poetry” (Essential 214-215).  After a drunken Kerouac had leveled Ginsberg 
with an offhand insult,30 the poet claims to have realized, “[i]f you allow the active phase to come 
to your mind, allow that out, you speak from a ground that can relate your inner perception to 
external phenomena, and thus join Heaven and Earth” (Essential 215).  Whether Kerouac’s 
insult actually sparked this epiphany is debatable, but it is undeniable that Ginsberg’s urge to 
“relate your inner perception to external phenomena” echoes Kerouac’s pronouncement in 
“Essentials of Spontaneous Prose” to write “in accordance (as from center to periphery) with 
laws of orgasm” (Portable 483).  Ginsberg would expand upon this philosophy of instantaneous 
inspiration in a 1970 conversation with Jane Fortunado, Lucille Medwick, and Susan Rowe, 
usually referred to as “the Craft Interview.”  In response to a question about writerly anxiety, 
Ginsberg lays out his belief that “[i]deally, the ambition, my childhood desire, is to write during a 
prophetic illuminative seizure.  That’s the idea: to be in a state of such complete blissful 
consciousness that any language emanating from that state will strike a responsive chord” 
(Essential 309-310).  To find this “prophetic illuminative” state, Ginsberg continues, one must 
engage in the endurance writing sessions Kerouac was famous for.  “What I mean is if you write 
all day you will get into it, into your body, into your feelings, into your consciousness.  I don’t 
write enough, actually, in that way.  Howl, Kaddish and other things were written that way: all-
day-long attention” (Essential 310, italics in original).   
When Ginsberg speaks of “all-day-long attention” he actually undersells the time he 
spends in this “prophetic illuminative” state, at least if we are to use the composition of 
“Kaddish” as representative of his process.  “Kaddish” is perhaps not as widely taught as 
“Howl,” but many readers, Ginsberg included, view it as his masterpiece. Biographer Bill Morgan 
called it flatly Ginsberg’s “greatest poem” (28).  A mournful elegy for Ginsberg’s deceased 
                                                           
30 Ginsberg recalls that Kerouac declared him “[a] hairy loss!” (Essential 215). 
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mother, Naomi, the poem is a prime example of Ginsberg’s amphetaminic poetics of the come-
down.  According to Ginsberg’s own recollections in “How Kaddish Happened” (1966), Ginsberg 
began working on the poem in 1957, but composed the bulk of it two years later in a single 
session, sitting “at same desk from six AM Saturday to ten PM Sunday night writing on without 
moving my mind from theme except for trips to the bathroom, cups of coffee . . . and a few 
Dexedrine tablets to renew impulse” (Essential 168).  Though Ginsberg was famous for using a 
wide variety of drugs in his search for inspiration, most notably hallucinogens in the 1960s,31 his 
use of amphetamines had a profound impact on his work in the 1950s.  Not only did Ginsberg 
use Dexedrine to “renew impulse” during the writing of Kaddish,32 but he also incited his 
“prophetic illuminative” state that Saturday morning with an injection of morphine and “some 
new-to-me meta-amphetamine” (Essential 167).  With the aid of this injection, and the regular 
supplementation of Dexedrine, Ginsberg was able to write in the spontaneous mode he sought, 
even though writing the poem’s latter half became much more difficult, as “attention wandered, 
the writing became more diffuse, dissociations more difficult to cohere, the unworldly messianic 
spurts more awkward” (Essential 168).  Thus a pharmacentric reading of “Kaddish” identifies the 
slowly degrading nature of the amphetamine come-down operating behind the self-evident 
elegiac tone the poem is celebrated for.  The poem’s structure further supports this 
pharmacentric reading, as both the rhythm and line length dwindle, becoming more stark, in 
Ginsberg’s words, “more awkward,” as the poem comes down.  Ginsberg’s use of the 
Dickensonian dash peters out as well.  Part I and II of the poem deal with Ginsberg’s 
recollections of Naomi, and use of the dash is frequent, some lines containing as many as six 
                                                           
31 In June 1966 Ginsberg testified before a special subcommittee of the committee on the Judiciary in the U.S. 
Senate about the positive effects of LSD and advocated against its criminalization.  In addition to LSD, Ginsberg also 
experimented with the South American hallucinogen ayahuasca, as detailed in his correspondence with William 
Burroughs collected in The Yage Letters (1963).   
32 Dexedrine (dextroamphetamine) is the trade name of an amphetamine capsule chemically similar to Benzedrine 
and also marketed by SKF in the 1950s.   
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dashes, propelling the reader along as if building to a climax.  After Ginsberg receives word of 
Naomi’s death at the end of part II, the line lengths shrink and the dashes recede: part III uses 
13 total dashes.  Parts IV and V: none.  The result is a poetic structure partially reflective of the 
arc of the pharmaceutical experience the poet underwent during composition. 
Like any poem, “Kaddish” is about far larger ideas than line length, typographical quirks, 
or the drugs Allen Ginsberg was on while he wrote it.  Ginsberg has been rightly celebrated for 
the poem’s open engagement with unvarnished memories of life with his mother, and his own 
reckoning with his faith after her death.  Naomi struggled with mental health issues throughout 
her life, and the poem’s most compelling moments grapple with the fallout of her condition.  
Throughout the poem’s hazy chronology, Ginsberg writes to Naomi, remembering being “a child 
in Paterson apartment, watching over your nervousness” (Essential 33), and her “first nervous 
breakdown was 1919” (35).  Ginsberg later recalls Naomi’s devastating paranoia, and phone 
calls received “at 2 A.M.--Emergency--she’d gone mad--Naomi hiding under the bed screaming 
bugs of Mussolini” (36) or her psychotic break at a pharmacy’s prescription counter, raving 
among the “racks of children’s books, douche bags, aspirins, pots, blood--’Don’t come near me-
-murderers!  Keep away!  Promise not to kill me!’” (37).  Crucially, among these poetic 
recollections, Ginsberg presents a poignantly chemical understanding of his mother’s mental 
health that demonstrates the increasingly neurochemical understanding of the self that was 
beginning to take root by the late 1950s. Deep in the poem’s part II, as Ginsberg details his 
mother’s various breakdowns and trips to the mental hospital, we encounter this telling line: 
“some insulin passes through her head--a grimace nerve shudder at Involuntary (as shudder 
when I piss)--bad chemical in her cortex” (40).  Despite the poetic, reflective language in this 
moment, Ginsberg is clearly trading in a scientific, neurochemical understanding of mental 
illness, linking Naomi’s involuntary reactions to psychiatric treatment with chemicals in “her 
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cortex.”  Though the anatomy here is fuzzy,33 this line in “Kaddish” suggests an understanding 
of neurochemistry’s role in mental health that would not have been possible just a few decades 
earlier.  Neurotransmitters were not even discovered until the 1920s, and yet by the time Allen 
Ginsberg injected himself with the speedball of morphine and “meta-amphetamine” to write 
“Kaddish,” the knowledge of scientific advances in the study of brain chemistry had clearly 
spread to the popular world of educated laymen.   
If we read this particular line more closely, we expose a pair of ideas at work that can 
greatly enhance our understanding of literature’s developing sense of a neurochemical self.  
Firstly, by attributing Naomi’s “involuntary” nerve shudder and grimace to “bad chemicals” in 
“her cortex,” Ginsberg implicitly suggests that one’s actions can be dictated by chemicals in the 
brain.  Naomi does not consciously choose to act; instead, she reacts involuntarily to her “bad” 
neurochemistry.  The implications of this moment are extraordinary and contribute to a profound 
rethinking of the self.  Could we think of “Naomi” as just a series of chemical interactions?  Is 
her mental illness an “involuntary” response to imbalanced chemicals?  Are all of her actions 
governed by neurochemicals, or just the “bad” ones?  Does brain chemistry supersede free will?  
“Kaddish” offers no answers to these questions, but it does locate an evolving conception of 
selfhood at the intersection of brain chemicals and philosophy.  While the science behind 
Ginsberg’s view was relatively new in the late 1950s, this neurochemical turn was just the latest 
salvo in a much longer history of philosophical response to scientific advancement.  Free will is 
one of the oldest concepts in philosophy, dating back at least to Aristotle, and the names of 
thinkers who have grappled with its various implications reads like a history of western 
philosophy: St. Thomas Aquinas, Baruch Spinoza, René Descartes, David Hume, Thomas 
Hobbes, Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, and many others have tried to interpret the 
                                                           
33 Presumably “her cortex” refers to a brain structure, since it would make little sense for Ginsberg to contemplate 
the chemical interactions at play in Naomi’s other bodily cortices, such as those around her kidneys, ovaries, or 
thymus. 
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fundamental questions of choice and freedom in human action.  Placed in historical context, 
Ginsberg’s invocation of neurochemicals into such a discussion is ultimately reflective of the 
mid-twentieth century’s developments in neuroscience, and contributes to a historical narrative 
wherein scientific advances have repeatedly given thinkers new techniques for relitigating the 
same eternal questions.34   
In addition to these neuro-philosophical implications, Ginsberg’s description of Naomi’s 
involuntary shudder in “Kaddish” also implicates particular neurochemical understandings of the 
self in the treatment of mental illness.  Before Naomi’s shudder, we read that “some insulin 
passes through her head,”  suggesting that Ginsberg’s mother is still dealing with the fallout 
from Insulin Coma Therapy (ICT), a popular and brutal treatment for mental illness in the 
sanatoria of 1940s and 1950s America.  Popularized by Austrian-American psychiatrist Manfred 
Sakel, ICT involved injecting patients with massive doses of insulin to invoke a temporary coma 
and convulsive seizures.  Though it operated on no known mechanism of therapeutic action, 
and required a specialized team of nurses and attendants to restrain and medicate the often 
terrified patient, ICT was a common treatment for schizophrenia and depression.  Despite the 
paucity of scientific evidence showing ICT’s success in treating schizophrenia, the procedure 
was widely administered to patients in the U.S. and Britain, including Naomi Ginsberg and 
Sylvia Plath.  While it is considered inhumane and perhaps barbaric now, ICT’s popularity in the 
1940s and 1950s demonstrates the blind vigor with which some in the psychiatric community 
                                                           
34 Though a comprehensive history of free will is beyond the scope of this project, it should be noted that the more 
recent work on this age-old idea has been done in the field of neurophilosophy.  Based on the work of researcher 
Benjamin Libet in the 1980s, the neuroscience of free will has proposed a variety of consciousness and mental field 
theories aimed at bridging the gap between the physical brain and the mind.  
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embraced the rather new notion that “abnormal” mental experience had a biological, chemical 
basis in the brain,35 and should be treated chemically.   
Enthusiasm for convulsive therapy was not limited to ICT in mid-century psychiatric 
institutions, and a variety of methods were explored to induce temporary comatose states in 
schizophrenic or depressed patients.  Both electric shock and stimulants were also used to 
produce convulsions in patients during the period of Naomi Ginsberg’s institutionalizations.  
“Kaddish” touches on all three methods in a moment of unsparing violence: “No love since 
Naomi screamed--since 1923?--now lost in Greystone ward--new shock for her--Electricity, 
following the 40 insulin./And Metrazol had made her fat” (39).  Committed to the “greystone 
ward” of a mental institution, Naomi is given a “new shock” with “Electricity,” surely an early form 
of Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT), “40 insulin” during her ICT treatment, and Metrazol.  The 
latter here is an important drug to explore for my analysis of uppers in Beat literature, since 
Metrazol (pentylenetetrazol) was a circulatory and respiratory stimulant used to induce 
convulsions in a manner similar to ICT or ECT.  The invocation of Metrazol raises the issue of 
pharmaceutical literacy once again, since Ginsberg offers the drug’s brand name here with no 
further explanatory detail.  Unlike Benzedrine, Metrazol had a very specific, circumscribed 
application and did not have anything like the advertising or cultural presence of SKF’s 
amphetamine juggernaut.  While Metrazol would have been a familiar name to anyone with 
experience in the mid-century treatment of mental illness, a wider reading audience would have 
found such a reference esoteric.  Ginsberg himself displays a less than clinical understanding of 
the drug’s action by suggesting that “Metrazol had made [Naomi] fat.”  If indeed Naomi’s weight 
gain was due to her psychiatric treatments, it almost certainly would have been from the insulin 
treatment, which notoriously left patients “grossly obese” (Jones 147).  However, Metrazol’s 
                                                           
35 Interrogating the concept of the "normal" is foundational to disability studies, and I follow Lennard Davis in 
arguing that "normal" is a heavily contested and slippery term that should not tyrannize our conceptions of mind 
and body.  The word "abnormal" here should be read as its own open question regarding norms of experience. 
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function in this grim sequence of convulsive treatments does not rely on a widespread cultural 
understanding of this specific drug, as in the case of Kerouac’s references to Benzedrine.  
Instead, Ginsberg’s poem relies on a reader’s mid-century understanding of my two central 
claims here: the developing sense of a neurochemical self, that the mind was at least partially 
understood to be the result of chemical interactions, and an increasing pharmaceutical literacy 
that suggested specific drugs could be used to tinker with those interactions.  Readers might not 
have recognized the word “Metrazol,” but they would have recognized the logic of treating 
Naomi’s ailing mind by the administration of a chemical with a trade name. 
The mention of Metrazol brings us back to Ginsberg’s “Howl,” where the same emerging 
notions of a neurochemical self and pharmaceutical literacy inform our reading of the treatment 
received by the poem’s dedicatee and emblematic “destroyed mind,” Carl Solomon.  Like Naomi 
Ginsberg, Solomon was treated with convulsive therapies during his institutionalizations, and, 
expanding upon the series of treatments in “Kaddish,” “Howl” describes those “who were given 
instead the concrete void of insulin Metrazol electricity hydrotherapy psychotherapy 
occupational therapy pingpong & amnesia“ (18).  “Howl” is a different poem, and Carl Solomon 
is a different patient, and yet Ginsberg again recites a litany of psychiatric therapies, from insulin 
to Metrazol to electricity.  If “Howl” is centrally concerned with “the best minds of” Ginsberg’s 
generation “destroyed by madness,” then what role in this destruction is played by these 
neurochemical treatments? Read pharmacentrically, Metrazol and insulin and these methods of 
tinkering with brain chemistry represent terrifying threats to one’s identity, given the nascent 
vision of a neurochemically-based self emerging at the time.  From having watched his mother 
fade away after such treatments, and having spent time with Carl Solomon in a psychiatric 
hospital, Ginsberg was well-aware of the dangers posed by these convulsive, chemical 
interventions into the brain.  These treatments were offered under the guise of resetting a 
chemically dysfunctional brain, but often the result was simple destruction yielding a 
consciousness of heavy, thick emptiness: a “concrete void.”  “Howl” then is both a poem of the 
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come down, but also a poem of attack.  Ginsberg’s attack is not on a priori assumptions as to 
the chemical nature of consciousness, but rather the unfeeling, social, medical, and industrial 
forces that presume to contain madness via institutionalization and neurochemical manipulation.   
In the poem’s conclusion, Ginsberg ultimately rejects this neurochemical manipulation in 
favor of the metaphysical.  In “Howl’s” final sequence, addressed to Carl Solomon, the reader 
encounters nineteen lines, each beginning with the statement, “I am with you in Rockland,” an 
expression that establishes solidarity with the institutionalized and reminds us that Ginsberg met 
Solomon during his own period of institutionalization.  Here Ginsberg speaks to an aspect of 
identity older and deeper than neurochemical selfhood, that endures despite clumsy electrical 
and chemical assaults on the physical brain, writing, “I am with you in Rockland/ where fifty 
more shocks will never return your soul to its body again from its pilgrimage to a cross in the 
void” (21).  Viewed as an attack on the unfeeling conception of the self as a chemical 
expression, these concluding lines offer a literally metaphysical response.36  Etymologically, 
“metaphysical” refers to that which is beyond the physical, and Ginsberg’s appeal to the soul’s 
ability to survive the “shocks” administered to the “body” indicts the specifically physical vision of 
the self that chemical and electrical treatments of the brain presume.  Though not a rejection of 
neurochemistry outright, Ginsberg’s line of attack here troubles the exclusively neurochemical 
sense of self obtaining in the psychiatric wards of mid-twentieth century America, and guiding 
the practice of treating mental illness with convulsive therapies.  “Howl” pushes the reader to 
ask, are we just our chemicals?  Are metaphysics and neurochemistry irreconcilable? In the 
final accounting, which chemicals comprise the “soul”?  Ultimately, the idea of a soul leaving its 
body for “a pilgrimage to a cross in the void” remains, obstinately resistant to neurochemical 
manipulation, the stubborn remainder left over in the stoichiometric equation of identity. 
                                                           
36 “Metaphysical” here is not intended to directly reference the metaphysical school of 17th century British poets, 
nor the long tradition of metaphysical philosophy in Western thought.  Though similarities to those established 
traditions abound, my usage here is literal and etymological in nature.   
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Ginsberg’s poetry is, indeed, a poetry of resistance, but not just resistance to orderly 
poetic form or Eisenhower-era attitudes toward conformity and drug use.  Read with an 
appreciation for the developing notion of a neurochemical self, Ginsberg’s poetry offers a 
resistance to the unfeeling, industrial approach to humanity that a purely neurochemical view of 
the self implies.  Ginsberg’s engagement with pharmaceuticals and psychiatric treatment 
accepts the ontological implications of the neurochemistry of his era while strenuously resisting 
the idea that these electro-chemical conceptions entirely bound the self.   An individual is not 
limited by the play of neurotransmitters in his or her brain, “Howl” argues, and one should fight 
back against the mechanistic notion that people are merely chemical automata to be serviced 
with titration and convulsion.  Such attitudes inform Ginsberg’s depiction of “Moloch” in “Howl,” 
the inhuman monstrosity that haunts the poem’s second section.  Moloch is described in a 
number of frightening ways, detailing a soulless, unfeeling creature responsible for the 
“destroyed minds” at the heart of the poem.  Given the emerging attitudes of neurochemical 
identity I have argued for so far, the most telling description of this oppressive entity laments, 
“Moloch whose mind is pure machinery!” (20).  To read this line through a pharmacentric lens is 
to see Moloch’s tyrannizing, industrial horror as a logical extension of the ideology held by 
psychiatrists who might flood a patient’s brain with Metrazol, insulin, or electric shock in an effort 
to repair a malfunction.  A view of the mind as “pure machinery” implies a singular and precise 
vision of proper mental function, like a new engine rolling off the assembly line, and any 
deviation from this putative proper function indicates a problem in need of a technical solution.  
Such a view permeates the very language of medical and pharmaceutical science, and 
Ginsberg’s poem might ask us to consider what vision of humanity is being assumed when we 
use a fundamental pharmacological phrase like the “mechanism of therapeutic action.”  Surely 
the metaphor operating unexamined in the background of such an expression is the similarity 
between biochemistry and machinery.  In the treatment of kidney function or a skin condition, 
this metaphor poses no obvious problems, but when applied to the metaphysically fraught 
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connections between the brain and the mind, between the chemical and the soul, between 
synaptic action and individual human action, such a mechanistic view is insufficient.  One 
cannot distill “Carl,” or “Naomi,” down into “pure machinery” to be tinkered with by 
neurochemical mechanics.  The forces that represent this totalizing, mechanizing, industrializing 
view of humanity must be resisted.   
 
Coming Down 
 
 As the two most famous writers of the Beat Generation, Jack Kerouac and Allen 
Ginsberg have a great deal in common.  They attended Columbia University together.  They 
had the same group of friends in Greenwich Village.  They influenced each other’s work directly, 
in terms of both subject matter and artistic method.  As I have argued here, they also shared a 
relationship with stimulants that warrants closer examination. Indeed, both writers ingested 
amphetamines, like Benzedrine and Dexedrine, and wrote some of their most enduring works 
while experiencing the loquacious rush typical of these drugs.  Furthermore, the improvisational, 
impromptu nature of Beat literature derived some of its force from the physical effects of 
stimulants which granted these Beat eminences the energy to write all day and night, and the 
mindset to embrace the moment-to-moment inspiration they retained in their formal 
experimentation.  According to my pharmacentric reading here, the works of Jack Kerouac and 
Allen Ginsberg can be understood as an amphetaminic literature: texts that in both form and 
content enact the traits of the amphetamines that were so common to Beat social life.   
More importantly, a pharmacentric reading of stimulants in Beat literature exposes much 
more than the preferred intoxicants of two noteworthy artists or simple cultural attitudes toward 
recreational drugs.  By using literature to trace popular conceptions of stimulants, their history 
both before and after WWII, their industrial and marketing presence in Eisenhower America, and 
their role in the treatment of mental health, we can see the emergence of two vital 
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developments in twentieth century American culture: pharmaceutical literacy and the 
neurochemical self.  Here I have argued that the immediate post-war period in American 
literature demonstrates, in its engagement with amphetamines and stimulants, a growing 
awareness among American readership of specific pharmaceuticals and their effects, and a 
concurrent growth in the popular acceptance of the idea that the self is governed by chemical 
interactions in the brain that can--and perhaps should--be altered by pharmaceutical 
intervention.  This pair of related developments marks a significant shift in the fundamental view 
of American identity that emerges in the latter half of the century.   
Given their influence on this important development, how then should we locate 
amphetamines within the broader context of post-war letters?  While these uppers swelled in 
popularity in the years after WWII, and clearly helped shape the style and identity of that 
particular literary moment, the pharmaceutical industry, and the Americans it developed drugs 
for, eventually moved on from stimulants, and as Beat literature was beginning to recede from 
the public spotlight in the late 1950s, so too was the prevalence of amphetamine use in 
everyday life.  Benzedrine was reclassified as a prescription-only drug in 1959, and 
amphetamine use since then has been largely consigned to the shady corridors of illicit, black 
market drug traffic--a far cry from the Beat-era heyday of SKF’s national ad campaigns targeting 
day laborers, domestic women, and children.  But the legacy retained from that initial burst of 
amphetamine popularity lived on in America’s growing pharmacological appetite.  In the wake of 
Benzedrine and its amphetamine cousins, new drugs emerged that would become even more 
popular, and would cement the place of the pharmaceutical in America’s industrial economy, in 
its literature, in its cultural vocabulary, and in its citizen’s understandings of themselves.  If 
Benzedrine and the amphetamines had taken America up by clearing a space for increased 
pharmaceutical literacy and the sense of the neurochemical self, then the next wave of popular 
pharmaceuticals was poised to go the opposite direction.  American pharmaceutical literature 
was about to go down.    
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Chapter 2 - “Tamed by Miltown”: Tranquilizing Robert Lowell and Anne Sexton 
 
  
“Many of our traditional notions about ethics and religion, many of our current views about the 
nature of the mind, will have to be reconsidered and reevaluated in the context of the 
pharmacological revolution.  It will be extremely disturbing; but it will be enormously fun.”  
-Aldous Huxley, (qtd. in Tone 62) 1956  
 
 
Though American interest in amphetamines diminished in the late 1950s, the cultural 
hunger for pharmaceutical intervention into everyday life emphatically did not.  Americans who 
had sought out Benzedrine and other uppers to alleviate their stresses turned, in staggering 
numbers, to chemical compounds with radically different effects and putative actions.  Anti-
anxiety medications, “tranquilizers” in the argot of 1950s psychiatric medicine, skyrocketed to 
prominence on the back of a handful of big-name drugs that firmly cemented psychotropic 
pharmaceuticals as enormously influential medical, economic, and cultural forces.  In this 
chapter, I make the pharmacentric argument that the enormous cultural impact of these new 
tranquilizing drugs played a significant and under-examined role in the literary production of the 
era.  This influence played out generally in the broad trends of drug popularity, the gradual 
recession of Freudian ideas into views of the self as a neurochemical entity, the pharmacist’s 
role in the era’s battle over gender norms and expectations, and the continued ascent of 
pharmaceutical literacy in the culture.  This influence acted specifically by affecting the 
production and reception of two important literary figures, Robert Lowell and Anne Sexton, 
whose troubled mental health histories and personal experiences with tranquilizers intersected 
with a new “confessional” mode of poetry.     
The de facto leader of this move toward confessional poetry was Robert Lowell, a poet 
whose life and poetry are particularly compelling from a pharmacentric perspective.  Lowell is 
often credited with developing the confessional style in American poetry, and I argue that a 
pharmacentric reading of his work, a reading that prioritizes the role of pharmaceuticals, opens 
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up new avenues of inquiry into this important development.  How does what we know about 
pharmaceuticals impact how we understand poetry?  In what ways do pharmaceuticals function 
similarly in a poem as in a body or brain?  To what extent can we understand a poem or a 
culture to be tranquilized?  In addition to addressing these questions, I claim that Lowell’s poetic 
innovation is directly linked to his mental health and the pharmaceutical interventions it 
necessitated--interventions that reflect the specific cultural moment of mid-twentieth century 
ideology where discourses of traditional gender roles, the neurochemical nature of the self, and 
the treatment of non-normative mental behavior were all in flux, cast against the rising 
prominence of pharmaceuticals in the culture.  
I then turn my attention to Anne Sexton, a less-celebrated figure in literary history, but 
one whose relationship with pharmaceuticals yields a direct and fascinating expression of the 
neurochemical self.  Like Lowell, Sexton’s confessional mode drew heavily from her own 
struggles with mental illness, and in conducting a pharmacentric reading of her poetry, I argue 
that her work adds this new neurochemical sense of identity formation to the socio-economic, 
religious, and gendered perspectives through which selfhood is traditionally considered.   
Moreover, I make the claim that Sexton’s expression of the neurochemical self helps bridge the 
Cartesian divide between two camps of critics: those interested in the mind in Sexton’s work, 
and those interested in the body.  Viewing the self as a neurochemical entity, as I argue Sexton 
does, puts the mind and body in a direct and immediate relationship that also foregrounds the 
role of pharmaceutical intervention in the critical conversation around her work.   
These pharmacentric readings of confessional poets serve not only as examples of an 
interesting and underused reading practice, but also help expose the cultural discourses around 
psychopharmaceuticals in the late 1950s and 1960s.  The era of the amphetamine had passed, 
and the world of uppers that drove the Beat poets was replaced by a variety of pills designed to 
lessen the psychic toll of everyday life by offering a sort of sanctuary in pill form: the tranquilizer.  
The rise and fall of the tranquilizer is itself an important story and one that provides necessary 
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context for the exploration of pharmaceutical literacy, the neurochemical self, and the production 
and reception of confessional poetry to follow.  
 
The Tranquilized Fifties 
 
 
“These are the tranquilized Fifties,/ and I am forty.  Ought I to regret my seedtime?” 
-Robert Lowell, “Memories of West Street and Lepke” (1959) 
 
 
 Like the development of amphetamines a generation earlier, the genesis of 
pharmaceutical tranquilizers is a story of serendipity with roots in WWII and Eastern European 
émigrés.  The future anxieties of millions of Americans were hardly the primary concern of 
British laboratories in the early 1940s engaged in the urgent, practical task of providing penicillin 
to the hospitals and battlefields of the war in Europe.  Due to the exigencies of global conflict, 
most British pharmaceutical concerns had converted their output to help the war effort, and the 
main field of laboratory research became the enhancement and protection of industrial penicillin 
production.  It was in one of these British labs that a Czech bacteriologist by the name of Frank 
Berger made the breakthrough that would eventually become the first blockbuster psychotropic 
drug.  Searching for a preservative that would protect against the breakdown of penicillin during 
shipment, Berger synthesized a chemical called mephenesin in 1945 that indeed protected 
penicillin,1 but also “caused tranquillization, muscular relaxation, and a sleep-like condition” 
(Berger and Bradley 265) in animal testing.  Berger’s inadvertent discovery marked one of the 
earliest uses of the term “tranquillization” in medical literature and would soon spawn an 
unlikely, multi-billion dollar industry.    
 After the war, Berger moved to the U.S. to work for the University of Rochester before 
taking a position with the pharmaceutical company that would eventually become Carter-
                                                           
1 According to medical psychiatry historian Paul E. Stepansky, mephenesin (also called myanesin in the early 
pharmacological literature) protected penicillin against gram-negative bacteria. 
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Wallace.  Working with a Wallace Labs chemist named Bernard Ludwig, Berger developed a 
longer-acting version of mephenesin called meprobamate in 1950.  Building upon mephenesin’s 
reputation for tranquilization, meprobamate was conceived as a drug that could potentially fill a 
gap in the post-war American pharmaceutical market: calming everyday anxieties.  With this 
mechanism in mind and the compound stably synthesized, meprobamate was ready for market.  
Taking inspiration from the cozy hamlet that could be seen from the New Brunswick offices at 
Wallace Labs, the drug was named Miltown, and it launched in May of 1955.   
Miltown was an instant and smashing success, much to the surprise of those at Carter-
Wallace who had shelved the drug for several years prior to release under the mistaken 
assumption that Freudian America would resist pills that presumed a biological source of 
anxiety.  When the team at Carter-Wallace identified minor anxiety as an underserved 
pharmaceutical market, they knew they would have to contend with prevailing psychoanalytic 
theories of anxiety, and they did not expect Miltown to explode in popularity as quickly and as 
vigorously as it did.2  By the end of 1955, just months after its release, Miltown was the fastest-
selling drug to ever enter the U.S. market.  Demand for the drug vastly exceeded supply, and 
“[s]igns reading ‘Out of Miltown’ and ‘Miltown Available Tomorrow’ became familiar sights on 
drugstore windows” (Carey).  Lines grew at pharmacies.  Word of mouth spread quickly. 
According to historian Andrea Tone, “By 1957, Americans had filled 36 million prescriptions for 
Miltown, more than a billion tablets had been manufactured, and tranquilizers accounted for a 
staggering one-third of all prescriptions” (xvi).  Long the province of Freudian psychoanalysts 
and talk therapy, American anxiety had experienced a sudden and radical shift toward the brain 
and the neurochemical.           
                                                           
2 Berger himself certainly did not anticipate the runaway success of his formulation, since in his contract with 
Carter-Wallace he had “agreed to a 1 percent royalty rate at sales under seven and a half million dollars, and 
nothing over” (Shorter 42).  Though $7.5 million probably seemed like an ambitious number prior to the release of 
the drug, Miltown would eventually bring in hundreds of millions of dollars more than that.   
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Figure 3.1: Demand for tranquilizers was so high that pharmacies in the mid-1950s hung signs 
out to advertise when the drugs were in stock.  Source: New England Journal of Medicine, 2009. 
 
So what were the social and cultural conditions in mid-twentieth-century America that 
occasioned this shift from the therapist’s couch to the pharmacist’s counter?  Why did 
pharmacological demand for the treatment of anxiety erupt seemingly from nothing in the mid-
1950s?  What constituted the appeal of a drug like Miltown?  A number of recent histories have 
sought to explore these questions.  In The Age of Anxiety (2009), Andrea Tone looks at the 
advertising and popular representation of Miltown, and the minor tranquilizers,3 to argue “[t]he 
availability of fast-acting, effective, and relatively cheap pills to tame quotidian distress carried 
special meaning to a cold war nation that championed political containment, economic 
efficiency, and consumer convenience, and that valorized homegrown innovations as a symbol 
of America’s technological might” (xv).  Similarly, David Herzberg’s Happy Pills in America 
(2009) analyzes the commercial development and advertising presence of psychotropic drugs 
after WWII to assert that “medicine became part of a new consumerist ‘American dream’ that 
                                                           
3 “Minor tranquilizers” here refers to a wide variety of what pharmacists now call anxiolytic drugs: 
benzodiazepines, barbiturates, carbamates like Miltown, and many others.  The term is out of fashion now, but 
was originally used to draw a distinction between these mid-century anxiolytics and the so-called “major 
tranquilizers,” drugs like Thorazine, that are now referred to as “neuroleptics” or “antipsychotics.”   
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reconfigured conceptions of what a good middle-class life--what happiness itself--ought to be 
like” (4).  In his more caustic book, Before Prozac (2009), Edward Shorter traces the rise and 
fall of Miltown and several other popular psychotropic drugs after WWII, analyzing their 
therapeutic impact to attack the current state of psychopharmacology, arguing that the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), academic psychiatry, and pharmaceutical 
companies have conspired to champion ineffective, expensive drugs at the expense of older, 
cheaper, more effective alternatives.  These three texts together reflect the growing interest in 
pharmacological history, and locate the mid-twentieth-century emergence of popular anxiolytic 
pharmaceuticals as a critical moment in the development of American culture.   
Given the unexpected popularity of Miltown and its descendants, it is easy to classify this 
period of American culture as an anxious one.  Cold War fears of nuclear war with the Soviet 
Union, and the paranoia of Joseph McCarthy’s communist witch hunts contributed to an era 
where anxiety seemed to be the default reaction to global politics; a sentiment presaged by 
historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. who opened his seminal 1948 tome, The Vital Center, with the 
stentorian pronouncement that, “Western man in the middle of the twentieth century is tense, 
uncertain, adrift.  We look upon our epoch as a time of troubles, an age of anxiety” (1).  
Schlesinger was not alone in his perception of an “age of anxiety.”  W.H. Auden’s 1947 poem, 
The Age of Anxiety: A Baroque Eclogue, won the Pulitzer Prize and inspired both a Leonard 
Bernstein symphony and a Jerome Robbins ballet.  “The Age of Anxiety” also gave religious 
philosopher Alan Watts the title of the first chapter in his 1951 book, The Wisdom of Insecurity, 
where he wrote of the benefits of Eastern mindfulness practices in response to “the feeling that 
we live in a time of unusual insecurity,” that has led to “the deepest anxiety” (14).  Clearly, by 
the mid-1950s, anxiety was a thriving discourse in politics, art, and philosophy.         
 However, as Andrea Tone has observed, anxiety was hardly a new idea in 1955.  
Anxiety first showed up in English usage in sixteenth century Catholic humanist Thomas More’s 
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description of Christ dying “without anxietie” (qtd. in Tone 3), but considerations of anxious 
psychological states have an even longer history.  The humors of Hippocrates in ancient Greece 
and the writings of Roman physician Galen in the second century both theorize physiological 
sources for psychological problems that contemporary physicians might now label anxiety.  
Astonishingly, theories of mental illness based at least partially on these ancient notions of an 
excess or deficiency in bodily humors--phlegm, blood, yellow bile (choler) and black bile 
(melancholy)--would remain influential well into the nineteenth century.  As I discuss in the next 
chapter, by the turn of the twentieth century, American anxiety became the purview of 
neurologists, men like George Miller Beard and S. Weir Mitchell, who treated this particular kind 
of nervousness with rest and diet, calling the condition “neurasthenia.”  Though neurasthenia 
was a popular diagnosis for a time, particularly among affluent, white women, its impact on 
psychological understandings of anxiety waned with the emergence of the works of Sigmund 
Freud, whose influence would dominate twentieth-century psychology through the arrival of 
Miltown and beyond.  Freud ushered in the era of psychoanalysis and resisted somatic 
treatments for what he called “neuroses,” since, according to his theories, anxieties had 
psychodynamic, not biological, roots.  Freud’s popularity and the psychoanalytic establishment 
predominated American views of the self through both world wars and well into the post-war 
period.  By the end of WWII, American medical schools were training doctors in Freudian 
terminology. The first edition of the DSM, released in 1952, over a decade after Freud’s death, 
demonstrates a clear engagement with explicitly Freudian concepts and language, officially 
legitimizing psychoanalytic theory’s role in the treatment of American mental health.4   By 1955, 
                                                           
4 This would formally change with the 1980 publication of the DSM-III where objective, diagnostic language would 
replace Freud’s “Anxiety Neuroses” that, according to Allen Frances, et al., provided the “major organizing 
principle” for anxious disorders in 1952’s DSM-I.  For more on the DSM’s transition from Freudian terminology to 
that of psychobiology, see Gary Greenberg’s The Book of Woe (2013), Hannah Decker’s The Making of DSM-III 
(2013), or any practicing psychiatrist with over four decades clinical experience. 
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American anxiety was the well-established terrain of Freudian psychoanalysts and their officially 
sanctioned conceptions of psychic conflict, repressed childhood trauma, and the unconscious.  
It is little wonder, given the dominant psychodynamic understandings of anxiety in 1955, 
that Carter-Wallace underestimated the market appeal of Miltown.   After all, if pills were 
capable of instantly relieving anxieties biologically, then what would be the purpose of years of 
emotional excavation in the psychiatrist’s office? Doesn’t Miltown’s advertised action contradict 
the logic of Freud’s psyche?  Though it would seem that Freudian psychoanalysis and drugs like 
Miltown existed in a mutually exclusive opposition, it took the better part of a decade for this 
conflict to manifest.  As Louis Menand points out, throughout the advertising and psychiatric 
literature of the 1950s, “references to Freud appeared alongside references to tranquillizers with 
no suggestion of a contradiction” (Menand 1, sic), and the real ideological schism between 
Freudians and psychopharmacologists wouldn’t appear until the publication of J. J. Schildkraut’s 
landmark 1965 article outlining the amine theory of depression, and the related efforts of the 
NIMH to establish biological sources of mental anguish that I discuss in chapter 3.5  Thus, the 
window between the 1955 release of Miltown and the entrenchment of Schildkraut’s hypothesis 
in the late 1960s bounds a fascinating and important period for understanding the evolution of 
American identity.  As the cultural and clinical impact of Freudian conceptions of neurotic 
anxieties and the self began to fade, neurochemistry was primed to fill the resulting void in a 
process we might call the neurochemical turn. 
                                                           
5 Schildkraut’s article in the American Journal of Psychiatry, “The Catecholamine Hypothesis of Affective Disorders” 
revolutionized the way we looked at depression (again), asserting that depression is pathogenetically linked to 
brain deficiencies of catecholamines.  
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Figure 3.2: Advertising to psychiatrists throughout the 1960s positioned tranquilizers like Miltown 
as drugs with near limitless application, belonging in “every practice” and helpful to “[v]irtually any 
of your patients, regardless of age or disorder.”  With the important exception of race, the six 
images here portray the wide variety of patient categories companies like Carter-Wallace sought 
to treat with tranquilizers. Source: ProCon.org, 1964. 
 
How then did this neurochemical turn function?  What were the industrial, cultural, and 
social forces that propelled these pills and their logic of biologically-based anxieties into 
mainstream America’s understanding of the self in the middle of the twentieth-century?  
Historians and cultural critics have offered a variety of useful readings of this period to address 
these questions.  Though there are a number of complex answers to these questions, perhaps 
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the most important approach accounts for the role of gender in mid-century notions of mental 
health.  The Rolling Stones famously sang of tranquilizers as “Mother’s Little Helper” in 1966,6 
and it is tempting, given the lasting popularity of that song, to think of Miltown and its 
descendants as primarily drugs of women in the domestic space, but such an impression 
ignores the drug’s early history.  As Andrea Tone points out, although by the late 1960s, two out 
of every three tranquilizer prescriptions were written for women, “in the beginning, tranquilizers 
were very much a man’s drug” (106-107).  Initially, Miltown was positioned to relieve the 
anxieties of high-pressure careers; the drug was known as “executive aspirin” in the 1950s, and 
early critics of psychopharmacology’s popularity viewed Miltown as a sign of crisis in middle-
class, white-collar masculinity.7 Gender traditionalists complained that these drugs dulled the 
edge man has needed to succeed since pre-history, and yet a decade later tranquilizers carried 
the feminine associations of restless domesticity Mick Jagger sung of.  This transition marked a 
significant shift in conceptions of American selfhood, as psychopharmaceutical discourses of 
masculinity, the self-made man of Jack Kerouac’s “Benzedrine-fueled” independence for 
example, were disassembled and reformed to include the broad swath of American women 
whose anxieties represented an under-addressed and fertile market for the pharmaceutical 
industry.  With the imprimatur of objective, scientific dispassion, the developing ideology of the 
neurochemical self allowed pharmaceutical advertisers to frame their products’ function in terms 
                                                           
6 Though not named explicitly in the song, the “little yellow pill” the Stones sang of almost certainly refers to the 
iconic 5mg diazepam pill sold under the trade name Valium, a colossal money-maker for Hoffman-La Roche, which 
held the title of highest-selling U.S. drug from 1968 to 1982.  For more on the history and action of Valium, see 
Calcaterra and Barrow, or Steven Manners’s chapter in Super Pills.   
7 Perhaps the highest profile exploration of mid-century, white-collar masculinity and executive anxiety was AMC’s 
television drama Mad Men, which aired from 2007 to 2015.   Famous for its attention to period detail, the show 
did make passing mention of Miltown in a scene between Betty Draper, the wife of the show’s charismatic, 
philandering Madison Avenue protagonist, and her slightly unhinged friend Francine.  Noticing her friend’s anxiety, 
Francine asks Betty, “Do you want a Miltown?  It’s the only thing keeping me from chewing my nails off” (qtd. in 
Whitaker 126).  The scene is set in 1962, and features two housewives instead of the advertising executives the 
show followed, which makes sense given that by the early ‘60s popular conceptions of Miltown had largely 
transitioned away from treating masculine careerist anxieties, though pharmaceutical advertisers continued to 
trade on the workplace pressures of men throughout the decade (see Figure 1.4). 
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that seemed purely neutral, that claimed an authority derived from chemistry’s objectivity and 
not the highly subjective, gendered legacy of Freudian psychoanalysis.  The promise was of 
scientific, objective interventions into emotional distress that ignored all forms of identity beyond 
the neurochemical.  While this was an enticing promise, as Jonathan Metzl, David Herzberg, 
and others have noted, this putative objectivity collapses with even the slightest investigation 
into the discourses of pharmaceutical advertising in the period, or, as I demonstrate below, with 
an engaged pharmacentric reading of the era’s literary production.   
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Figure 3.3: An advertisement for Meprospan, a slow-release formulation of meprobamate, the 
drug in Miltown, depicts a housewife whose tranquilizer allows her to optimize her performance of 
domestic duties.  Her medication enables her to prepare dinner for her family and “listen carefully 
to P.T.A. proposals,” “even under the pressure of busy, crowded supermarket shopping.”  Though 
originally conceived as drugs to medicate the career stresses of men, tranquilizers were quickly 
repurposed for sale to women, and to reinforce traditional distinctions in domestic labor under the 
guise of dispassionate, medical neutrality.  Source: JAMA, 1960. 
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Anxiety on the Page 
 
A pharmacentric reading of this anxious age’s literature then must engage with these 
various facets of the neurochemical turn: the tension between older Freudian beliefs and newer 
psychopharmacological ideas, the psychic rigors of the urgent careerist workplace against the 
numbing tedium of the domestic space, and the related issues of gender in the rapidly evolving 
culture of 1950s and 1960s America.  One artistic movement where these issues can be seen 
quite clearly is the mode of confessional poetry that emerged during this period.  Originally 
coined by critic M.L. Rosenthal in his review of Robert Lowell’s 1959 book Life Studies, 
“confessional” poetry referred to a loose affiliation of mid-twentieth-century poets who 
foregrounded individual experience and personal voice in their work in ways that I argue are 
particularly useful for exploring the transition to the neurochemical self in the culture.  Though it 
is an imperfect and inexact label, “confessional poetry” has given scholars a term around which 
to categorize the works of poets like Lowell, Sylvia Plath, Anne Sexton, John Berryman, W.D. 
Snodgrass, and others, who, as British poet and critic Alfred Alvarez wrote in his influential 1962 
anthology The New Poetry, pursued “a new seriousness . . . and willingness to face the full 
range of [the poet’s] experience” (qtd. in Wooten 66).  This “new” emphasis on personal 
experience blurred the line between the poem’s speaker and its writer, inviting biography into 
the reading of poetry.  Like the semi-autobiographical texts of the Beat writers, confessional 
poetry embraced artistic openness, frequently eschewing artful or indirect symbolism as the 
confessional poets openly mined their own lives for poetic material previous generations might 
have approached obliquely: mental illness, marital discord, and, of course, drug use.   
 Lowell, and Life Studies in particular, was fêted for this innovative turn toward the poetry 
of the self.  Poet Stanley Kunitz wrote plainly in the pages of the New York Times in 1964 that, 
“Lowell is without doubt the most celebrated poet in English of his generation.”  In 1965, Irvin 
Ehrenpreis wrote of Lowell’s impact, dubbing both his essay and the period, “The Age of 
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Lowell.”  With only slightly less force than Kunitz’s assertion, Adam Kirsch opened his review of 
Lowell’s Collected Poems (2003) suggesting “Robert Lowell was one of the three or four 
greatest American poets of the twentieth century.”  Despite these proclamations of artistic 
significance, Lowell’s legacy is complicated, as much by his personal demons as the evolution 
of his poetry over his thirty-year career.  This complicated legacy is due largely to the influence 
of Ian Hamilton’s widely-read 1982 book, Robert Lowell: A Biography which provided many 
titillating details of Lowell’s personal foibles (drunken fistfights, extramarital affairs, red-baiting, 
his appreciation for the writing style in Mein Kampf, etc.), connecting these moments to the 
poet’s numerous nervous breakdowns and hospitalizations to create a mad caricature of its 
subject.  Though popular and significant, Hamilton’s book has been panned by scholars for its 
one-dimensional, voyeuristic depiction of Lowell and his illness.  Richard Tillinghast suggested 
that Hamilton “presented a damagingly wrong-headed and skewed picture of Lowell the man,” 
and Steven Gould Axelrod has contemplated how to best think about Lowell’s poetry “in the 
aftermath of a highly influential, narratively forceful, but intellectually deficient biography?”  (16).   
Recent scholarship has sought to paint a more nuanced portrait of Lowell and his poetry, 
as Kay Redfield Jameson has done in Robert Lowell, Setting the River on Fire (2017) which 
foregrounds the poet’s struggle with bipolar illness and its influence on his creative process.   
Jameson has a longstanding interest, both personal and academic, in bipolar illness, and her 
work is particularly helpful in developing a pharmacentric understanding of Lowell’s life and art.  
Among its numerous approaches to contextualizing Lowell’s biography, Setting the River on Fire 
explores a number of correspondences from Lowell’s doctors, his friends, and the poet himself 
that detail his nearly twenty hospitalizations for mania, and his exposure to tranquilizers.  As I 
discuss later, Lowell had a complicated relationship with the tranquilizers he was given for his 
manic episodes since they pulled him from his mania but often left him psychologically unable to 
write.  Jameson observes that Lowell’s most fruitful creative periods often coincided with his 
mania, and that his recoveries and subsequent tranquilizer regimens--whether major 
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tranquilizers like the Thorazine I discuss later or minor tranquilizers like Valium8--posed 
significant obstacles to his poetry, in addition to the obvious human cost he and those around 
him endured.  As Jameson’s biography makes clear, Lowell’s life and art were clearly influenced 
by the popular psychiatric drugs of his day, and a thorough reading of his poetry must therefore 
engage with these compounds and the related neurochemical sense of selfhood they impart.  
 The most obvious of Lowell’s poems to analyze from a pharmacentric perspective is Life 
Studies’ “Man and Wife,” which foregrounds its pharmaceutical influence in the opening line: 
“Tamed by Miltown, we lie on Mother’s bed” (87, italics in original).  Such an upfront emphasis 
on Miltown requires an awareness in the reader of the drug’s effects to properly understand the 
poem’s mood.  In a less pharmaceutically literate culture, the poem’s opening would not work; 
the drug’s brand name would be unable to perform the scene-setting labor Lowell asks of it.  
Even just a generation earlier, it is difficult to imagine a poem opening with such a crucial 
emphasis on a particular drug brand name, yet by the end of the 1950s Miltown’s popularity and 
the general pharmaceutical literacy in the U.S. had reached levels where such an opening is not 
just comprehensible but immediately evocative of the tranquilized, domestic state the poet 
explores throughout the poem.  The neurochemical self, the self as an abstraction of innate 
chemical compounds in the body, exists as the unnamed, “untamed” background against which 
a reader understands the psychopharmacologically “tamed” atmosphere that opens the poem.  
Moreover, the “Man and Wife” of the poem’s title lie “tamed by Miltown” in “Mother’s bed,” a 
furniture choice that carries Oedipal connotations, linking psychopharmacology and 
psychotherapy in a moment that reflects the uneasy détente between neurochemical and 
Freudian visions of the self obtaining in 1959.  Despite the personal specificity of this moment, 
                                                           
8 Among many harrowing stories in Setting the River on Fire, Jameson relates a 1975 episode where Lowell’s third 
wife, Caroline Blackwood, and a London physician named Dr. Brass tried to sedate the poet with “a massive valium 
injection . . . [t]he physician told Blackwood that patients had their legs amputated under the same dose he had 
given Lowell.  ‘Cal was still walking around, talking and waving his arms.’  Dr. Brass ‘had never seen anything like 
it.’” (349).   
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and confessional poetry more broadly, Miltown also functions in “Man and Wife” to expand the 
poem’s scope, gesturing to the universal by way of the individual.  As Marjorie Perloff points out, 
“the name Miltown metonymically suggests such terms as Mill Town, mill stone, and small town.  
The poet’s state of anxiety is thus immediately seen as somehow representative of a larger 
American dilemma, of a crisis that occurs in Small Town or Any Town, U.S.A.” (90).  Thus the 
invocation of Miltown in the opening of “Man and Wife” serves three distinct purposes: to 
establish the poem’s tranquilized, domestic tone, to place the period’s two dominant modes of 
psychiatric intervention in conversation around the neurochemical self, and to suggest the 
sweeping Americanness of a seemingly personal, confessional moment.      
Hitched to its introductory Miltown reference and the attendant discourses thereby 
evoked, the poem continues:   
Tamed by Miltown, we lie on Mother’s bed; 
the rising sun in war paint dyes us red; 
in broad daylight her gilded bed-posts shine, 
abandoned almost Dionysian. 
At last the trees are green on Marlborough Street, 
blossoms on our magnolia ignite 
the morning with their murderous five days’ white.     (87)  
 
The sedation of the speaker’s opening line is contrasted here with a series of violent images, 
flashes of danger within symbols of domestic tranquility.  The “rising sun” does not bring a 
peaceful, suburban morning, but wears “war paint” and “dyes us red,” threatening the “tamed” 
couple with the color of rage and the intimation of death in the pun on “dyes/dies.”  The “trees” 
on “Marlborough Street” are finally green, presumably after a winter of bare branches, and the 
magnolias begin to blossom, establishing the poem’s springtime setting.  But the season in 
“Man and Wife” is not a hopeful one of new growth and rebirth; the flowers “ignite/ the morning 
with their murderous five days’ white,” recasting the spring with the threat of “murderous” 
violence, and perhaps, as Marjorie Perloff notes, reminding us of Eliot’s assertion in The Waste 
Land that “April is the cruelest month.”  The broad strokes of the poem’s opening--a married 
couple in bed as the springtime sun rises on their sleepy and floral domestic space--belie the 
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threats and anxieties that Lowell’s pharmaceutical reference and specific diction create.  “Man 
and Wife” opens in a mode that is not tranquil; it is tranquilized.    
A pharmacentric reading of “dyes” in this sedated but hostile domestic scene is further 
complicated by Lowell’s personal history with--and the industrial history of-- 
psychopharmaceuticals.  Chemical dyes have long been tied to the production of 
pharmaceuticals, and throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, chemical companies 
like Bayer and BASF found great success in synthesizing chemicals to replace dyes derived 
from expensive, resource-intensive natural sources,9 and in researching pharmaceutical uses 
for these synthesized chemicals.  One such chemical dye was methylene blue, a coal tar 
derivative that late nineteenth-century German chemist August Bernthsen discovered could do 
more than simply stain materials.  Working with methylene blue, Bernthsen discovered a 
previously unknown family of compounds called phenothiazines that would eventually be used 
in a variety of early medications, primarily anti-malarial drugs, where they experienced moderate 
success as alternatives to quinine.10  Having been established as a promising source of 
pharmaceuticals, phenothiazines were further explored by French neurosurgeon Henri-Marie 
Laborit in the late 1940s, who discovered that a particular phenothiazine derivative, 
promethazine, when combined in a cocktail of other drugs, calmed his patients effectively before 
surgery.  Laborit was so enamored with the potential of promethazine as a sedative that he 
approached Rhone-Poulenc Drug Company about developing an even more sedating version of 
promethazine.  The result was a chlorinated form of promethazine called chlorpromazine, a drug 
that Laborit praised for eliciting a “beatific quietude” (qtd. in Keinan 77) in surgical patients, and 
that he urged his colleagues in psychiatry, Jean Delay and Pierre Deniker, to use on patients in 
                                                           
9 In their history of chemical discovery, F. López-Muñoz et al. point out that prior to the development of cheap 
synthetic alternatives, yellow dye was obtained from the flowers of the Crocus sativus plant that also gives us the 
spice saffron--a cooking ingredient that today retails for $5000-$10,000 per pound.   
10 The primary anti-malarial from the phenothiazine family is a derivative called quinacrine.  
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need of calming.  Delay and Deniker observed chlorpromazine’s remarkable antipsychotic 
effects, especially in patients with manic-depression,11 and the drug was quickly adopted 
worldwide.  By 1954, after spreading throughout Europe, chlorpromazine arrived in the U.S. to 
be marketed by SKF and prescribed to treat the manic-depression of Robert Lowell and millions 
of others under a trade name that would become one of the more successful drugs in 
pharmaceutical history: Thorazine. 
The extent to which Lowell was familiar with Thorazine’s seventy year journey from 
dyeing blues to treating them is unclear, and he left no records to indicate that the reference to 
“dyes” in “Man and Wife” was intended to evoke Thorazine’s history.  However, Lowell was 
notorious for his encyclopedic interest in history, and given the importance of Thorazine to 
Lowell’s mental health in the mid-50s, it is not unlikely that he would have researched the drug’s 
background.  Lowell was first given Thorazine following an intense manic episode in the spring 
of 1954 that left him hospitalized--his fourth such hospitalization for attacks of manic-
depression--in New York’s Payne Whitney Clinic, complaining that he “had been delusional, had 
hallucinated, and now was suffering from a ‘terrible, unpleasant inner and outer distractibility’” 
(Jameson 125).  Chlorpromazine had been first tested on human beings just two-and-a-half 
years earlier, and Lowell was certainly among the very first American psychiatric patients to be 
given the drug.  Lowell improved dramatically after his first Thorazine injection.  “Thank heaven 
[chlorpromazine] seems to be working,” his second wife, Elizabeth Hardwick remarked, “[t]he 
results are quite astounding” (qtd. in Jameson 127).   
While Thorazine had an immediate and “astounding” impact on Lowell’s mania, it also 
saddled him with the drug’s common side effects of torpor and lassitude--side effects that bear a 
striking resemblance to the deadened, enervated tone established in “Man and Wife.”  Thanks 
to Kay Redfield Jameson’s sedulous archival work in Setting the River on Fire, we now have 
                                                           
11 “Bipolar disorder” or “Bipolar illness” in contemporary psychiatric parlance. 
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access to many of Lowell’s medical records from that period, and Lowell’s difficulties with 
Thorazine’s side effects are obvious.  Lowell told his doctors at Payne Whitney that he felt 
“‘restless and weighed down’ by the drug and had a ‘desire for more activity but [felt] less able 
to do it.’  He felt ‘slow witted and helpless intellectually,’ ‘as though I’m carrying 150 lbs. of 
concrete in a race’” (127).12  Showing a less-than-stellar grasp of his medication’s name, Lowell 
wrote from Payne Whitney in June 1954 to Giovanna Erba, a manic crush of his living in Milan, 
“I am undergoing at the moment injections of chlorochromozene or something similar, with the 
result that each pen-stroke is like lifting fifty pounds” (Letters 236).  Lowell’s sense of being 
weighed down by Thorazine is evident in his comments, but the drug did reduce his mania 
enough to see him discharged by September of that year.   
Considered as a whole, these moments--Lowell’s fourth hospitalization for manic-
depression, his heavy feelings of mental and belletristic sedation on Thorazine, the uxorial 
attentions of Elizabeth Hardwick, the flirtatious correspondence with Erba--provide the real-life 
context for the middle section of “Man and Wife”:  
All night I’ve held your hand, 
as if you had 
a fourth time faced the kingdom of the mad— 
its hackneyed speech, its homicidal eye— 
and dragged me home alive. (87)       
 
Indeed Elizabeth Hardwick had “dragged” Lowell “home alive” from his “fourth time” facing “the 
kingdom of the mad,” a term that could refer to either Payne Whitney, the mental hospital where 
Lowell recuperated, or perhaps his state of mania that lead him there.  If read as the former, the 
following line’s “hackneyed speech, its homicidal eye” can be understood as critiques of the 
“hackneyed” clinical language of psychoanalytic treatment set against the “homicidal eye” of 
                                                           
12 “Concrete” was a common metaphor for the impenetrable density imagined of psychiatric intervention in the 
mid-50s.  Lowell’s comments to his doctor here were made just a year before Allen Ginsberg wrote of those “who 
were given instead the concrete void of insulin Metrazol electricity hydrotherapy psychotherapy occupational 
therapy pingpong & amnesia” in “Howl.”  
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harsh somatic treatments, like Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT), that were frequently employed 
in such facilities in the mid-50s, again indicting the curious balance between Freudian and 
biological visions of selfhood under tension during the period. Alternatively, if we read “a fourth 
time facing the kingdom of the mad” as a metaphor for Lowell’s fourth psychotic break, then the 
“hackneyed speech” and “homicidal eye” become the speaker’s own.  From a pharmacentric 
position, Lowell’s complaints of feeling “slow witted and helpless intellectually” on Thorazine can 
be understood to result in “hackneyed speech,” and the delusions and hallucinations of Lowell’s 
manic episode could explain the “homicidal eye” that sees violence in otherwise calm, domestic 
objects, like the rising sun, or magnolias blooming on a spring morning.  Lowell’s language 
allows for either interpretation here, though in both cases the basis for selfhood should be seen 
as engaging in neurochemical discourses resulting from the poet’s tranquilizer-aided recovery 
as well as his wife’s concurrent support.      
The second half of “Man and Wife” shifts to a recollection of the married couple’s first 
meeting, liberally adding biographical details from Lowell and Hardwick’s real life introduction, 
where the poet: 
hand on glass 
and heart in mouth, 
outdrank the Rahvs in the heat 
of Greenwich Village, fainting at your feet- 
too boiled and shy to make a pass, 
while the shrill verve 
of your invective scorched the traditional South. (87) 
 
The poet first met his wife while inebriated, drinking in New York with Phillip Rahv, editor of the 
Parisian Review at the time, and he recalls Hardwick’s lively conversation, her “shrill verve” and 
“invective” aimed at tradition.  This nostalgic reminiscence contrasts sharply with the 
tranquilized spring morning of the poem’s opening.  The orderly, composed space of “gilded 
bed-posts” on dreamy “Marlborough Street” has been changed out for the “heat of Greenwich 
Village,” and the scorching “invective” against southern traditionalism the poet recalls.  
Importantly, for my pharmacentric reading, the poet’s chemical state is also curiously inverted.  
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In both settings, Marlborough Street and Greenwich Village, the poet is sedated in the presence 
of his violently impassioned wife, but the nature of that sedation changes the contexts of those 
moments.  In his nostalgic reverie, the poet is drunk, “too boiled and shy/ and poker-faced to 
make a pass.”  The booze has kept the speaker from acting, masking his emotions like a card 
player might.  The sense here imparted is one of restraint: restraining feelings, restraining 
emotions, restraining the desire to “make a pass.” This reminiscence of restraint is sandwiched 
between the poem’s opening and closing sections where medicated states indicate not simply 
the restraint of emotions, but their total absence. This contrast is clear in the poem’s final lines, 
where the action returns to the present tense, transitioning back to the tranquilized, “concrete” 
mode of psychopharmacological domesticity: 
Now twelve years later, you turn your back. 
Sleepless, you hold 
your pillow to your hollows like a child; 
your old-fashioned tirade- 
loving, rapid, merciless- 
breaks like the Atlantic Ocean on my head. (87) 
 
Where once the wife had railed against southern traditionalism in a hot, Greenwich Village bar, 
she now delivers her “old-fashioned tirade” to a husband she will not face, a man so thoroughly 
anesthetized by tranquilizers that her words crash over him like ocean waves along a rocky 
shore.   
The vital image in this closing sequence is the poem’s final word, the speaker’s “head,” 
which is here configured as a rock, or perhaps a cliff, against which the wife’s oceanic “tirade” 
breaks, leaving the reader with a representation of the self that illuminates the intersection of 
psychopharmacology and gender at the poem’s core.  In an inversion of the classic Medusa 
myth, the poem closes on a moment of stoicism and impassivity in the face of feminine fury, the 
speaker’s “head” already turned to stone before the woman attacks.  The speaker’s “head,” the 
fleshly container of his neurochemistry, has been fortified against attack by his tranquilizers, but 
this has come at a cost.  Neurochemically unable to experience the feelings he once drank to 
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restrain, he lives devoid of passion.   The wife, “loving, rapid, merciless,” turns her back to the 
speaker, holding a pillow to her “hollows” suggesting an emptiness the speaker is unable to fill.  
Given that this moment plays out with a married couple in a bed, a potential pharmacentric 
reading of “hollows” here could imply the speaker is unable to perform sexually--an occasional 
side effect with anti-psychotics like Thorazine,13 and, to a lesser extent, the minor tranquilizers 
like Miltown.  More likely though, is that the speaker is unable to satisfy his wife emotionally and 
intellectually, since his medication has “tamed” him, reducing his “head” to an unfeeling stone 
against which her marine fury crashes futilely.  He is as unfeeling as a rocky coast and though 
this protects him against his wife’s tirade, it perhaps has also caused it.  
 
Happy Housewife Heroin(e) 
 
One fruitful application of a pharmacentric reading of “Man and Wife” and its chemical 
context is to invert the typical way in which gender is read in the poem.  As in the reading 
above, the poem has been traditionally read through a masculine lens that privileges the male 
perspective.  The reasons for this are self-evident: the poem was written by a man, from the 
position of a male speaker.  The reader is implicitly invited to don the speaker’s masculine point 
of view.  Even the poem’s title reinforces this assumed position by pairing “Man”--singular, 
independent, first-- “and Wife” a position that before the poem has even begun is subordinated, 
defined only contingently, a role that cannot exist outside its relation to the titular “Man.”  The 
poem would function quite differently were it called “Man and Woman,” or “Wife and Husband,” 
                                                           
13 “Ejaculatory disorders/impotence” is indeed listed as a potential adverse autonomic reaction in Thorazine’s FDA 
prescribing information, sanctioning this pharmacentric reading in “Man and Wife,” though, to be fair, “priapism” 
is paradoxically also listed in the same section.   
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but its resolutely asymmetrical title, “Man and Wife,” funnels the reader into its logic of a 
privileged masculine perspective before it even begins.14   
Moreover, the anxiety that animates the poem has a distinctly gendered quality, and 
unpacking these elements can help us make sense of larger social and pharmacological 
discourses operating around the evolving issues of gender in the 1950s and 1960s.  Looked at 
from the wife’s position, “Man and Wife” clearly, and perhaps unintentionally, implicates the 
speaker, his mental illness, and his medication in the maintenance of the system whereby 
educated, middle-class women were relegated to anxiety-producing, unfulfilling domestic labor 
like the kind so plangently decried by Betty Friedan in The Feminine Mystique (1963).  Among 
the numerous paths she explored in her now-famous analysis of women’s magazines across 
this period, Friedan traced the evolution of heroine characters in magazine fiction, finding a 
fundamental change in the representation of women between the late 1930s and the early 
1960s.  From 1939 to 1949, Friedan argues, heroines of such stories were primarily “happily, 
proudly, adventurously, attractively career women--who loved and were loved by men.  And the 
spirit, courage, independence, determination--the strength of character they showed in their 
work . . . --were part of their charm” (85-86).  Though this passage displays the blindness to 
issues of race, class, and sexuality that theorists like bell hooks, Rachel Bowlby, and others 
would later criticize Friedan for,15 it also highlights the celebration of spirited, independent, 
career women that would largely disappear from such stories in the 1950s.  Friedan suggests 
that these strong female characters were replaced in the 1950s and 1960s by what she called 
the “happy housewife heroine”: the cheerful, submissive woman who enters “occupation: 
                                                           
14 To be fair to Lowell, this is also true of the matrimonial pronouncement the title mimics. 
15 In her 1984 book From Margin to Center, hooks attacked Friedan’s work for its myopia, writing that Friedan “did 
not speak of the needs of women without men, without children, without homes.  She ignored the existence of all 
non-white women and poor white women” (2).  Eight years later, Bowlby’s Still Crazy After All These Years, 
criticized The Feminine Mystique for homophobic suggestions that homosexuality was “a sinister source of cultural 
contamination” (86). 
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housewife” on her census form.  In failing to find satisfaction in this new role, women of the 
1950s and 1960s experienced what Friedan famously called “the problem that has no name.” 
Friedan herself could hardly have concocted a more direct example of the change from 
vibrant female independence to stifling domestic dissatisfaction than that experienced by the 
wife in “Man and Wife.”  What little we know of her life before marriage maps pretty cleanly onto 
Friedan’s image of the spirited, independent women of 1939’s magazine fiction: she spends her 
evenings out in the exciting “heat of Greenwich village,” passionately debating intellectual 
issues with eminent literary critics and besotted poets.  When Friedan writes of those women 
whose “individuality was something to be admired, not unattractive to men, that men were 
drawn to them as much for their spirit and character as their looks” (86), she could easily have 
been describing the woman who “scorched the traditional south” with the “shrill verve of [her] 
invective” while the poem’s speaker looked on with admiration, too “boiled and shy to make a 
pass.”  But in the tranquilized domestic setting of Marlborough Street the wife has changed.  
She is no longer lively and independent. She is now the poem’s titular “Wife,” trapped by the 
“gilded bed-posts” of “Mother’s bed,” consigned to the two roles of 1950s femininity--wife and 
mother-- that do not deliver on their promise of satisfaction.  She holds her husband’s hand all 
night, offering the care of a mother, but maternal and wifely duties, much less the blending of 
the two, fail to fulfill her.  She turns her back on her husband, sleepless and dissatisfied, holding 
a pillow to her “hollows,” a word choice that could suggest sexual longing, as mentioned above, 
or even an inability to conceive.     
Miltown’s role in the Wife’s experience of “the problem that has no name” is complicated 
by Lowell’s ambiguous language, as well as larger pharmacological issues related to gender.  In 
the line “Tamed by Miltown, we lie on Mother’s bed,” it remains unclear who exactly is taking the 
anxiety medication.  Does the first-person, plural pronoun “we” suggest that both the speaker 
and his wife have taken the tranquilizer, or simply that one of them has, thus “taming” them 
both?  It remains unclear precisely who has taken the drug, but the marital “we” has been 
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tamed; what was once a vibrant and heated union has been domesticated by Miltown.  A 
pharmacentric reading of this “taming” sees the collision of two different gender discourses 
operating around Miltown during the period of Lowell’s composition,16 made possible by the 
poem’s uncertain declaration regarding who has taken the drug, and an increasingly 
pharmaceutically literate readership that would interpret the poem differently based upon which 
party swallowed the pill.  If we read the poem’s “Man” as having taken Miltown, then Lowell’s 
work contributes to the belief of 1950s gender traditionalists who held that tranquilizers were 
partly to blame for a crisis in white, middle-class masculinity.  Alternatively, if the “Wife” from 
Lowell’s poem has taken the Miltown that has “tamed” the marriage, then the pharmacological 
interpretation necessarily shifts. The effect of tranquilizers on masculinity recedes in such an 
interpretation, and the pharmaceutical discourse around the anxieties of thwarted ambition and 
stifling domestic monotony in educated women assumes primacy.  In either case, the impact of 
neurochemical notions of selfhood become refracted through gender dynamics made clear 
through the application of pharmaceutical literacy to the poem’s opening reference to Miltown. 
The confluence of the emerging notion of neurochemical selfhood and the gendered 
themes processed through confessional poetry bring to mind another poet, and one of Robert 
Lowell’s former students: Anne Sexton.  Sexton’s poetry is not as widely studied as Lowell’s, but 
her experiences with tranquilizers and mid-century discourses of domestic tedium create 
intriguing similarities with his work.  Like Lowell, Sexton endured numerous breakdowns and 
psychiatric hospitalizations, culminating with a two week stay at Mass. General in 1964 where 
biographer Diane Wood Middlebrook identified a critical moment of psychopharmaceutical 
                                                           
16 “Taming” as a term for the domestication of formerly unruly women has a long history in literature, dating back 
at least to Shakespeare’s Taming of the Shrew, whose titular metaphor describes the process by which Kate, the 
feisty daughter of a wealthy merchant, is forced to submit to marrying the protagonist, Patruchio, after a series of 
abuses that modern readers might find difficult to understand as comedy. 
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intervention in Sexton’s life.  After an ineffectual course of Tofranil,17 Sexton was given 
Thorazine to quell her mania.  The result was an immediate reduction in her symptoms, but she 
complained of the drug’s dulling effect on her creativity in language that mirrored that of Lowell’s 
similar complaints, and also exposed her conception of selfhood as related to the brain 
chemicals Thorazine effected.  After three weeks on the drug, Sexton wrote that “manic me is 
under control thanks to the Thorazine,” (qtd. in Middlebrook, 226) but that the neurological side 
effects of the drug (sedation, weight gain, facial tics and distortions) were wreaking havoc on 
her life and her art.  According to Middlebrook, Sexton “not only resisted the drug’s side effects, 
she resisted its frontal attack on the linguistic powers she referred to as ‘Language,’ often 
capitalized--the name for her inspiration that most acknowledged its alliance with her illness” 
(226).  As Sexton herself put it poetically, “Thorazine, they say, is supposed to make the rhymer 
go away” (qtd. in Middlebrook 226).  Just as Robert Lowell found himself “slow-witted and 
helpless intellectually” on Thorazine, so too did Sexton find herself battling the drug’s slowing 
effects on her creative process.  Similarly, these struggles against the drug’s deleterious effect 
on creativity carried ontological implications that necessarily impacted the poet’s notions of 
selfhood.  Sexton’s expressions of “manic me” and “the rhymer” who are thwarted by the 
chemical intervention of Thorazine indicate a vision of selfhood vulnerable to 
psychopharmaceutical manipulation, a delicate neurochemical mix that could be artistically 
productive but threatened her ability to function in day-to-day life. These neurochemical 
considerations would linger in Sexton’s poetry throughout her career, impacting both how she 
created her art and how it was received.    
 One common observation shared by many critics of Sexton’s work is the essential 
absence of variety in her subject matter.  Unlike Plath or Lowell, the poets to which she is most 
                                                           
17 Tofranil (imipramine) is an early tricyclic antidepressant.  As I discuss in Chapter 3, antidepressants like Tofranil 
were not nearly as popular as tranquilizers in the 50s and 60s and would remain on the fringes of pharmaceutical 
significance until the introduction of SSRI antidepressants in the late 80s.   
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frequently compared, Sexton rarely wrote of subjects beyond her own immediate experience.  
To those who criticized confessional poetry for its solipsistic tendencies, Sexton was 
emblematic of the mode’s too-personal turn inward.  As Joyce Carol Oates put it, “Sexton was 
frequently criticized for the narrow range and intensity of her preoccupations: always the self, 
the self as victim, the self as Narcissus, the self as destructive unappeasable bully, more than 
half in love with sickness and madness and her own ‘violent heart’” (52-53).  Oates’s 
observation captures, in its mention of “sickness,” “madness,” and “heart,” both the corporeal 
and psychological themes that emerge from a close study of Sexton’s poetry.  In a sort of mock-
Cartesian duality, early analysis of Sexton’s work frequently focused on either the body or the 
mind of the poet.  Critics responding to the former, to the corporeal elements in Sexton’s work, 
often belied a strong undercurrent of misogyny given the gendered specifics they took issue 
with.  In a 1963 New York Times Book Review of Sexton’s poetry, writer James Dickey 
suggested “[i]t would be hard to find a writer who dwells more insistently on the pathetic and 
disgusting aspects of bodily experience.”18  Sexton’s sometime friend, poet and literary critic 
Louis Simpson wrote glowingly of her first book, calling it “a phenomenon . . . to remind us, 
when we have forgotten in the weariness of literature, that poetry can happen,” (qtd. in Maio 87) 
but later abandoned her poetry, writing in Harper’s “A poem titled ‘Menstruation at Forty’ was 
the straw that broke this camel’s back” (qtd. in Middlebrook 264).  
Other early critics took issue, not with the body, but with the mind on display in Sexton’s 
poetry.  Charles Gullans wrote of Sexton’s Live or Die in 1970 that, “these are not poems at all 
and I feel that I have, without right or desire, been made a third party to her conversations with 
her psychiatrist,”19 finding irritation with “the tone of hysterical melodrama which pervades most 
                                                           
18 As noted by Tamar Lehrich, and others, this was the same James Dickey whose putative aversion to the 
“pathetic and disgusting aspects of bodily experience” somehow still allowed him to graphically detail the rape of 
two men on a canoe trip in his 1970 novel Deliverance.   
19 Gullans’s attack here perfectly and inadvertently anticipates the uproar that followed the release of Diane Wood 
Middlebrook’s 1991 book Anne Sexton: A Biography.  Middlebrook was granted access to over 300 hours of 
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of the writing,” and ultimately claiming that her poems “are not poems, they are documents of 
modern psychiatry and their publication is a result of the confusion of critical standards in the 
general mind” (148-49).  That Gullans would conclude with a criticism of the “general mind” is 
ironic given his clear distaste for the very specific “mind” on display in the poetry, and his coded 
criticism no doubt trades on the distaff connotations of “hysterical.”  Other critics found Sexton’s 
psychological work more compelling, particularly as it relates to the process of identity 
formation.  Greg Johnson found Sexton’s psychological journey “heroic,” arguing “to understand 
her poetry as a record of this struggle, and as a testament to its value and importance, is to 
appreciate its special relevance to the contemporary world, a world of increasing disjunction 
between personal and social selves and one whose chaotic, literally ‘maddening’ effect on the 
individual mind Anne Sexton manages to convey with that blend of craft and vulnerability that is 
her special magic” (172).  Here Johnson finds not hysterical, embarrassing psychiatric over-
sharing but a magically vulnerable struggle toward mental health and the task of maintaining a 
self against maddening forces of contemporary society.  Indeed the preoccupation with 
suicide20--a theme central to analysis of Sexton’s poetry as well as, sadly, her biography--
emphasizes this connection between psychology and physiology, since the final act of ending 
the physical self is necessarily preceded by the long and often beleaguered contemplation of 
the psychological self.   
So where then does the neurochemical self intervene in these analyses?  How do 
emerging notions of the psychological self as a reflection or composition of physical chemicals 
                                                           
audiotapes recording Sexton’s sessions with her psychiatrist, Dr. Martin T. Orne, who treated her between 1956 
and 1964.  Though Middlebrook treats the material with transparent care and delicacy, much of the conversation 
raised by the book’s publication surrounded the ethical and moral complications of publicly releasing such private 
and intimate information. 
20 Critical attention to death and suicide in Sexton’s work is a mini-genre unto itself.  For deeper, suicide-specific 
criticism see Diana Hume George’s “Anne Sexton’s Suicide Poems,” William H. Shurr’s “Mysticism and Suicide: 
Anne Sexton’s Last Poetry,” or, really, the introduction to virtually any article that compares Sexton to Sylvia Plath.   
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in the brain influence how Sexton’s work was produced and received?  Firstly, the idea that the 
mind is composed of chemical compounds produced by the brain disrupts the tidy mind/body 
split of older philosophical traditions, and influenced both the critical landscape into which 
Sexton’s poems were released and her own conceptions of self that the poetry developed from.  
The central poem to such a reading is Sexton’s “The Addict,” from her 1966 collection, Live or 
Die.  The speaker in “The Addict” details the ritual of pharmaceuticals she takes every night, 
and muses about the relationship between her own selfhood and the influence of her drugs.  
The poem’s first stanza makes clear the speaker’s preoccupation with pharmaceuticals:  
Sleepmonger, 
Deathmonger, 
with capsules in my palms each night, 
eight at a time from sweet pharmaceutical bottles 
I make arrangements for my pint sized journey. 
I’m the queen of this condition. 
I’m an expert on making this trip 
And now they say I’m an addict. 
Now they ask why. 
Why!  (165)  
 
Like Lowell’s “Tamed by Miltown,” Sexton’s poem opens with a clear reliance on the reader’s 
pharmaceutical literacy, anchoring the scene to the “capsules” from “sweet pharmaceutical 
bottles” that bring sleep each night.  The poem’s first stanza also acts as a sort of mock-epic 
invocation, taming grand images by pairing them with the quotidian: “Deathmonger” is demoted 
to “Sleepmonger,” the speaker is a “queen” but just of “this condition,” and the “journey” she 
takes is only “pint sized.”  Thus, pharmaceuticals as objects are foregrounded, but the poem 
also creates a pharmaceutical effect, as grand, potentially intense feelings, are mitigated by the 
presence of the pills.  The epic is tranquilized, the adventure is simply a short “trip”--a pun that 
itself only works if the reader brings a certain level of pharmaceutical literacy to the poem.   
This tranquilized mode continues in the second stanza where Sexton’s contemplation of 
her self and her drugs offers an unnervingly sedate approach to death: 
Don’t they know that I promised to die! 
I’m keeping in practice. 
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I’m merely staying in shape. 
The pills are a mother, but better, 
Every color and as good as sour balls. 
I’m on a diet from death. (165) 
 
Sexton’s hallmark cavalier attitude toward death and dying is on full display here, as the 
sedating effects of the speaker’s nightly pill regimen are presented as “practice” at death, 
“staying in shape” for the “promised” end of the self, a self that in Sexton’s formulation here is 
both constituted and threatened by chemicals.  As in the first stanza, sleep stands in for death, 
recasting the regular chore of falling asleep as a nightly banishing of the self, the drugs offering 
a habitual exercise in losing life.  Death is so often feared and approached with terror, or 
perhaps awe, but Sexton’s tone here is satirical, impertinent in the face of doom.  Death is a 
“promise” to be kept, a state that pills can provide a “diet”-strength version of, before the real 
indulgence to come.  Sexton’s unnerving tone here combines the frivolous (diets, exercising) 
and the macabre (death and dying) in a manner that Helen Vendler calls “malevolent flippancy” 
(33).  According to a pharmacentric reading, this malevolently flippant aesthetic is produced 
because the reader already has a sense for the soporific and numbing effects of bedtime 
pharmaceuticals and can imagine the tranquilized sleep they provoke on a trajectory between 
waking life and final death.   
“Addict’s” malevolent flippancy toward mortality, its refusal to take living seriously, 
highlights the blurry, thin line between life and death while setting up the maternal metaphor that 
a pharmacentric reading makes clear.  “The pills are a mother,” the poem asserts, “but better,/ 
Every color and as good as sour balls.”  This line offers a clear example of Sexton’s 
pharmacentric and malevolently flippant attitude toward cherished institutions.  Motherhood, the 
source of all life, is here perversely conflated with the pills she has established as a form of 
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practicing death.21  Pharmaceuticals put the speaker to sleep, as a mother might a child, only 
“better,” as the childlike malevolent flippancy extends to the pills, imagined in vibrant candy 
colors, “as good as sour balls.”  In this reading, the speaker has been reduced to the state of a 
sleepy child by the safe, inviting, imagined maternity of her pills, but another reading of this line 
would see the pills as an escape for the speaker-mother.  If a pharmaceutically-literate reader 
approaches the speaker’s pill habit with the contemporary understanding of tranquilizers as a 
common prescription for the anxieties of modern domestic life, then “the pills are a mother, but 
better” can be interpreted differently.  Perhaps the release provided by the pills is freedom from 
the pressure of mothering--a different and preferable addiction. 
The third stanza of “Addict” contains the poem’s most salient lines for a pharmacentric 
reading and offer confessional poetry’s clearest engagement with the developing idea of a 
neurochemical self.    
Yes, I admit 
it has gotten to be a bit of a habit- 
blows eight at a time, socked in the eye, 
hauled away by the pink, the orange,  
the green and white goodnights. 
I’m becoming something of a chemical 
mixture. 
that’s it! (165) 
 
In exploring her addiction to eight colorful pills a night, the poem’s speaker arrives at a line that 
is emblematic of the period’s evolving sense of selfhood: “I’m becoming something of a 
chemical/ mixture.”  This line could easily be interpreted as a simple critique of drug addiction.  
Eight pills a night “hauling away” the speaker would certainly constitute more than the 
understated “bit of a habit,” and would be generally reflective of the increasing awareness of the 
dangers of addictive psychopharmaceuticals in U.S. culture in the early 1960s.  Even though 
                                                           
21 This is terrain Sexton worked frequently.  In her celebrated 1960 collection, To Bedlam and Part Way Back, 
Sexton writes of the psych ward’s night nurse “passing/ out the evening pills” and of a white sleeping pill as a 
“splendid pearl” (29),  in her maternally-titled poem “Lullaby.”     
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these pills were made in an expensive lab and (presumably) prescribed by a doctor, they could 
still lead to addiction--a truth that many in the late 50s and early 60s were just realizing.  
Miltown’s meteoric rise was thwarted by the discovery that its innocuous promises to salve daily 
anxiety came with addictive properties.22  In the U.S., government interest in the addictive 
nature of psychopharmaceuticals lead to a variety of hearings, committees and laws dismantling 
the traditional notion of a bifurcated market between narcotics (i.e. criminal street products) and 
medicines (i.e. doctor-prescribed compounds), and investigating the increasing power of 
pharmaceutical advertisers to influence cultural attitudes.23  The effect of this public interest in 
brain drugs and addiction was an increase in pharmaceutical literacy in the culture: a rise in the 
knowledge and understanding of psychopharmaceuticals, how they worked, and some of their 
dangers.  Sexton’s “bit of a habit” before bed would thus have been read with the proper edge of 
understated danger, an extension of her malevolently flippant tone made legible only to 
pharmaceutically literate readers.  A pharmaceutically literate readership would have been able 
to make the connection between the poem’s critique of addiction and its self-destructive theme 
of toying with death.    
Moreover, the line “I am becoming something of a chemical mixture,” speaks directly to 
the idea of identity as molecular compound: a neurochemical self.  In the world of the poem, the 
addiction to eight nightly pills has progressed to a point where the speaker’s identity is 
subsumed by the chemicals she ingests, but the line works much more broadly as well, 
                                                           
22  Among the earliest alarms regarding Miltown’s addictive nature was sounded by Frederick Lemere.  Lemere, a 
doctor who had prescribed Miltown to hundreds of patients, described his troubling observations of abuse and 
dependency behavior in two articles: “Drug Habituation” in JAMA, and “Habit Forming Properties of 
Meprobamate” in AMA Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, both in 1956.     
23 The most relevant action on Capitol Hill in these regards was discussed in the Kefauver Antitrust and Monopoly 
Committee meetings, the Humphrey Committee hearings, and the Nelson hearings.  For more thorough histories 
on 1950s-1960s legislative interest in the pharmaceutical industry see Steven Manners’s chapter on Valium in 
Super Pills (2006), David Herzberg’s study of barbiturates in Happy Pills in America, or Nikolas Rose’s examination 
of tardive dyskinesia in “Neurochemical Selves.”  
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capturing the ontological uncertainty of early neurochemistry emerging in the 1960s.  The idea 
here, the very root of the psychopharmacological project, is that chemicals in the brain can 
change not just how you feel, but who you are.  You are not a being that experiences 
fluctuations of brain chemicals: you are those chemicals.  To manipulate those chemicals is to 
“become something of a chemical mixture,” in a way that is unique to brain drugs.  Drugs that 
claim to act on our chemical makeup to alter these conditions must therefore also act on who 
are.  We have become something of a chemical mixture.   “That’s it!” 
The conclusion of “The Addict” carries this theme of neurochemical identity into another 
traditional realm of identity: religion, an intersection that Sexton worked throughout much of her 
career.24  Sexton explores her nightly eight-pill regimen as a sort of ritual: 
and I don’t stand there in my winding sheet. 
I’m a little buttercup in my yellow nightie 
eating my eight loaves in a row 
and in a certain order as in 
the laying on of hands 
or the black sacrament. 
 
It’s a ceremony 
but like any other sport 
it’s full of rules. 
It’s like a musical tennis match where 
 my mouth keeps catching the ball. 
Then I lie on my altar 
elevated by the eight chemical kisses. (166) 
 
The religious imagery here, the “loaves,” “the laying on of hands,” the “sacrament,” the 
“ceremony,” the “altar,” are twisted by their reappropriation as facets of the speaker’s pill 
addiction.  In another example of Sexton’s penchant for malevolent flippancy, she skewers the 
self-serious forms and rituals of her Christian upbringing and conflates them with the pills that 
                                                           
24 Sexton’s “Protestant Easter” is emblematic of her struggles to find identity in religion.  The poem takes the 
perspective of an eight-year-old girl sitting in Easter services, thinking “Who are we anyhow?/ What do we belong 
to?/ Are we a we?/ I think that he rose/ but I’m not quite sure/ and they don’t really say/ singing their Alleluia/ in 
the churchy way” (130). 
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have become such a central part of her life, impudently pairing holy rituals with “chemical 
kisses.”  She does not wear the “winding sheet” of the dead, she is “a little buttercup in [her] 
yellow nightie,” playing a ridiculous game of “musical tennis.”  Here the neurochemical sense of 
self trumps the traditional system for developing identity, as the pills take on mock-religious 
importance.   
Sexton’s elevation of her pills at the expense of religion also asks the pharmaceutically 
literate reader to compare the effects of these two systems of identity, leading to the poem’s 
final lines. 
 What a lay me down this is 
with two pink, two orange, 
two green, two white goodnights. 
Fee-fi-fo-fum- 
Now I'm borrowed. 
Now I'm numb. (166) 
 
Having blurred the lines between the ontological processes of religion and psychopharmacology 
with the neurochemical metaphors of the previous stanzas, Sexton’s coda presents the reader 
with a playful conclusion cementing that link.  As “The Addict” portrays it, both religion and 
psychopharmaceuticals share relevant similarities.  Both impose strict instructions, both require 
dedication to follow, both promise salvation, both seek to mitigate the fear of death, and both 
are dispensed by men in positions of unquestioned power.25  Sexton’s final line, a sing-song 
nursery rhyme that presages her later interest in folklore and fairy tales,26 lays out the final 
connection: the “numb” feeling brought on by her eight colorful pills as a preferable alternative to 
the hollow, absence of feeling offered by Christianity.  Sexton ends her pharmaceutically 
                                                           
25 Sexton’s troubling history with psychiatrists in particular is telling here, as one of her long term therapists, Dr. 
Martin T. Orne, recorded her sessions and posthumously released these confidential recordings to her biographer, 
and another, referred to in Middlebrook’s biography by the pseudonym Dr. Ollie Zweizung, was sleeping with her 
while continuing to treat her, and charge her for his time. 
26 Sexton’s 1971 collection, Transformations, maintains her focus on personal struggles but also reimagines 
seventeen Grimm’s fairy tales in the process. 
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influenced poem with an image of deadness, a “numb” absence of feeling that recalls the 
“hollows” and unfeeling, rocky “head” that closes Lowell’s “Man and Wife.”    
 
Something of a Chemical Mixture 
 
“You can tranquilize your mind/ So go running for the shelter of a mother's little helper/ 
And four help you through the night, help to minimize your plight.” 
-The Rolling Stones, “Mother’s Little Helper” (1966) 
  
As both Robert Lowell and Anne Sexton demonstrate, the turn toward the personal that 
marked the most prominent stylistic innovation of the confessional poets of the 50s and 60s 
necessarily requires a certain pharmaceutical literacy to properly contextualize.  Pharmacentric 
methods offer new ways of reading these established texts and unlock the visions of the self as 
a neurochemical entity circulating at the time, both in the culture more broadly, and within the 
self-conceptions of these artists whose experiences with tranquilizers shaped their relations to 
their illnesses and informed their artistic production.  Though both Lowell and Sexton are 
traditionally read in relation to their frequent mental breakdowns and relatively early deaths, 
their works have rarely been understood as vital to understanding mid-century conceptions of 
pharmaceuticals and neurochemical identity, as I argue their relationships to tranquilizers justify 
here.   
The era of the tranquilizer in American history didn’t end with the deaths of Robert 
Lowell and Anne Sexton, nor even with the revelations of addictive properties in these drugs.  
Government regulations and pharmaceutical literacy both increased dramatically over the 
period, but tranquilizers continued to be among the most popular medications for Americans 
through the 1970s.  Newer drugs in the benzodiazepine family, such as Librium and Xanax, 
replaced older formulations like Miltown and Equanil in the popular treatment of anxiety, and the 
pharmaceutical boom in U.S. industry and culture continued apace.  Indeed, the era of treating 
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anxiety primarily through tranquilizers lasted well into the 1980s, at which point a relatively 
dormant class of antidepressant drugs would re-emerge to dominate cultural, economic, and 
literary discourses around American psychopharmaceuticals, with the help of a new formulation 
and a new twist on the theory of neurochemistry’s relation to emotional distress.   
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Chapter 3 - “Nothing but a Pack of Neurons”: Antidepressants and the 1990s Depression 
Memoir 
 
  
“The Astonishing Hypothesis is that ‘You,’ your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your 
ambitions, your sense of identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast 
assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll’s Alice might have 
phrased it: ‘You’re nothing but a pack of neurons.’”  
 -Francis Crick (qtd. in Artigas 11) 1994 
  
 Like amphetamines before them, tranquilizers would eventually relinquish the mantle of 
most popular psychopharmaceutical class in U.S. culture. As medical research, psychiatric 
practice, and pharmaceutical industry developed across the latter half of the twentieth century, a 
new breed of drugs emerged to treat many of the same anxieties and psychic distresses that 
had previously driven the Benzedrines and Miltowns of the mid-century into cultural and literary 
significance.  These new drugs, a constellation of molecules that came to be known as 
antidepressants, would take pharmaceutical companies to unprecedented commercial heights, 
become commonplace in both psychiatric practice and broader cultural discourse, and come to 
represent the last chapter in the story of how psychopharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical 
literacy came to shape American literature’s expression of the self as a neurochemical being.   
 This chapter will argue antidepressants represent the clearest formulation of the logic of 
the neurochemical self, taking the groundwork laid by amphetamines and tranquilizers from 
previous generations, and establishing a scientifically-justified, commercially-exploitable, and 
thoroughly American vision of the self as a complex, but ultimately decodable, play of synapses 
and neurotransmitters within the brain.  After establishing the historical and cultural context of 
the rise of antidepressants, the following pages will seek to support the claim that the immense 
popularity of the antidepressant era becomes possible only because it coincides with--and 
ultimately begins to produce--a very specific formulation of the neurochemical self.   
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Beyond commercial and scientific interests, this psychopharmaceutical era directly 
influenced literary production, as can be seen most clearly with an examination of a micro-genre 
within 1990s literature: the depression memoir.  After identifying the psychopharmacological 
influences that govern this particular genre and its unique historical moment, this chapter uses 
two such memoirs--Elizabeth Wurtzel’s Prozac Nation (1994) and Meri Nana-Ama Danquah’s 
Willow Weep for Me (1998)--to argue for the necessity of a shared neurochemical view of 
selfhood between author and audience.  These works will be seen to rely on an assumed 
understanding of the self as an expression of neurochemical forces consistent with the logic that 
underpins the marketing and sale of the very drugs at the center of the treatment these memoirs 
examine.  Moreover, both the production and reception of these depression memoirs will be 
seen to be constructed from the shared vocabulary and communal understanding of drugs and 
how they operate that I have called “pharmaceutical literacy.”    
Previously I have defined “pharmaceutical literacy” as the vocabulary of, and related to, 
drugs and their function in literary texts.  Throughout the twentieth century I have traced the rise 
of this specific pharmaceutically-inflected discourse through the use of drug brand names, the 
assumptions of drug-action familiarity in the reading audience, and the ways that writers have 
mimicked the function of certain drugs in the form, symbolism, and inspiration of their works.  I 
have argued that the rise in prevalence of this pharmaceutical literacy is directly connected to 
the rise in prevalence of pharmaceuticals in everyday life in the twentieth century, and a clear 
manifestation of how thoroughly imbricated pharmaceuticals became into American culture 
through advertising, popular culture, and explosive increases in prescription rates of certain 
drugs.  The depression memoirs of the 1990s represent a particularly focused example of this 
pharmaceutical literacy, specific to the drugs and actions that are their purview: 
antidepressants. 
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The Rise of Antidepressants 
 
Antidepressants were not new drugs when they ascended to the highest peaks of 
cultural and literary importance in the 1990s.  Despite the veneer of innovation that attended the 
marketing and promotion of antidepressants at the end of the century, the drugs were actually 
conceived over the course of several years following the conclusion of World War II. Like so 
many other blockbuster American brain drugs, antidepressants were developed more-or-less 
alongside antipsychotics and tranquilizers in the early 1950s, an era that pharmaceutical 
historians refer to as “the golden age of psychopharmacology” (Lieberman et al, 1255).1  
Though they did not experience anything like the explosive initial popularity of their 
psychopharmacological cousins the amphetamines and the tranquilizers, antidepressants did 
share a number of similarities regarding the manner of their development through serendipitous 
research in American labs and a curious debt to the Second World War.  The first drug to 
emerge from the family of compounds pharmacists now call antidepressants was the 
Monoamine-Oxidase Inhibitor (MAOI) iproniazid.2  Iproniazid was initially synthesized in 1912 by 
Hans Meyer and Josef Malley, a pair of doctoral students at Prague’s Charles-Ferdinand 
University while working with derivatives of hydrazine.  For 40 years, the pharmaceutical 
applications of the compound lay unexplored until the conclusion of World War II when 
victorious Allied forces discovered enormous stockpiles of hydrazine in the form of Nazi V2 
rocket fuel depots, and offered the chemical to U.S. pharmaceutical companies at bargain 
                                                           
1 See also, Lopez-Munoz and Alamo, 1563. 
2 As detailed above, the term “antidepressant” could probably be applied to dozens of drugs that have been 
prescribed or used to treat “depression” and its aliases throughout history.  One could persuasively argue that 
anything from Benzedrine to Miltown to Valium to frankincense to cheesecake could be called an 
“antidepressant.”  For this chapter, I will confine my use of “antidepressant” to the specific class of molecules that 
modulate monoaminergic neurotransmissions at a synaptic level (MAOIs, tri-cyclics, and SSRIs).    
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prices.3  Flush with material, pharmaceutical companies conducted research on a number of 
hydrazine derivatives, discovering the powerful antitubercular properties of Meyer and Malley’s 
iproniazid, and Hoffman-La Roche brought the drug to market under the trade name Marsilid.  
While effective at treating tuberculosis, Marsilid also demonstrated mood-elevating properties 
during clinical trials in 1950, inspiring the New York Times to report that patients were “dancing” 
through the tuberculosis wards “even though they had holes in their lungs” (qtd. in Ravina, 82). 
As Eliot Valenstein explains in his book Blaming the Brain (1988), since Marsilid was already 
approved for clinical use as an antitubercular drug, it was easy for doctors to reclassify it as an 
antidepressant, but it found a very modest market, reaching just 400,000 patients in its first 
year.   
During the same period iproniazid was evolving into the first MAOI antidepressant, work 
was also being done on a different molecule that would become the second major type of early 
antidepressant: the tri-cyclic antidepressant (TCA).  Based on the established antipsychotic 
properties of chlorpromazine in treating schizophrenia, medical researchers began synthesizing 
a variety of antihistamines in order to find a more potent antipsychotic.  This lead scientists at 
Geigy Chemical Corp. to synthesize an antihistamine they called imipramine, which they 
supplied to a Swiss psychiatrist, Dr. Roland Kuhn, for testing on his patients.4  Though the drug 
did not display the anticipated antipsychotic properties, Kuhn wrote at the time that “[t]he 
patients express themselves as feeling much better, fatigue disappears, the feeling of heaviness 
in the limbs vanish, and the sense of oppression in the chest gives way to a feeling of relief” 
(qtd. in Valenstein 39).  Kuhn’s success with imipramine lead Geigy to manufacture the drug 
                                                           
3 For a succinct account of this history, see Lopez-Munoz and Alamo. 
4 Dr. Kuhn’s contribution to psychopharmacology is immense, though his research methods would be unacceptably 
risky and imprecise in today’s research climate.  For a more thorough--and mildly disconcerting--history of Kuhn’s 
research on imipramine, see Brown and Rosdolsky. 
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specifically for this antidepressant effect under the trade name Tofranil, releasing it in 1958 (it 
arrived on U.S. shores in 1959), just one year after Marsilid hit the shelves. 5   
Though these years saw the clinical introduction of the antidepressant class, the drugs 
failed to make an immediate impact on American culture.  At least part of this failure could be 
attributed to the colossal popularity and cultural import of the amphetamines and tranquilizers 
discussed in previous chapters.  With Benzedrine, and later Miltown and its descendants, 
dominating the minds of patients and prescribers--not to mention the industrial concerns selling 
these products--there was little room for early antidepressants in either the clinical or cultural 
pharmacopeia.  There was simply very little need for the likes of Marsilid and Tofranil in 1950s 
America.  As Steven Manners writes in his pharmaceutical history Super Pills (2006), “A half-
century ago, clinical depression as we know it today did not exist” (88).   
This is not to say that depressive symptoms did not exist prior to the 1990s.  As scholars 
like Rinehart Kuhn have pointed out, depression has passed through history in a number of 
guises: the melancholia of the Black Gall in the humors of Hippocrates's Greek medicine, the 
acedia of third-century monastic ascetics, Swift's "splenetic yahoos," and the fixations on the 
paralysis and nothingness of ennui in the modernist period.  Indeed, by the late nineteenth 
century, feelings of sadness and ennui were thought to be a condition of depleted nervous 
energy called “neurasthenia,” and were popularized by several famous neurologists, particularly 
George Miller Beard in the U.S.  For Beard, along with fellow neurologist S. Weir Mitchell, 
neurasthenia represented a unique form of mental illness that afflicted a very specific social and 
racial pedigree.  As Tom Lutz points out in his book, American Nervousness, 1903 (1991), 
Beard believed that neurasthenia was "a mark of distinction, of status, of class, of refinement . . 
. [and] it afflicted only the more 'advanced' races, especially the Anglo-Saxon" (6).  As Lutz 
                                                           
5 The first published work of American author David Foster Wallace was a short story about a boy’s experience 
with the antidepressant Tofranil, entitled “The Planet Trillaphon as it Stands in Relation to The Bad Thing” (1984).  
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explains, this racial diagnosis informed larger cultural understandings about work, since many at 
the time, notably Beard, Mitchell and prominent political figures like Teddy Roosevelt, believed 
that certain races were only capable of certain types of labor, and that a draining of "nerve 
force" could only be the result of overwork among "leisure-class men and women, artists and 
brain workers of various kinds" (4).  A number of famous "brain workers" were treated for 
neurasthenia, among them American writers Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Edith Wharton, 
whose experiences being treated with the "rest cure" made famous by S. Weir Mitchell, inspired 
some of their later work.  Such diagnoses are among the earliest examples of twentieth-century 
psychiatric and medical discourses reconfirming existing modes of structural oppression under 
the aegis of a false objectivity rooted in the putative neutrality of scientific research.  
After “neurasthenia” faded in popularity, depressive symptoms were again reclassified, 
when, for the first time, industrial pharmaceutical concerns began to target these ancient 
feelings.   As explained in Nicolas Rasmussen’s history of amphetamines, the first 
advertisements for the psychopharmacological treatment of mild depression were based upon 
the 1920s work of famed psychiatrist Abraham Myerson, who promoted an awareness 
campaign for “anhedonia” or “lack of pleasure” (19).  Though Myerson campaigned for an 
ailment psychiatrists might now treat with antidepressants, the pharmaceutical identified to treat 
it in the late 1930s was actually Smith, Kline, and French’s Benzedrine.  Myerson’s ideas failed 
to catch on in any lasting manner, and, as detailed in the previous chapter, by the late 1950s the 
miracle drugs of tranquilizers had cornered the pharmaceutical market on quotidian distress in 
American culture.  Regardless of its title, from melancholia to neurasthenia to anhedonia, the 
clinical affliction of sadness that we might now call “depression” was not perceived in a sufficient 
enough form to create a commercially viable demand upon the introduction of the 
antidepressant class in the 1950s.  Trapped between the popularity of tranquilizers aimed at 
minor depression, and the antipsychotics aimed at major depression, antidepressants 
seemingly had nothing to treat.  By 1958 two-thirds of the twentieth century’s major 
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antidepressant classes had entered clinical practice, but the true impact of antidepressants 
would not be felt until the final subclass of antidepressants hit the market three decades later, in 
an era with a radically different understanding of the brain and its relation to the self.   
Here, the story of the development of antidepressant drugs intersects with the rise of the 
neurochemical view of the self, as the battle between psychodynamic, Freudian psychiatrists on 
the one hand and advocates of biological psychiatry on the other began to swing heavily toward 
the men with the lucrative pill patents and the corporate-branded lab coats.  If one of the market 
obstacles for antidepressants was the pervading Freudian view that depression had 
psychodynamic roots in childhood trauma, then that pervading view had to be altered.  
Psychopharmacological research throughout the 1960s and 1970s made enormous inroads into 
the popular conceptions of the self, first by promoting new, chemical theories of mental health, 
and second by pushing those theories into the doctor-patient relationship with elaborate and 
well-funded marketing campaigns championing biology’s role in depression and other maladies 
of mood.  The major institutional push for this campaign came from the halls of the National 
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) whose doctors advanced a variety of cutting-edge theories 
based on promising research and fascinating new discoveries in how the brain communicated 
with the body.  As detailed in Steven Manners’s work, throughout the 1960s a neurochemical 
theory of depression developed gradually based around the work of NIMH scientists William 
Bunney Jr. and John Davis, as well as Joseph Schildkraut who proved to be “especially 
persuasive” regarding the role of neurotransmitters in depression, publishing “13 reviews of the 
subject, including a three-part article in the New England Journal of Medicine in the summer of 
1969” (95).  Though the NIMH scientists could not offer indisputable proof of a biological source 
of depression, nor could they agree among themselves as to which neurotransmitter was most 
important,6 “it began to seem as if a neurochemical hypothesis of mental illness had somehow 
                                                           
6 Bunney Jr. and Davis favored norepinephrine; Schildkraut famously championed serotonin and dopamine. 
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been proven” (Manners 95).  In an irony that speaks to the growing power of the 
pharmaceutical-industrial complex in the second half of the twentieth century, one of the 
cornerstones for the neurochemical theories advanced by NIMH scientists was the fact that 
research showed some patients “with depression responded to antidepressant drugs which . . . 
appear to alter the level of neurochemicals in the brain” (Manners 95).  Depressed patients 
responded to existing brain-chemical-altering drugs, the argument went, therefore the 
depression must be caused by deficiencies in these brain chemicals.  While this is a seductive 
line of reasoning if you are suffering from depression (or financially involved in a company that 
sells these brain-chemical-altering drugs) the logic is problematic.  To paraphrase neuroscientist 
Eliot Valenstein: just because Aspirin alleviates a headache, does not mean that a headache is 
an Aspirin-deficiency disease.7   
According to David Healy and others,8 these logical problems, compounded by 
conflicting research results, meant that “[b]y 1970, psychopharmacologists had abandoned 
these hypotheses because of clear inadequacy” (59).  While it is beyond the purview of this 
dissertation to offer conclusions regarding the scientific or logical processes that lead to new 
drug treatments, it seems clear based on the evidence that the “chemical imbalance theory” of 
depression fails to capture the entirety of depression’s etiology.  Despite widespread 
acceptance of this theory’s inadequacy in the scientific fields, the myth of depression as a 
“chemical imbalance” has proven to be remarkably durable in the broader culture, becoming 
“widely used and considered absolute truth” (Davis 48) and “the potentially dominant cultural 
story of depression etiology,” (France et al., 411) especially in the United States.  It is difficult to 
precisely measure why a psychopharmacological research misconception might take hold in the 
                                                           
7 Christopher France, et al. offer a similar formulation: “Psychotherapy can alleviate depression . . . therefore 
(using the above logic) a deficiency of psychotherapy causes depression” (412). 
8 See France et al., Valenstein, or Kirsch for thorough debunkings of the “chemical imbalance theory” of 
depression. 
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lay population, or, indeed within the minds of writers and readers of literature, but a number of 
critics lay the blame at the feet of pharmaceutical companies who promulgated the chemical 
imbalance theory in a variety of antidepressant advertisements, both to prescribing physicians 
and the general population.  As Healy has argued, “the idea that serotonin was low in 
depression and restored to normal by treatment was resurrected within the marketing 
departments of SmithKline Beecham, Lilly, and Pfizer, as part of the sales pitch for Paxil, 
Prozac, and Zoloft” (59).  Clearly there was an enormously profitable market for pharmaceutical 
companies to tap if depression could replace anxiety as the en vogue mood malady, and a 
variety of mechanisms combined to promote such a switch.  Frank Ayd’s 1961 book 
Recognizing the Depressed Patient made the case for mild depression as an increasingly 
frequent ailment, “among the most common illnesses encountered by the general practitioner” 
(qtd. in Herzberg, 155) which provoked Merck Sharp and Dohme to distribute the book freely to 
every physician in the U.S.  As David Herzberg details in his book, Happy Pills in America 
(2009), depression-awareness articles began circulating in mainstream channels, such as 
magazines like Good Housekeeping and Vogue throughout the 70s, often promoting versions of 
the chemical imbalance model of depression.  This climate of depression awareness lead to the 
production of several popular literary works that acted as forerunners to the run of 1990s 
depression memoirs discussed later in this chapter.  One such work was Percy Knauth’s 1975 
memoir A Season in Hell, where the novelist wrote, “[t]here is little doubt that I had been 
suffering from a norepinephrine imbalance . . . which the antidepressant medication had now set 
aright” (qtd. in Herzberg, 169).  Just as these antidepressant narratives were building, 
tranquilizers began to suffer the inevitable backlash that Mickey C. Smith forecasts for all 
wonder drugs.  As Andrea Tone details in The Age of Anxiety (2009), addiction narratives 
warning of the dangers of long-term tranquilizer use began to proliferate in mainstream media, 
congressional hearings convened to discuss political reform in response to the “tranquilizer 
epidemic” of the late 70s, and both state and federal legislatures passed laws further restricting 
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tranquilizer prescription, possession, and use.9  By the late 80s, the popularity of anxiety and the 
tranquilizers that treated it had faded, and depression entered the public consciousness poised 
to fill the resulting cultural void, alongside a tidy-if-inaccurate etiological narrative congenial to 
the psychopharmaceutical industry, and a growing pharmaceutical literacy among the lay and 
literary population.  As Tone put it, “pharmaceutical firms capitalized on the commercial vacuum 
created by the [tranquilizer] backlash and America’s affinity for psychiatric pill popping to help 
make . . . a new generation of antidepressants, the biggest psychiatric blockbusters since 
Miltown and Valium” (207).  The cultural and material conditions had set the stage, but the 
antidepressant story still needed a star.  
In 1988,10 that star arrived, encapsulated in a green and white pill.  It was called Prozac. 
Prozac experienced the kind of explosive growth in popularity and profitability that its 
MAOI and TCA cousins never did 30 years prior.  The vanguard of a new class of 
antidepressants, the Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs), Prozac was developed 
throughout the mid-1970s by a team at Lilly Labs, led by Lilly scientist David Wong, trying to 
modulate specific neurotransmitters thought to be associated with depression.11  The result was 
a compound by the name of fluoxetine hydrochloride.  Wong’s idea, informed by new and 
promising research in biochemical and neurochemical processes,12 was that fluoxetine could be 
more precise in its neurotransmitter modulation than existing, and effective, antidepressants in 
                                                           
9 Andrea Tone’s history of the tranquilizer backlash argues for the importance of Barbara Gordon’s bestselling 
Valium addiction memoir I’m Dancing as Fast as I Can (1979), the 1979 Kennedy hearings on benzodiazepines in 
Washington, and influential 1980s restrictions on tranquilizer coverage in state Medicaid funding measures from 
Georgia and New York for creating a commercial vacuum that antidepressants were poised to fill. 
10 Fluoxetine, the compound in Prozac, was first sold in Belgium in 1986, and was granted FDA approval in  
December 1987, releasing in the U.S. market a month later.   
11 For an exhaustively-detailed scientific history of Wong’s research, see his first person account in Nature Reviews 
Drug Discovery (2005).  For a more concise history, see Shorter, Edward, pp. 321-23. 
12 Wong specifically cites 1969’s The Structure and Function of Nervous Tissue, Volume III: Biochemistry and 
Disease (Ed. Bourne) as a central influence on his early work with SSRIs. 
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the MAOI and TCA families.  This putative precision, the drug’s ability to target only serotonin 
and nothing else, meant that users experienced fewer side effects and advertisers could 
develop a useful narrative to position the drug as a revolutionary,13 near-miraculous treatment 
for depression caused by a “serotonin imbalance.”14  Armed with an easily digestible 
explanation for its action, Prozac and its producers at Eli Lilly leveraged American culture’s 
heightened, if rudimentary, understanding of neurochemistry into a bona fide pharmaceutical 
blockbuster.  According to David Wong, Lilly’s own internal estimates of Prozac’s market were 
ambitiously set at $200 million per year. In its first year, Prozac reached sales of $350 million.  
By 1992, just four years after its release, Prozac hit the “blockbuster” threshold of one billion 
dollar annual sales, peaking in 1998 with annual sales of $2.8 billion.  By the time its patent 
protection expired in 2001, “over 40 million people had taken [Prozac] and total worldwide sales 
were estimated at US $22 billion” (Wenthur et al.).  Eli Lilly wasn’t the only company to benefit 
either.  Throughout the 1990s, as doctors and patients grew more comfortable with the idea that 
brain chemicals were the culprits for psychic distress, pharmaceutical companies released a 
stable of new SSRI antidepressants to a ravenous market.  Lundbeck’s Celexa (citalopram) and 
Lexapro (escaitalopram), Pfizer’s Zoloft (sertaline), and GlaxoSmithKline’s Paxil (paroxetine) 
would all join Prozac in the blockbuster ranks before decade’s end, dramatically changing the 
                                                           
13 Though such a discussion is beyond the bounds of this dissertation, I stand with Leonard Davis who argues in The 
End of Normal (2013) that what constitutes a drug’s “primary” effect and its “side” effects is “simply ideological” 
(55).   
14 The medico-historical discussion around the precision implied by SSRI action usually identifies two major trends 
in the 1970s and 1980s that contributed to the rise of depression diagnoses in the U.S.  The first is the 1980 release 
of the DSM-III which radically extended the diagnostic reach of “Major Depressive Disorder,” to the eventual 
benefit of SSRI interests.  The second trend bore out in the rise of “disease specificity,” historian Charles 
Rosenberg’s term for “the notion that diseases should be thought of as entities existing outside the unique 
manifestations of illness in particular men and women” and that “diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment have been 
linked ever more tightly to specific, agreed-upon disease categories” (13) amenable to precise pharmaceutical 
intervention.  For more, see Rosenberg’s chapter “The Tyranny of Diagnosis” in Our Present Complaint (2007), or 
Allan Horwitz’s “How an Age of Anxiety Became an Age of Depression” (2010). 
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pharmaceutical industry, and indicating a clear and significant shift in how Americans viewed 
depression, its etiology, and its treatment. 
  
Figure 4.1: Prozac became so iconic so quickly that a single pill could reasonably be used as the 
cover image to sell major, national periodicals promising stories of the new “Breakthrough Drug.” 
Source: Newsweek, 1990. 
 
The SSRI boom of the 1990s was not limited to corporate bottom lines either; 
antidepressants blossomed in cultural relevance like no class of drugs before it.  In a 
representative image, a single iconic green and white Prozac pill graced the cover of Newsweek 
magazine in 1990 under the heading “A Breakthrough Drug for Depression.”  News reports from 
the era paint a picture of lively dinner table discussions and water cooler chatter about the drug.  
Rhode Island psychiatrist Peter Kramer’s 1993 book, Listening to Prozac, became a New York 
Times Bestseller and coined the term “cosmetic pharmacology,” meditating on the idea of using 
Prozac not just to treat depression but also to enhance beneficial personality traits in otherwise 
healthy patients.  Kramer’s book’s popularity makes clear that in 1993, the idea of one’s 
personality deriving at least in part from one’s brain chemistry was taking hold in American 
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readership, and, of course, further producing the same neurochemical discourses that it drew 
from.  Listening to Prozac sold the idea of proactively tinkering with the neurochemical self 
through psychopharmaceutical intervention, becoming, as one critic put it, “one of the signature 
cultural artifacts of its time,” (Stossel) and inspiring a variety of responses in popular culture, 
from the academic (Ginger and Peter Breggin’s 1995 book Talking Back to Prozac) to the 
parodic (Louis Menand’s savage “Listening to Bourbon” in the April 18, 1994 issue of The New 
Yorker).   While the TCA and MAOI antidepressants of an earlier era had labored in relative 
obscurity, casualties of an inchoate sense of the neurochemical self and unable to establish 
enough cultural cache to boost their public profile, Prozac and the SSRIs were an undeniable 
cultural phenomenon.  As one magazine article put it in 1994, “Compared with the anti-
depressants of the past--obscure compounds that only psychiatrists and their patients could 
name--Prozac has attained the familiarity of Kleenex and the social status of spring water” 
(“Culture”).  By September 2001, Prozac had achieved the ultimate symbol of cultural 
penetration with its formal induction into the English language’s grand old gatekeeper: The 
Oxford English Dictionary.15    
 
Prozac Literature and the 1990s Mental Health Memoir 
 
“With all these statistics flying around, subjective though they may be, who’s to say that there’s 
too much Prozac?  Maybe there isn’t enough.” 
 -Elizabeth Wurtzel, Prozac Nation (339) 1994 
 
                                                           
15 According to Alex Frankel’s Wordcraft: The Art of Turning Little Words into Big Business (2004), Prozac entered 
the OED alongside one other pharmaceutical, and perhaps the only competition for Prozac’s claim to 
representative pharmaceutical of the 1990s: Pfizer’s Viagra. 
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Clearly, a case could be made that SSRI antidepressants were the representative drug 
of the era.  Certainly no other chemical compound so thoroughly encapsulated the thriving and 
intersecting discourses of pharmaceutical-industrial growth, scientific research into brain 
processes, philosophical investigations into the potential neurochemical nature of the self, and 
the production of art.  This latter category, art engaged with the themes of depression and its 
pharmaceutical remedies, proved a fertile ground throughout the 1990s and 2000s, inspiring a 
wide variety of artists, and contributing to a swelling interest from the broader culture in these 
issues of drugs, brains, and selfhood.  In popular music, Prozac had attained such cultural 
ubiquity that it could easily stand in for an impressively wide range of signifiers, from simple 
sadness, to the inability to experience excitement, to representations of class and race.   
Country singer Alan Jackson relied on Prozac’s popularity to assert his joy in love, singing “Give 
my doctor a call/ And tell him I won’t need that Prozac after all” on 2000’s “The Thrill is Back”.  
Rock acts as diverse as Aerosmith (“And Prozac is my fixer” from 1997’s “Nine Lives”) and The 
Magnetic Fields (“Take Prozac, right/ And smile all night” from 1999’s “I Don’t Want to Get Over 
You”) offered lyrical references to Prozac as easily legible substitutes for relief from psychic 
distress.  Atlanta rapper T.I. drew from Prozac’s associations with disinhibition and middle-class 
whiteness, rapping about being “At the club gettin’ crunker than crackers on Prozac” on 2001’s 
“You Ain’t Hard.”  Antidepressants figured in visual art as well, from the high-brow installations 
of British artist Damien Hirst, whose play with pills and their forms in works like “Pharmacy 1” 
and his “Medicine Cabinets” series netted millions of pounds at auction, to the kitchy work of 
Massachusetts artist Stephen Schrieber, whose roadside sculpture in Red Hook, New York is 
composed of an enormous Prozac capsule, fashioned from an old septic tank.   
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Figure 4.2: Stephen Schreiber’s roadside sculpture of the iconic Prozac pill. Source: 
Roadsideamerica.com, 2009. 
 
In literature, SSRIs emerged in the 1990s as a serious subject of discussion among a 
similarly varied group of writers, both in the U.S. and abroad.  British author Will Self lampooned 
the frenzy behind Prozac’s release in his epistolary short story “Inclusion®” (1994), presenting 
its preposterous titular drug as a “Revolutionary Approach to Anti-Depressant Medication” (201) 
made from the refined feces of parasitic honey bee mites, capable of targeting “the exact 
receptors in the brain responsible for depression, like some smart misery-seeking bomb, 
dropped down the ventilation shaft of the mind” (238).  In the U.S., the popularity of Prozac-
inspired literature was so pervasive it pushed psychiatrist and cultural critic Jonathan Metzl to 
wryly describe it as “a form so widespread it threatens to go generic along with the medication” 
(166).  Looking at four such works: Lauren Slater’s 1996 essay “Black Swans,” Pagan 
Kennedy’s short story “Shrinks” from her 1994 collection Stripping, Gary Krist’s short story 
“Medicated” (1994), and Persimmon Blackridge’s 1997 novel Prozac Highway, Metzl argues 
against the prevailing critical reading of these works that Prozac users discover wholly new 
selves through their psychopharmaceutical adventures that are “constructs of late-twentieth-
century postmodern discourse formation” (166).  Asserting that Prozac literature does not, in 
fact, “claim[] liberation from a cultural discussion rooted in the past,” (168) Metzl ties the 
discoveries of selfhood expressed in these works to two established historical discourses: the 
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trajectory of wonder drugs throughout pharmaceutical history,16 and “[t]he historical narrative 
[that] . . . concerns the particulars of psychiatric and popular notions of selfhood” (168).  It is this 
latter narrative, the notion of a self drawn from psychiatric and popular formulations around 
brain drugs, that I have called the neurochemical self, and Metzl’s historical-psychiatric 
argument places these Prozac inspired works within the larger scope of brain drug narratives 
and identity that have constituted this dissertation’s previous chapters.  
Metzl’s historically contingent reading of Prozac’s literary function puts him at 
loggerheads with feminist philosopher Jacqueline Zita who views the new self emerging from 
Prozac-inspired psychopharmaceutical discourse as individualist, presentist, and commercial, “a 
potential market-driven nightmare: A hypernormalized conformity, a solipsism of power, and a 
foreclosure on a more radical collective feminist consciousness” (63).  In Body Talk (1998), Zita 
derives her postmodern view of Prozac subjectivity in response to Peter Kramer’s assertion in 
Listening To Prozac, that “antidepressants are feminist drugs, liberating and empowering . . . it 
allows a woman with traits we now consider ‘overly feminine,’ in the sense of passivity and a 
tendency to histrionics, to opt out . . . for a spunkier persona” (270-71).  Resisting Kramer’s 
“liberation” through medication, Zita sees “Prozac feminism and the promotion of personality 
sculpting” (63) as threats to women and their bodies, as “matters of self (ob)literation” (63).  
Critical of Kramer’s “Prozac feminism’s” effect on women, Zita draws the analogy between 
Prozac’s putative use-value in altering the neurochemical self and forms of disciplining elite 
women’s bodies:  
In this picture of the mind and body, human personality becomes largely a 
function of neurons and neurotransmitters, a mix that can be altered and 
rearranged like a recipe for white cake.  For the Prozac-activated female, this 
portends not only the possibility of sculpting our corporeal bodies by discipline, 
surgery, and dieting but also designing our personalities by altering our brain 
                                                           
16 Metzl here works from pharmacological historian Mickey C. Smith’s often-quoted 1980 observation that 
pharmaceutical trends tend to develop through three stages: enormous initial hype and popularity, a delayed 
backlash and fear, often regarding safety or long-term effects, followed lastly by a stabilized state of equilibrium.  
For a reading of Prozac’s trajectory through Smith’s model, see also Sharpe, Katherine.  
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chemistries. Pharmaceuticals may have entered the world of fashion, fitness, and 
feminism. (62)  
  
Zita’s feminist reservation regarding Prozac’s disciplinary function expresses the neurochemical 
self in metaphorical and ironically domestic terms, the reduction of personality to decodable 
brain science seen as analogous to a cake recipe.   
While Zita and Metzl disagree on the idea’s historical debts, they, and others,17 broadly 
agree on the problems of “Prozac feminism,” and both the influence and importance of the 
neurochemical self to women specifically in the wake of Prozac and its chemical cousins’ 
enormous cultural impact.  According to recent CDC figures, women in the United States are 
“about twice as likely as males to take antidepressant medication” (Pratt et. al.) across all age 
groups,18 raising a constellation of related questions: Are women more depressed than men?  
Are women more likely to seek psychopharmacological treatment than men?  Or, are women’s 
personalities more likely to be viewed as depressed than men’s?  What cultural or structural 
conditions lead to such an inequity in prescription?19  Add to these considerations the fact that 
middle class, white women are the demographic most-likely to take antidepressants in the U.S., 
and a picture starts to form around the specific function of antidepressants regarding gender, 
                                                           
17 Straddling this historical divide are Linda Blum and Nena Stracuzzi who locate the gendered shaping claims of 
Zita’s work within the historical scope of Metzl’s, arguing that Prozac discourses “are about women with 
neurochemical imbalances but also about the need to discipline elite female bodies, to enhance productivity and 
flexibility.  This new form of female ‘fitness’ mirrors demands of the New Economy and indicates how psychiatric 
discourse contributes to the historically specific shaping of gendered bodies.”  See also, Mark Kingwell’s argument 
that “far from being a feminist solution to a preexisting problem, [Prozac feminism] merely confirms a debilitating 
stereotype of women, while at the same time suggesting that they are ever in need of medical attention for their 
sickness” (132).   
18  A variety of sources could be cited here to discuss antidepressant prescription rates among women, as numbers 
vary depending on which years or which cohorts one looks at.  Markie Robson-Scott estimated in 1993 that the 
ratio of women taking Prozac to men taking it was as high as five-to-one.  As Jacqueline Zita observes, that ratio is 
consistent with Kramer’s case studies in Listening to Prozac.  Regardless of the exact figures, it is clear that women 
take Prozac and other antidepressants at disproportionately higher rates than men. 
19 Here it should be noted that upon the expiration of Prozac’s patent protection in 2001, Lilly repackaged 
fluoxetine in pink and lavender capsules, rechristened it as Sarafem, and marketed it to treat premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder (PMDD), thus extending its patent protection to 2007. 
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identity, and psychopharmacology.  In identifying “spunkier personas” as preferable post-SSRI 
traits in women, traits he categorizes as “hyperthymic,” Kramer problematically ties women’s 
neurochemical happiness to neo-liberal, industrial figurations of distaff compliance and 
productivity, arguing “[h]yperthymics are optimistic, decisive, quick of thought, charismatic, 
energetic, and confident.  Hyperthymia can be an asset in business” (16).  Reducing the 
complexities of a woman’s personality to a “business asset” is a particularly dangerous 
philosophical manifestation of the idea of a neurochemical self, but it is directly related to the 
pharmacological specificity of SSRIs, which don’t carry the cholinergic side effects of lethargy 
and sedation of previous mood medicines like Miltown.  As Metzl argues, these “spunky” 
“hyperthymic” women on SSRIs are viewed in Kramer’s model as “chemically Taylorized beings 
whose disconnect from affective fluctuations renders them manically hyperproductive” (174).   It 
is little wonder, then, that in a culture of productivity busy embracing the idea of the self as a 
neurochemical entity, Prozac and the SSRIs were largely marketed to white, middle-class 
women, “who can afford both Prozac and its diagnostic expense and who experience loss in 
efficiency and energy as a terrifying turn in personality requiring medical intervention” (Zita 233).  
These “hyperthymic” themes of gender and productivity rippled out into the culture, manifesting 
in the news reporting, advertising, and, indeed, literary production of the era, though as we shall 
see in the works of memoir in this chapter, the “terrifying turn” that necessitates antidepressant 
intervention can take a variety of other forms as well. 
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Figure 4.3: Prozac ads from the 1990s often traded on productive figurations of “hyperthymic” 
women. Source: American Journal of Psychiatry, 1998. 
  
 These critical themes can help limn the effects of pharmaceutical literacy and the 
neurochemical self within the depression memoirs that constitute this chapter’s focus: Elizabeth 
Wurtzel’s Prozac Nation, and Meri Nana-Ama’s Willow Weep For Me.  These two works are 
broadly representative of the impact antidepressants had on the literary output of the mental 
health memoir of the 1990s, each with an interesting perspective on the role of chemical 
intervention on identity, and a reliance on a presumed readership with an evolved capacity for 
pharmaceutical literacy.  While I have chosen to focus on these two works here, similar 
analyses could reasonably examine a host of other mental health memoirs from the period.  
William Styron’s 1990 memoir Darkness Visible explores the famous novelist’s sudden onset of 
depression and its relationship with his addictions to alcohol and the benzodiazepine sleep aid 
Halcion.  Susana Kaysen’s Girl, Interrupted (1994) recalls the author’s experiences recovering 
from depression and psychosis in Boston’s famed McLean psychiatric hospital, replete with 
official copies of her own admission and observation paperwork.  Kay Redfield Jameson’s 1996 
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memoir, An Unquiet Mind: A Memoir of Moods and Madness, details a lifelong battle with 
bipolar illness from the perspective of a professor of clinical psychology.  Andrew Solomon’s 
evocative The Noonday Demon: An Atlas of Depression (2001) interweaves his personal 
experience of depression with a journalist’s insights into the scientific and cultural developments 
around the condition.  Anne G. Rogers’ A Shining Affliction: A Story of Harm and Healing in 
Psychotherapy (1996) parallels the author’s psychiatric work with a disturbed 5-year-old boy 
and her own mental breakdown.  Each of these works, and many others, participates in a 
tradition of mental health narratives that must contend with the twin forces of the neurochemical 
self and the language of pharmaceutical literacy in a post-SSRI culture. 
 
Medicating a Prozac Nation 
 
“Prozac was the miracle that saved my life.”  
-Elizabeth Wurtzel, Prozac Nation (343) 1994 
 
Perhaps the highest profile work to emerge from the micro-genre of 1990s mental health 
memoirs is Elizabeth Wurtzel’s 1994 bestseller Prozac Nation.  Emblematic of the SSRI 
zeitgeist, the book rode the ascendant popularity of its titular drug to a place on The New York 
Times bestseller list, made a minor celebrity of its 26 year-old author, and eventually got 
prescribed a dose of Hollywood with a 2001 film treatment starring Christina Ricci.20  The book 
details the author’s lifelong struggle with what is eventually diagnosed as “atypical depression,”  
from her New York City childhood, to her time at Harvard University, to her cathartic experience 
                                                           
20 The film version of Prozac Nation was a catastrophic failure at the box office, due at least in part to its timing; it 
debuted two years after Girl, Interrupted (1999), Kaysen’s mental health story that won Angelina Jolie an Academy 
Award for Best Supporting Actress, perhaps saturating the market, and just three days before September 11, 2001, 
which sabotaged any commercial prospects the film might have hoped for in a pre-9/11 American culture.  It’s also 
a woefully bad movie. 
 123 
 
with Prozac that she ultimately champions as a “miracle” (343) and “a biochemical cure” (327) 
for depression.  The book’s full title, Prozac Nation: Young and Depressed in America, suggests 
a concerted commercial effort to appeal to the massive and growing interest in Prozac and its 
chemical cousins in the U.S. in 1994, suggesting as it does, a community of medicated 
sufferers, a “Nation” of “Young” “Depressed” Americans, navigating the 1990s with the help of 
brain-altering chemicals.  Initial reviews of the book were mixed, some praising Wurtzel and the 
memoir’s flip style, while others lambasted the book as a transparent ploy to capitalize on the 
cultural momentum of depression and its chemical treatment.  In the pages of The New York 
Times, former Chief Book Critic Michiko Kakutani offered measured praise, applauding 
Wurtzel’s “humor and her ability to write sparkling, luminescent prose [that] . . . ultimately wins 
the reader over,” though she found the “efforts to present her story as ‘some sort of case study 
on the changing nature of the American family in the late 20th century’ [to be] decidedly clumsy 
at best.”  Other reviewers were less-inclined to pull punches.  New York Magazine’s Walter Kim 
excoriated the book for “striv[ing] to position its author as a poster child for a putative bluesy 
youthquake, pretending to offer us not just the memoir of one woman’s early sorrows but a 
newsworthy generational complaint,” before dismissing it as “a work of singular self-absorption,” 
and a “long moan.”  Writing in Wurtzel’s Alma Mater’s Harvard Crimson, Erica L. Werner took an 
unkind glee in criticizing Prozac Nation for getting “marketed as an object lesson in depression 
among the young, privileged, and talented,” despite being “simply the tedious and poorly written 
story of Wurtzel’s melodramatic life,” calling it, “obscenely exhibitionistic,” and “pathetic.”   
As both Kim’s and Werner’s reviews illustrate, much of the vitriol aimed at Wurtzel and 
her book drew from the tension between the book’s title’s attempt to embody a youthful,  
community united in psychic pain, and the book’s content’s focus on just one woman’s 
experience.  These arguments are persuasive, though the genesis of the title complicates such 
claims.  Wurtzel initially titled her manuscript I Hate Myself and I Want to Die, which was 
eventually repurposed as the title for the book’s prologue when Houghton-Mifflin made the 
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financially-sound decision to publish the book with its current title.  Wurtzel’s original title, replete 
with three first-person pronouns, more accurately reflects the book’s personal focus and 
certainly would have mitigated some of the more forceful critical attacks on the memoir’s 
solipsism had it remained, though one rather suspects the book would not have seen such 
commercial success.  “Prozac Nation” is a brilliant title in its own way, both for its commercial 
appeal, but also for the way it captures its cultural moment, trading on the ascent of one drug’s 
enormous popularity and relying on a savvy exploitation of America’s increasing pharmaceutical 
literacy and understanding of the self as an expression of brain chemicals. 
  Prozac Nation is well-positioned to illustrate the intersection of the neurochemical self 
and pharmaceutical literacy, in that it frequently relies on the reader’s understanding of specific 
drugs and their actions for basic characterization.  In pharmaceutically literate texts, important 
figures are frequently defined in relation to particular psychopharmaceuticals, suggesting a form 
of literary characterization that relies on viewing a person, at least in part, as a neurochemical 
entity that can legibly be communicated via an implicit cultural understanding of drugs.  In the 
memoir, Wurtzel describes her relationship with her divorced, emotionally unavailable, and 
distant father by defining him in relation to his tranquilizer use.  “A daily Valium doser, my dad 
would spend most of our Saturday afternoon visits sleeping, leaving me to watch TV or paint 
with watercolors or call my mom to say, Daddy won’t move, I think he’s dead” (27, italics in 
original).  Wurtzel’s recollection of her father’s specific visits, and his absence from her life more 
generally, is rendered for the reader in direct connection to the Valium he ingests, concisely 
communicating his sluggishness, borderline neglect, and absence of nurturing behavior through 
the reader’s pre-existing understanding of Valium’s reputation for causing drowsiness.  Such a 
characterization would be far less effective without an established pharmaceutical literacy in the 
memoir’s imagined readership.  Moreover, Wurtzel’s description contributes to the era’s 
conception of the self as a collection of chemicals in the brain by identifying her dad as “a daily 
Valium doser.”  Her father does not “take Valium”; rather, he is precisely defined by both the 
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frequency and type of psychopharmaceutical he ingests to control his nerves.  In a 
representative discussion later, Wurtzel uses these drugs to draw a distinction between her 
solicitous but loving mother and her absentee father.  “My mom was desperate to shelter me . . .  
and my dad, who began to load up on tranquilizers shortly after the divorce, was just plain 
indifferent” (28).  Again, tranquilizers stand in as both unelaborated descriptors of the father’s 
character and as psychopharmaceutical explanations for his paternal apathy.  No direct link 
between the drugs and the father’s indifference is offered because none is needed for a 
pharmaceutically literate reader.  Moreover, the existing discourses of Valium and its frequent 
associations with motherhood emasculate Wurtzels’ father, casting his failures as a father in 
terms that suggest failures as a man.21  The chemical and its reputed action stand in for the 
person, a curious reflection of the logic of the neurochemical self where the play of chemicals in 
the brain comes to stand in for personality or behavior or the nebulous connections between 
mind and body.   
This pharmaceutical expression of Wurtzel’s father also dates him, relying on a reader’s 
pharmaceutical literacy to understand the generational differences Wurtzel posits between 
herself and her father.   In opposition to her graying, ineffectual father, Wurtzel identifies 
strongly with the era’s preponderance of young Americans, Kim’s “putative bluesy youthquake,” 
experiencing depression and taking antidepressants like Prozac: the sub-titular “Young and 
Depressed in America.”  This “Nation” of “Young” sufferers are defined as much by their 
affliction as by the era-specific drugs they use to combat it.  Wurtzel’s father is clearly identified 
and excluded from this class by his use of older, stodgier psychopharmaceuticals from a 
                                                           
21 Valium’s association with maternal conditions in the American cultural imagination is a frequent topic in cultural 
studies of post-Miltown tranquilizers.  Recall the previous chapter’s discussion of The Rolling Stones’ song 
“Mother’s Little Helper,” or see Jonathan Metzl’s work inspired by the title of that song, “‘Mother’s Little Helper’: 
The Crisis of Psychoanalysis and the Miltown Resolution” (2003) where he writes “[p]opularised and problematised 
in the notion that these drugs were ‘Mother’s Little Helpers’, the pills became known as the treatments of choice 
for the pressures of motherhood, singlehood and other historically specific forms of essentialised womanhood” 
(240).  
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previous era: a stale old man taking stale old drugs.  Pharmaceutical literacy exposes this 
classification as Wurtzel shrugs off her father’s pharmaceutically specific response following a 
confrontation about his lack of involvement in her life.  “When I am old enough to ask my father 
about it, when I wonder why he sleeps through our little bit of quality time together, he just 
speaks of nerves--of nerves and Valium.  Librium and Miltown and whatever else too” (30, italics 
in original).  By simply listing these tranquilizers, Wurtzel dismisses her father for his clear lack 
of warmth and paints him as some feckless anachronism, a man as out-of-fashion as his dusty 
old pills. In the pharmaceutically literate climate of 1994, Wurtzel’s father’s association with 
Valium, Librium, and Miltown--drugs that reached their commercial and cultural peaks decades 
earlier--indelibly marks him as past his prime.  He is a man stuck in the past, made obvious by 
his association with blockbuster drugs of previous eras.  In other texts, this distance between 
generations could be articulated through a variety of interests: styles of dress, musical taste, 
political attitudes, etc.  In a pharmaceutically literate text, though, existing tools of 
characterization are supplemented by the cultural reputation of drugs and their constellation of 
related effects.  Pharmaceuticals offer an era-specific shorthand built around the presumed 
understanding of these older drugs and the connotations regarding the types of people who 
would still be taking them a generation after their peak cultural popularity.   
Wurtzel relies on pharmaceutical literacy to probe at the neurochemical characterization 
of her mother as well in what passes for the climax of her memoir.  While recovering from a 
suicide attempt, and waiting for her newly-prescribed Prozac to kick in, Wurtzel receives news 
that her mother has been badly beaten by a mugger on the street.  Visiting in the aftermath of 
the attack, Wurtzel, nearly catatonic with depression, apologizes for her inability to properly care 
for her mother.  In a pivotal moment for their relationship, and the text as a whole, Wurtzel’s 
mother absolves her daughter by observing for the first time, “[y]ou’re depressed.  That’s a real 
problem.  That’s not imaginary.  Of course you can’t deal with anything.  You’re depressed” 
(311-12).  Her mother’s frank acknowledgement of Ellie’s condition, without the usual retinue of 
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deflections and recriminations against her father’s role in her upbringing, crystallizes something 
profound for the author.  It is the first time her mother has offered an unqualified description of 
her diagnosis, legitimizing much of the misery Ellie has endured, and the book’s penultimate 
chapter closes on an uncharacteristically upbeat note: “I got up and sat next to her and hugged 
her, and thought to myself, She understands. She understands and it will be all right” (312).  
This episode is rendered as a small but significant moment in Wurtzel’s recovery, but crucially it 
is enabled by pharmaceutical intervention.  To some degree, Ellie’s ability to express a hopeful 
statement like “it will be all right,” in the immediate aftermath of her mother’s beating and her 
own suicide attempt is only possible at this moment because the Prozac has finally, after weeks 
of torturous waiting, begun to work.   
More directly though, Wurtzel’s mother’s acknowledgement of Ellie’s depressed reality is 
directly tied to the drugs the older woman is taking for her own convalescence in the wake of 
her attack.  Wurtzel muses, “I’d never heard her acknowledge my depression so 
straightforwardly before.  What had happened? Had somebody talked to her? Or was it all the 
painkillers she was taking?” (312).  The reader’s pharmaceutical literacy here helps unpack this 
pivotal moment, since understanding the destabilizing effects of painkillers provides a more 
rounded understanding of the scene.  Previously, Wurtzel had characterized her mother as “a 
trouper. She doesn’t even like having Demerol intravenous because she’s one of these stoic 
antidrug people who aren’t even comfortable taking aspirin for a headache.  She’s one of those 
people . . . who don’t complete the Percodan or codeine prescriptions that they get after 
surgery.  Can we possibly be related?” (308). Just as she defined herself against her indifferent, 
“Valium doser” father, Wurtzel again relies on the cultural reputation of drugs and their users to 
define herself against her “stoic antidrug” mother.  Her mother comes from a separate class, 
“one of those people,” who don’t view access to heavy-duty painkillers as one of the few 
perquisites of enduring surgical procedures.  Here Wurtzel highlights a pharmaceutically 
significant rift between her and her mother, since it is clear from her interrogative conclusion-- 
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“Can we possibly be related?”--that she does not share her mother’s stoicism, nor her “antidrug” 
stance.  The invocation of pharmaceutical painkillers (Demerol, aspirin, Percodan, codeine) 
illustrates to a pharmaceutically literate reader the clear and potentially damaging divide Ellie 
sees between herself and her mother.  That divide is finally breached only when her mother 
formally acknowledges Ellie’s depression under the influence of the painkillers she has 
previously resisted.  In a final flourish of pharmaceutically literate symbolism, Ellie’s mental pain 
of depression and familial estrangement begins to find its relief in the presence of her mother’s 
pain relief pills.  Ellie’s pain isn’t killed exactly, but the memoir’s pivotal scene suggests that this 
moment of maternity mediated by medicine marks the beginning of a dulling of her psychic 
torment and a healing of her toxic relationships rendered through proximity to both literal and 
metaphorical pharmaceutical action.   
Ellie’s recovery follows this climactic moment as the Prozac that enabled her brief 
moment of hope above becomes “the miracle that saved my life and jump-started me out of a 
full-time state of depression” (343).  Wurtzel’s use of the phrase “jump-started” in her final 
summation of Prozac’s role in alleviating her depression is especially apposite given the 
discourses of productivity and Peter Kramer’s “hyperthymia” criticized by Jacqueline Zita and 
Jonathan Metzl above.  Suggesting a conformity to the neurochemically wrought concept of 
“Prozac feminism,” Wurtzel’s use of “jump-start” evokes a mechanistic metaphor of identity and 
productivity, her sluggish mental state rendered as a car with a dead battery, inert and helpless 
without the zap of psychopharmaceutical intervention.22  Wurtzel’s use of neurochemically 
automotive metaphor here at the end of the memoir recalls an earlier argument with her mother 
where she writes, “I felt like my depression was a broken car and she was ordering me to just 
fucking fix it, as if my mind could be rewired like a faulty transmission or unresponsive brakes” 
                                                           
22 Another potential reading of this “jump-starting” treatment could relate to Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT) of 
the kind described so searingly in the poetry of Allen Ginsberg.  Although Wurtzel does make a passing reference 
to ECT in a conversation with her therapist, she does not undergo the procedure in Prozac Nation. 
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(253, italics in original).  Here again Wurtzel’s depressive identity is presented as a 
malfunctioning car, connecting improper mechanical function (“broken,” “faulty,” “unresponsive”) 
with a potential neurochemical solution via “rewiring.”  This mechanistic view of the self, and the 
unexamined privileging of proper function via optimal working condition, participates in the 
larger hyperthymic ideology that conflates women’s diminished productivity with neurochemical 
deficiency or imbalance.  Wurtzel’s memoir is awash in moments where the author employs this 
hyperthymic view of the tension between her own productivity and her neurochemical selfhood.  
“The measure of our mindfulness, the touchstone for sanity in this society,” she writes early in 
the book, “is our level of productivity, our attention to responsibility, our ability to plain and 
simple hold down a job” (55).  This view is briefly confirmed when Ellie enjoys a manic period of 
productivity working a summer internship at a Dallas newspaper, writing “I even started to think 
that I had recovered from my depression, that all I had ever needed was a satisfying job that 
kept me busy” (154) concluding “[s]emiotics, not a chemical imbalance, was killing me.  I just 
needed to stop thinking so much and start doing” (155).  Here Ellie demonstrates a clear, if 
flawed, example of pharmaceutical literacy by invoking the period’s “chemical imbalance” theory 
of depression, and an obvious loyalty to the particularly durable belief that the value of a 
woman’s neurochemical selfhood is maintained only through the “doing” of productive labor.  
This latter connection between economic and neurochemical prosperity is cemented when 
Ellie’s depression returns in response to a miscarriage she experiences on October 19, 1987, 
the day the Dow Jones dropped 508 points.  “I would later note that the market and I both 
crashed at the same time” (188).   
 Ultimately, it is not sedulous economic effort or satisfying vocational occupation that 
helps Ellie emerge from her depression, but rather the book’s titular antidepressant.  After years 
of largely ineffectual therapy and drugs, Ellie is given Prozac, observing, “[i]t was as if the 
miasma of depression had lifted off me” (329).  She is relieved of her worst symptoms and 
because of the text’s hyper-developed sense of pharmaceutical literacy, she is able to render a 
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unique and era-specific perspective on her post-Prozac identity that exposes the variety and 
complexity of ontological discourses at work around depression and the neurochemical self in 
1994.  For Ellie specifically, depression acts not simply as a biological disease as the medical 
model of mental illness might suggest, but as an identity category in its own right, similar to 
gender, race, disability, or sexuality.  In reflecting on her recovery, Wurtzel notes the irony that  
“I thought my depression was the part of my character that made me worthwhile” (326) and that 
“I was so scared to give up depression fearing that somehow the worst part of me was actually 
all of me” (327).  Ellie’s fear that treating her depressive symptoms threatens her authentic self 
indicates a clear ontological association between how she feels and who she is.  Meditating on 
the cost of altering her own neurochemical self through medication, Wurtzel reveals a fear “of 
throwing away my depression, of having to create a whole personality” (327).  This new post-
Prozac personality is not the “spunky,” “hyperthymic” “business asset” that Kramer predicted, 
but rather someone forever carrying the psychic baggage of both the symptoms she had 
previously endured and her new association with the swelling “Prozac Nation” of medicated 
Americans.  While Wurtzel has no problem seeing herself in the company of various 
“glamorous” depressives throughout artistic history, from Anne Sexton, to Sylvia Plath, to Kurt 
Cobain, she blanches at more mundane associations with “the guy who fixes your plumbing,” 
“your gynecologist,” and “your grandmother” (338) who are all on Prozac. Even more troubling, 
Wurtzel draws a curious post-Prozac identity affiliation with her friend Olivia’s cat who is 
touched with “excessive grooming disorder, which meant the cat had grown depressed and self-
absorbed,” and takes a “feline-sized prescription” (333) of Eli Lilly’s flagship SSRI daily.  Within 
these quotidian and even ridiculous affiliations is the expression of selfhood as a communal 
relationship to depression and its treatment, a view of the self and one’s relationship to others 
indebted to a neurochemical view of identity and its modification via psychopharmaceuticals.   
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As Abigail Cheever observes in her book Real Phonies: Cultures of Authenticity in Post-
World War II America (2010), Wurtzel’s depression-as-identity model illuminates an ontological 
change in how neurochemical identity is understood in a post-Prozac society.  
No longer understood as a collection of characteristics--a set of symptoms that, 
taken together, are identified as a illness--depression after Prozac is imagined as 
a state of being, an identity in its own right independent from any particular 
characteristics or behaviors.   In this sense the post-Prozac memoir . . . 
establish[es] depression as a . . . type of alternative selfhood . . . [and] it does so 
through biological definitions of insanity, rather than in opposition to them.  (96, 
italics in original)     
 
Cheever’s argument here sees the depressive identities of memoirists like Elizabeth Wurtzel as 
neurochemical in nature: biologically-informed, post-Prozac entities, in opposition to previously 
imagined understandings of the depressed self as independent from, and under-siege by, 
externally-defined criteria.23  Taken with the prevailing notion of depression as a deficiency in 
brain chemicals, Cheever’s “alternative selfhood” in post-Prozac memoirs here clearly 
subscribes to the logic of the neurochemical self.  One particularly grim extension of the 
neurochemical selfhood Cheever notes in Prozac Nation is the notion that the depressive “state 
of being” persists after the cessation of depressive symptoms.  Under this view of the self, an 
antidepressant can alter behavior and feeling through biochemical intervention, but cannot 
change the “alternative selfhood” of a person, any more than a pill could change someone’s 
race, sexuality, or religion.  The analogy here might be something close to the mantra of those 
in Alcoholics Anonymous who identify as an “addict” even decades after their last drink.  Wurtzel 
confirms this conception of depression as a class of “alternative selfhood” when she notes her 
“creepy” realization in the memoir’s epilogue that “six million Americans had taken Prozac,” and 
that “[a]s a Jew” she “had always associated that precise number with something else entirely” 
                                                           
23 Cheever places a variety of writers from a previous generation into this latter camp, including Sylvia Plath, 
Michel Foucault, R.D. Laing, Thomas Scasz, and “other members of the movement for anti-institutionalization” (96) 
in psychiatry in the 1960s and 70s.  For a broader unpacking of her critical positions on this point, see Real Phonies 
chapters 1 and 2.    
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(341).  Though she offers little in the way of explanation for this purely numerical--and 
temporary, since Prozac prescription rates continued to skyrocket for several years after the 
book’s release --coincidence between the numbers of Prozac takers and Jews killed in the 
Holocaust, the observation presents itself as significant because of the way pharmaceutically 
medicated depression is experienced as an identity in the text.  As Cheever points out, the 
numerical “coincidence’s significance depends upon her considering herself to have a similar 
relationship to both quantities, to be a member of both groups . . .  being Jewish and being 
depressed are both understood by Wurtzel as identities--modes of being rather than modes of 
behaving” (97).  Cheever’s “mode of being” here is an important link in the chain of logic that 
established neurochemical selfhood as one of the dominant views of the self in 1990s mental 
health memoirs: if depression derives from chemicals in the brain--imbalanced or not--and 
depression is a “mode of being,” then neurochemicals are therefore central to conceptions of 
selfhood.    
Such a view participates in a broader social tendency to configure afflictions of the mind 
as far more constitutive of identity than bodily maladies, a tendency that manifests most 
obviously in everyday speech.  Expressions associating being and mental dysfunction such as 
“she is depressed,” or “he is schizophrenic,” or even “I am crazy,” rarely function the same as 
expressions of bodily illness like “he has cancer,” or “she has tuberculosis.”24  Diseases of other 
organs are possessed by the subject, whereas disorders perceived as affecting the brain and its 
chemicals are rendered as defining the subject.  Even at the linguistic level, there exists a sense 
that abnormality in the brain is more closely tied to being than problems elsewhere, a notion that 
predates neurochemical understandings of selfhood, but contributes to them nonetheless.  
Because her text is so thoroughly enmeshed in the language and discourse of 
psychopharmaceuticals--because her text is so pharmaceutically literate--Wurtzel is able to 
                                                           
24 This linguistic tendency is broad but not exclusive.  “Diabetic” as an adjective presents as an obvious exception.   
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comment on these expressions of neurochemical selfhood more directly than the Beats, or the 
confessional poets who came before her.  In contemplating her view of the afterlife as a 
welcoming alternative to depression, Wurtzel writes, “I still think that human beings, even our 
beautiful and wretched souls, are just biology, are just a series of chemical and physical 
reactions that one day stop” (316).  In reducing a metaphysical conception of selfhood, “our 
beautiful and wretched souls,” down to “a series of chemical and physical reactions,” Wurtzel 
aligns her text with the prevailing neurochemical conception of selfhood drawn from popular and 
market-driven understandings of scientific research that see the individual, in Francis Crick’s 
words, as “nothing but a pack of neurons.”                 
 
Ghost Spaces: Pharmaceutical Literacy and The Neurochemical Self in Willow Weep for 
Me 
 
“How many damn pills would I have to swallow before I felt like a regular person again?” 
-Meri Nana-Ama Danquah, Willow Weep for Me (203) 1998 
 
As I argue above, the neurochemical self assumed a larger role in U.S. conceptions of 
selfhood throughout the end of the twentieth century based on research advances connecting 
neurotransmitters and mental illness, and the resulting rise in popularity of antidepressant 
medications and their convenient advertising narratives of productivity, gender, and “chemical 
imbalances”.  These considerations of selfhood developed alongside an increase in the 
significance and complexity of pharmaceutical function in literary texts, what I call 
“pharmaceutical literacy.”  Both the neurochemical self and pharmaceutical literacy are central 
to the reading of another important mental health memoir from the 1990s, Meri Nana-Ama 
Danquah’s Willow Weep for Me: A Black Woman’s Journey Through Depression.  Danquah’s 
memoir hits many of the same beats as its genre sister Prozac Nation, detailing its author’s 
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upbringing, onset of depression, agonizing lows, and ultimate triumph through some 
combination of personal grit, therapy, and psychopharmaceuticals.  An immigrant from Ghana, 
Danquah writes of her difficulties adjusting to a new country, a new culture, and a new language 
as a young girl, to her experiences with sexual abuse and racism, to the onset of postpartum 
depression after the birth of her daughter, to her travels back and forth between L.A. and 
Washington D.C. struggling to survive as an underemployed writer and single mom.  Danquah 
has to maneuver through the challenges of the mental health care system, working to overcome 
her depression with therapists, psychiatrists, and pharmacists, while trying to simultaneously 
maintain nourishing relationships with family and friends.  As the book’s subtitle, A Black 
Woman’s Journey Through Depression, suggests, Danquah’s tale conforms to a broadly 
triumphant narrative arc, concluding with the author having traversed “through” her condition to 
find “beauty on the other side” (266) where her psychic pain is, if not completely abated, largely 
controlled and unthreatening.   
The subtitle of Willow Weep for Me also foregrounds Danquah’s race, her gender, and 
the singularity of her experience, since she offers simply A Black Woman’s Journey . . ., and 
avoids the gesture to the universal that critics felt mislead by in the subtitle of Elizabeth 
Wurtzel’s book.  Despite this careful phrasing, some reviewers still read the memoir as 
paradigmatic.  Reviewing for the Washington Post, Rachel Jones wrote at the time of the book’s 
release that “Danquah’s life perfectly illustrates the psychological land mines that can await 
black women in America.”  While race and gender issues are inseparable from Danquah’s 
journey through depression, the “perfect illustration” of psychic dangers faced by “black women 
in America” is surely too much of a burden to hang on the story of one woman’s depression.  
Indeed, academic critics have been more cautious in reading the implications of Danquah’s text 
on identity without freighting it with the expectation of “perfect illustration.”  In her indispensable 
essay on Danquah’s memoir, disability studies scholar Anna Mollow offers an appropriate 
amount of circumspection while exploring the intersectional effects of race, gender, and 
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depression by taking great pains to make clear “that I am not suggesting any intrinsic 
relationship among Blackness, femininity, and mental illness; nor do I propose to read 
Danquah’s memoir as representative of a monolithic ‘Black women’s perspective on 
depression’” (413).  Such discretion is important to keep in mind for the following pages as I 
offer a reading of Willow Weep for Me that contextualizes these issues of identity as they relate 
to expressions of neurochemical selfhood and the pharmaceutical literacy that helps us unpack 
them. 
Mollow’s essay offers an excellent way into these ideas, since it gets right to the 
intersectional issues of identity that contextualize the neurochemical self and the role of 
pharmaceuticals in Danquah’s memoir.  Mollow takes the title of her essay, “When Black 
Women Start Going on Prozac . . .,” from a deeply uncomfortable conversation that Danquah 
uses to begin her story.  Talking among a small group at a dinner party, Danquah recalls 
describing her in-process manuscript about black women and depression, when a white woman 
sarcastically asks, “Black women and depression? . . . Isn’t that kinda redundant?” (19, italics in 
original), adding without apology, “that when black women start going on Prozac you know the 
whole world is falling apart” (20, italics in original).  This moment fills Meri with rage and frames 
the book’s examination of depression, since it proceeds from the expectation in American 
culture--at least the version of American culture embodied by the graceless white woman at the 
party--that black women are impregnable fortresses of emotional strength, drawn from their 
centuries of oppression and perseverance in the face of historical forces that would presumably 
destroy a less psychically robust class of people.  Meri’s response illustrates her hostility to the 
view that suffering in black women is both normal and unconcerning. Danquah’s language 
makes clear her discomfort with the expectation that “[e]motional hardship is supposed to be 
built into the structure of our lives,” (19, italics in original) creating a situation where “[w]hen a 
black woman suffers from a mental disorder, the overwhelming opinion is that she is weak.  And 
weakness in black women is intolerable” (20).  Danquah points out that this “overwhelming 
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opinion” is held not just by insensitive white women at dinner parties, but by her friends in the 
black community as well, who tell her “[i]f our people can make it through slavery, we can make 
it through anything,” (21) thus reinscribing the historical specificity of black women’s “supposed 
birthright to strength,” and their multifaceted roles as “caretakers, nurturers, healers of other 
people--any of the twelve dozen variations on Mammy” (19). Thus in addition to the obstacles 
presented by financial access to treatment and the debilitating effects of her depression, Meri 
must also navigate the pressures of a culture--and its impact on her own self-image--that 
presumes her subject position makes her inherently more resistant to depression, that has used 
this putative resistance as a historical justification for oppression, and that therefore 
marginalizes her individual experience.25   
Danquah’s response to these pressures is to declare that her depression “is truly an 
illness” and that “[u]nless it has touched your life, depression can be a difficult disease to 
understand” (18, italics in original).  Viewing depression as an “illness” or “disease” poses some 
complex problems, since simple sadness or mourning are commonly understood as natural 
reactions to external stimulus, and so more intense and persistent manifestations of these 
feelings have to be reconfigured to be viewed within this disease model.  I argue that this 
“reconfiguring,” this process of framing depressive symptoms as part of a disease process 
requires an understanding of the brain and the self as biochemically linked, where an illness 
within the brain yields symptoms that affect the expression of who one is.  At least part of the 
logic of “mental illness,”26 the term Danquah and many others use for depression, relies on the 
                                                           
25 In the decades since Danquah wrote her memoir, academic attention to the specific pressures of black 
womanhood on mental health has improved, though many sources agree with sociologist Kamesha Spates, who 
laments the continued under representation of black women in academic psychological literature, writing that 
“pertinent information necessary to explain Black women’s culturally specific behavior is still essentially missing 
from the field.” 
26 Scholars of disability have long debated the effect of naming practices around non-normative mental 
experiences.  In “Defining Mental Disability,” Margaret Price argues persuasively for the term “mental disability.”  
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image of a neurochemical self.  By choosing to foreground depression as an illness, Danquah is 
able to contextualize her emotional distress within a comprehensible model of neurochemical 
selfhood that allows her to seek treatment from therapists and pharmaceuticals.  As we shall 
see below, much of the first half of Willow Weep for Me deals with Meri’s denial of her 
depression, and only once she accepts her condition as an illness does she allow herself to 
break free of the expectations foisted upon her by cultural expectations of strong black 
womanhood.  As Anna Mollow points out, Danquah’s choice to define “her suffering as sickness 
. . . transgresses the expectation that when Black women suffer, they do so silently and 
stoically,” (423) but also conflicts with some of the foundational arguments in the disability rights 
movement that reject “medical models” of disability that often conflate a person and her 
impairment, reductively viewing the individual as the source of a problem.27  Mollow explains 
this tension carefully, arguing, “while I certainly do not wish to reinstall hegemonic constructions 
of disability as a form of individual weakness or inferiority, I would suggest that Danquah’s 
narrative is more complicated than a simple opposition between an individual and a social 
problem.  Rather than imagining a wall of immunity between self and society, Danquah 
dramatizes the impossibility of ever remaining untouched by all that is wrong in the world” (423).  
Danquah must use this neurochemically informed, medical view of selfhood to embrace the idea 
that something is wrong within her so that she may embrace therapeutic and 
psychopharmaceutical healing and value herself in ways that, as Mollow observes, contrast with 
the stereotypical views of strength associated with black women in America.   
 Configurations of black women and their putative emotional fortitude play an important 
role in exposing not just the effect of the neurochemical self but also the play of pharmaceutical 
literacy in Willow Weep for Me as well.  Danquah’s relationships with the women around her are 
                                                           
27 As noted above, debates around the “social model” and the “medical model” are foundational to disability 
studies.  For more, see Oliver, Michael. 
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frequently rendered through the same pharmaceutically literate techniques seen in Prozac 
Nation.  Elizabeth Wurtzel used the cultural understanding of older drugs to establish distance 
between herself and her pharmaceutically unfashionable father, but Danquah inverts the 
technique to establish a fellowship with older sufferers of depression.  While still in denial 
regarding the seriousness of her depression, Danquah encounters the story of her good friend 
Eugene’s mother, Patricia, who has suffered from seasonal depression for four decades.  Meri 
expresses enormous admiration for Patricia, “a prominent person in D.C.’s black middle class . . 
. [who] had worked closely with many local and national politicians,” (59) and who “was 
absolutely beautiful, and full of energy” (60).  Belying her inability to diagnose depression in 
herself or in others, Meri is surprised to hear of Patricia’s Seasonal Affective Disorder, writing 
“[i]f life had been unkind to her, it didn’t show.  There was not a hint of resignation on her face or 
in her spirit” (60).  Despite all her outwardly winning traits, her political and social standing, her 
successful life and family, her vigor, Patricia still suffers from depression every winter and 
comes to represent for Meri a model of durability, an example of what can be possible if one 
survives depression.  This durability and survival is depicted pharmaceutically when Patricia 
reveals that her first episode of depression in 1960 put her in “the hospital, where she was then 
given a series of electroshock treatments and prescribed an antidepressant, Elavil” (63).  
Patricia’s treatment is immediately legible as both a reflection of her age and her tenacity.  Elavil 
(amitriptyline) is one of the oldest drugs in its class, second only to the venerable imipramine for 
the title of longest serving tri-cyclic antidepressant, and its invocation here effectively 
establishes a generational difference between Meri and Patricia.  Moreover, Patricia’s 
toughness in the face of adversity is reinforced by the perception of older antidepressant like 
Elavil carrying more dangerous side effects than newer, more precise SSRIs.  Pairing an 
antique TCA with the harrowing process of electroconvulsive therapy confirms a tenacity that 
only makes sense to a pharmaceutically literate readership.  Whereas Elizabeth Wurtzel found 
in her father’s superannuated tranquilizers a point of familial departure, here Meri Danquah uses 
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antidepressants to render a fountain of strength to draw from, a legacy of endurance she can 
connect to.    
Patricia’s revelation is not the only moment in the text where pharmaceuticals function to 
highlight Meri’s sense of fellowship through psychic pain and diagnostic naiveté. One of the first 
moments Danquah verbalizes her own depression occurs after a tumultuous night out with her 
friend Jade.  As the two women discuss their lives over beers and cigarettes, Jade, seemingly 
out of the blue, asks Danquah, “Are you depressed?” (81). Danquah mumbles in the affirmative, 
surprising herself.  In response, Jade volunteers that she too suffers from depression, and 
becomes a sort of clinical depression veteran for Danquah to follow.  Jade is clearly more 
experienced with navigating depression, and doesn’t retain the same reservations about 
disclosing her condition that have paralyzed Danquah in the past.  Recalling Danquah’s earlier 
observation that “depression teaches you the fine art of multiplicity,” (76) Jade demonstrates her 
specific sagacity in depressive behavior by telling her friend that she had figured out Meri’s 
depression because she “recognize[d] the masks” (81).  This moment in the text is vitally 
important, as it marks Danquah’s first tentative steps out of denying her own depression, and it 
is made possible through Jade’s experience and camaraderie via shared suffering.  Jade’s 
worldly experience is reinforced immediately as she asks Meri, “what medication are you on?” 
(83), presupposing Meri takes an antidepressant for her depression.  Revealing both her 
lingering denial and a callowness that would remain obscured without pharmaceutical literacy, 
Meri responds, “Oh no, girl . . . I’m not that far gone.  There are days when I feel like . . . my life 
doesn’t amount to much, but I hardly think that’s cause for medication or a trip to the loony bin . 
. . I mean, Jade, I’m just like you.  We get down, we deal with it, we pick ourselves back up and 
we move on” (84).  Meri’s conflation of antidepressants and psychiatric institutionalization here 
establishes her naiveté in psychopharmaceutical matters, and puts her in an awkward social 
position when Jade replies, “I’m on Prozac . . . [f]orty milligrams a day” (84).  For a 
pharmaceutically literate reader, this exchange serves to reinforce the disparate levels of 
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experience these two women bring to their conversation.  Meri comes off as uninformed, 
assuming her friend was “just like” her, proceeding under the logic that someone who takes 
medication for depression is easily recognizable to others.  Jade, on the other hand, is rendered 
as the savvy, experienced half of this depressive dyad, both because she expresses a 
diagnostic acumen in identifying her friend’s “masked” despair, but also because she is fluent in 
medication and dosage.  That dosage is an especially notable identifying characteristic in 
painting Jade as the wiser, more experienced figure here, since not only does she offer a 
precise dosage, indicating her own pharmaceutical literacy, but “forty milligrams” communicates 
to a pharmaceutically literate reader that she has been medicating her depression long enough 
that the standard 20mg Prozac prescription has had to be doubled.   
Later in the book, pharmaceutical literacy flips to serve a similar function, demonstrating 
Meri’s growth in understanding her condition and its chemical treatment, and ultimately a 
neurochemical view of selfhood.  No longer the green psychopharmaceutical neophyte, Meri 
has been diligently taking the Zoloft prescribed after her discussion with Jade, when she 
receives a call from her teenage sister, Paula.  The women have a ten year age difference, and 
Meri takes a maternal pride in guiding her sister, though they’ve rarely shared the same 
household.  Meri frequently offers advice to her sister in situations where the younger woman 
might feel uncomfortable talking to their mother.  In an inversion of Patricia and Jade’s 
psychopharmaceutical guidance of Meri earlier in the book, Meri assumes the role of 
antidepressant veteran when Paula calls to ask for advice regarding her own diagnosis of 
depression and antidepressant prescription.  Meri’s position as maternal stand-in is formalized 
through the presence of pharmaceuticals when her sister says, “my therapist wants to put me 
on this medicine.  She says she can’t do it unless she has legal consent from an adult.  Mommy 
and Daddy don’t know about it yet.  I was wondering what you thought. . . . It’s called Zoloft” 
(211).  The echoes of pharmaceutical literacy here recall Meri’s earlier discussions with Patricia 
and Jade, since the surprising revelation of mental anguish and turning to a more experienced, 
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wiser confidant are again connected by the presence of an antidepressant.  Furthermore, Meri 
is startled that her sister has been prescribed the very same antidepressant she has been 
taking, and the revelation that her sister endures the same malady she has struggled against 
confirms for her an aspect of selfhood that places depression and its etiology squarely in the 
world of the brain chemicals.  “Paula’s depression stood as proof positive for me that my own 
depression was most likely biochemical,” writes Danquah, “That conclusion did me in.  It 
confirmed my greatest fears . . . The horror of that thought sent me spiraling back into my pre-
Zoloft existence” (214).  Here Danquah offers a stark declaration of her affiliation with the 
discourses of biological depression in favor in the late 90s, and, more interestingly, offers a 
distinction in her own persona in response to the intervention of psychopharmaceuticals.  A 
“pre-Zoloft existence” implies a fundamental fissure in identity before and after SSRI ingestion, 
suggesting by implication a “post-Zoloft existence” that accords with the formulations of post-
Prozac identities identified in the works of Peter Kramer and Jacqueline Zita above.  Danquah’s 
“horror” in this crucial moment derives from her belief that her “biochemical depression” is part 
of her genetic makeup, shared with her family members in a way that is deeper, more insidious, 
than simple emotional reactions might be shared among family members.  Meri’s lingering 
hopes that depression is but a transient feeling she can easily escape are dashed; this 
“biochemical” state is now understood as who she is--a realization that results in a return of 
depressive symptoms that is symbolic in its resistance to the Zoloft.  Danquah mourns for 
herself and her sister, writing “[t]here was little solace in realizing that the illness might be 
genetic.  A profound sadness moved through me.  Even those pills that I dutifully swallowed 
every morning were not a strong enough barricade against the agony” (212).       
This pivotal conversation between Meri and her sister also illuminates the ways that 
pharmaceutical literacy can examine broader issues of identity.  When read against Prozac 
Nation, Danquah’s memoir foregrounds issues of labor and class in ways that remain 
ephemeral in Wurtzel’s text.  The books are not polar opposites, though, in that they share an 
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uneasy allegiance to the perception articulated earlier, that productivity is a central measure of a 
woman’s mental health.  Echoing Wurtzel’s claims about her own productivity and employment, 
Danquah relays an anecdote from her older, Elavil-and-ECT friend, Patricia, who recalls 
presenting depressive symptoms to a male doctor only to be told she “had housewives’ 
syndrome.  He told me to get a job, said it would make me feel better” (63).  Danquah herself 
struggles one autumn while working on a contract with the Smithsonian, when “my depression 
returned . . . This, of course, affected my productivity” (68).  This drop in productivity 
exacerbates the depression in a sort of negative feedback loop, since she expresses “guilt over 
my inability to work,” (69) before making the verbally loaded claim that despite these clear 
depressive symptoms, she “was still grasping at straws to find another reason, any reason, 
other than depression, to explain my periods of ‘down time’” (70).  Though she does not dwell 
on it, Danquah employs quotation marks around the pointed phrase “down time” to emphasize 
the two ways one might read that term.  “Down time” obviously can refer to moments of 
inactivity where productive work is not being done, but in Danquah’s phrasing here it could also 
apply to the same period where she has been experiencing the feelings she is as yet unwilling 
to describe as full-blown clinical depression.   
Where Danquah’s book differs most significantly from Wurtzel’s is in portraying the ways 
that poverty can affect the experience of depression in women.  Wurtzel writes at length about 
money struggles experienced by her family, and how, for example, her divorced parents’ 
arguments over who was financially responsible for Ellie’s therapy or orthodontia bills impacted 
her own mental health.  While Wurtzel paints a picture of a frugal, no-frills upbringing, she still 
details her journey through Harvard University, interspersed with a variety of frivolous trips to 
visit companions in others states and countries, while attending weekly therapy sessions, 
ingesting enormous quantities of drugs, both prescribed and illegal, and a significant 
hospitalization, without detailing any significant personal financial impact.  Danqauh’s text, on 
the other hand, is centrally preoccupied with the price of depression, with the difficulties arising 
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from trying to afford therapy and medication while balancing rent, freelance work, and the 
expense of single motherhood.  As Danquah’s story illustrates, manipulating one’s brain 
chemistry is not the only way that psychopharmaceuticals affect identity, since the challenges of 
access to these medications affect how these drugs are experienced and represented.  
Consider again the passage above where Meri’s younger sister Paula calls for advice on taking 
Zoloft.  Meri nearly misses her sister’s question, as she is distracted by her own quest to 
scrounge up enough loose change from the bottom of her purse to afford a six-pack of beer.  
What is not obvious to Meri until later, is that she is an alcoholic, but the genesis of her 
alcoholism has an important relation to pharmaceutical literacy and the impact of poverty on 
neurochemical conceptions of the self.  Meri has turned to alcohol to self-medicate the 
“uncontrollably nervous and edgy” jitters she experiences from her newly-prescribed regimen 
taking a “50-milligram pill of Zoloft each morning” (202).   When Meri relates this hyperthymic 
anxiety to her psychiatrist, Dr. Fitzgerald, he assures her that anxiety is a common side-effect of 
starting Zoloft and writes her a second prescription for a drug called “BuSpar, an anxiety 
controllant” (203).  Meri then itemizes the expenses of her treatment: $22.50 for each visit with 
her psychologist (a discounted rate for a clinical trainee), $13.00 for visits to Dr. Fitzgerald, 
$75.00 for 30 days worth of Zoloft, and the BuSpar would add $130.00 to the tab.  As Meri 
points out, “[t]he financial strain that treating my depression put me under was enough to push 
me into a whole new depression” (203).  Meri’s limited financial options mean that she must 
forego the BuSpar, turning instead to alcohol, since “it got the job done and it wasn’t as hard on 
the pocket” (203).  But of course the alcohol carries with it a host of debilitating side effects.  
Notably, alcohol is a depressant, so in attempting to avoid the “whole new depression” imposed 
by the financial hardship of treating depression, Meri must risk further depression through 
alcoholism.  In this way, Danquah illustrates the depressive double-bind faced by those with 
compromised access to the mental health system.  Meri can afford some of her treatment, 
barely, but is forced to choose between competing vectors of depression for the remainder.  
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Instead of reducing her emotional distress, her pharmaceutical treatment reinforces many of the 
conditions that contributed to the distress in the first place. 
Danquah’s complicated relationship with her pharmaceuticals is central to understanding 
her particular expression of the neurochemical self.  After identifying the Zoloft as a contributor 
to her alcoholism, Meri successfully treats her depression by switching to another SSRI, 
GlaxoSmithKline’s Paxil.  Despite the help it provides, Meri takes the drug “reluctantly,” and 
muses that “there is something really wrong with the fact that Prozac is one of the most 
prescribed drugs in this country” (258).28  In an echo of her earlier denial of her depression, Meri 
asserts her reluctance to medicate her depression, writing, “I have tried to deny my need for 
medication and stopped taking it.  Each time I have fallen, fast and hard, deeper into the 
depression” (258).  Meri’s reluctance draws from her specific conception of selfhood related to 
the interaction of her brain chemicals and some other, ephemeral, intangible source of being.  
Danquah writes that she is often asked if her depressions are “emotional or biochemical” (257) 
as if those two possibilities were mutually exclusive.  The presupposition held by these 
interlocutors is that there are two different forms of depression, and that the emotional variety is 
somehow “less profound, more topical because it is issue related and has very little to do with 
one’s brain chemistry” (257).  Certainly, one potential response to this false binary would be to 
ask why brain chemistry is privileged as a more authentic vector for mental distress than “issue 
related” pain.  Why, one might ask, should external criteria increase or decrease the perception 
of authenticity in another person’s internal pain?  Indeed, such questions amplify some of the 
problems inherent in assuming a purely neurochemical vision of psychiatric distress, in that 
such a view can diminish the urgency, and therefore the empathy, provoked by the emotional 
                                                           
28 As pointed out by both Jonathan Metzl and Anna Mollow, Meri Nana-Ama Danquah and her memoir have a 
curious relationship with Eli Lilly, the company that produces Prozac.  Despite the text’s clear discomfort with 
SSRIs, some versions of Willow Weep for Me include an interview transcript between Danquah and Freda C. Lewis-
Hall, director of the Lilly Center for Women’s Health, and Danquah has participated in book tours in conjunction 
with Eli Lilly-funded clinical depression campaigns.   
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pain of others.  Another response might place this question within a historical context, observing 
that the ideology that there is a distinction between “emotional” and “biochemical” depressions 
is but a few decades old, and the fact that it has obtained enough cultural weight to inform 
frequent questions from well-meaning acquaintances speaks to the enormous scope and 
penetration of ideas that foreground a neurochemical conception of the self in late twentieth-
century America.  Danquah’s response, though, takes a different approach by offering a 
modified expression of the neurochemical identity.  She rejects the implicit distinction between 
“emotional” and “biochemical” depressions, arguing that “all our emotions and moods are 
biochemically induced” (257), essentially arguing that the emotional is the biochemical, but then 
she concludes with a more nuanced vision of neurochemical selfhood by locating depression as 
an “illness [that] exists somewhere in that ghost space between consciousness and chemistry” 
(257-58).  It is here, in this liminal “ghost space,” between the “self” and the “neurochemical” 
that Danquah identifies the source of her distress.  “Ghost space” is an especially rich and 
evocative phrase to arrive at since it conjures images of a haunting, indistinct essence at the 
intersection of consciousness and chemical that recalls and reconfigures Elizabeth Wurtzel’s 
conclusion that “our beautiful and wretched souls, are just biology, are just a series of chemical 
and physical reactions” (316).  Danquah’s “ghost space” ultimately sees a similar “soul,” a 
neurochemical self of sorts, navigating this gap between “consciousness” and “chemistry,” but 
one that refuses to yield to the logic of a purely chemical identity.  What emerges at the 
conclusion of Willow Weep for Me is a highly pharmaceutically literate, hybrid vision of selfhood 
that pushes back against medical and neuro-scientific discourses of identity, recognizing the 
important role of chemistry to a brain’s function, but retaining a vital, vulnerable “space” for 
selfhood where chemistry alone is not the final arbiter of what defines a person.   
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Achieving Chemical Balance 
 
 As pharmacological historian Mickey C. Smith’s model of drug trends predicted, SSRIs 
did not retain their explosive growth forever.  Tracing the rise of antidepressants and their 
impact on neurochemical conceptions of the self in depression memoirs sits nicely within 
Smith’s model, with Elizabeth Wurtzel’s Prozac Nation aligning to 1994’s initially buoyant 
optimism about the possibilities of SSRI treatment, and Meri Nana-Ama Danquah’s 1998 work 
in Willow Weep for Me marking the commercial peak of Prozac sales as concerns about the 
drug and its effects began to manifest in the culture.  Though antidepressants would continue, 
and still continue to this day, to form a cornerstone of psychopharmaceutical sales and 
marketing for the treatment of depression, the perception of these drugs has slowly changed 
and their clout has diminished.  Where once SSRIs were presented as miracle drugs, sold as 
revolutionary cures for our age-old torment, antidepressants now sit comfortably within a broad 
spectrum of treatments patients might explore to mitigate feelings of despair.  Though clearly 
effective and life-saving drugs for some, antidepressants no longer inspire the cultural 
imagination the way they did when Peter Kramer wrote of their personality sculpting potential 
and “Prozac feminism” in 1993.  Discourses of “chemical imbalances,” while still lingering in the 
lay population, no longer animate the research or advertising climates around depression.29  
New and predictably promising alternative treatments are emerging now, slowly consigning 
SSRIs to the role of era-specific signifiers in the same way Prozac and its cousins did to 
tranquilizers a generation before.  
 What legacy these drugs will retain in the culture is at least partially tied to the way they 
were configured in the literature from the specific era of their ascendance.  Depression memoirs 
                                                           
29 Researchers Jeffrey Lacasse and Jonathan Leo have studied the propagation of chemical imbalance theories of 
depression in the media, especially on television, and noted that “these advertisements came to a screeching halt 
around 2006-07” (qtd. in Gadye).    
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from the 1990s give us a sense of how antidepressants were imagined as they stormed the 
culture, both how these chemicals were implicated in neurochemical understandings of the self, 
and how these texts relied on pharmaceutical literacy in both their production and reception.  
Moreover, the discourses around these pills and their role in understanding selfhood spread to 
related areas of identity, framing gender, race, class, disability and spirituality within a 
psychopharmaceutical context unique to its moment in time, but indebted to a history of “wonder 
drugs” and the shifting constructions of the psychic maladies they were designed to combat.    
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Conclusion 
  
 
 If you found yourself in a supermarket checkout line in March 2019, you might have 
gotten a glimpse of something odd, tucked in with the tabloid images of philandering celebrities 
and shirtless fitness models on the covers of the magazines that haunt those spaces.  As you 
approached the check stand, you might have struggled to focus on any particular image among 
the farrago of distractions at point of purchase: the revolutionary weight-loss stratagems, the 
airbrushed bosoms, the endless reconfigurations of high fructose corn syrup in lurid packaging, 
the promises to satisfy every type of American appetite.  If you were able to navigate this 
quotidian labyrinth of twenty-first-century American messaging, you might have noticed the 
special edition of Popular Science magazine on display.  Looking closely, you might have 
encountered the special edition’s cover image of a human brain composed entirely of electrical 
wires, power cables, and white plastic molex connectors, provocatively sculpted to approximate 
the wrinkled folds of sulci and gyri across its surface, under an equally provocative headline: 
“Your New Brain.”  If, as your eggs and kale and soap slowly conveyed toward the checker, this 
headline managed to catch your attention, you might thumb through the magazine’s pages and 
marvel at the possibilities implied by articles like “Editing Your Brain with Gold Nano-Particles,” 
“Upgrading with Artificial Neurons,” and “This New Ultra-Detailed Map of the Brain May Advance 
Medicine.”  If you are not one to be taken in by optimistic speculation, you might instead find 
yourself recoiling visibly, to the consternation of your fellow shoppers, at articles seemingly 
borrowed from dystopic science-fiction like, “Will a Brain Grown in a Lab Have a Mind of Its 
Own,” “Monitoring the Brain with Wireless ‘Neural Dust,’” and “Could We Give Criminals 
Corrective Brain Implants?”.  After tucking the magazine back into its wire display and making 
your purchases, you might have left the store with a mild sense of deja vu.  You could be 
forgiven for thinking: “I’ve seen this before.”  
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Figure 5.1: The image of the brain as computer components offers an updated version of mid-
twentieth-century Miltown ads that presented an anxious man’s head as a computer punch 
card.  This specific image also communicates popular understandings of the neurochemical self 
and American culture’s continued fascination with the brain and metaphorical understandings of 
its relation to selfhood. Source: Popular Science.  
 
 Though it is far from a rigorous academic journal, Popular Science offers a 
representative illustration of “popular” American culture’s enduring fascination with the brain and 
its relation to who we are, as well as the culture’s eternally renewable faith in scientific, medical 
progress.  The pages of the March 2019 special edition in particular are steeped in the ideology 
that selfhood is derived exclusively from the physical brain, and that control of the self is 
enabled through better and more precise scientific interventions therein.  This message is 
presented as groundbreaking and novel--Your New Brain!--but as this dissertation has explored, 
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these claims derive from an extensive and established tradition.  It is hard not to see the 
historical echoes of twentieth-century psychiatric discourses, pharmaceutical advertising, and 
literary explorations of neurochemical selfhood at work within Popular Science’s expressions of 
being.  Consider the magazine’s ontologically and neurochemically reductive introductory 
statement, set below a series of brain scan images offering a kind of authority Joseph Dumit 
might interrogate, that “[e]very second, twenty trillion electrochemical pulses flash through [your 
brain’s neural] connections . . . this means that every moment of your conscious--and to an 
extent, unconscious--existence, there is a never-ending lightning storm roiling through the 
cosmos that is encapsulated by your skull.  That’s you” (4-5).  The prose may be more purple, 
but this modern sentiment offers little more than Francis Crick’s “You’re nothing but a pack of 
neurons” from an earlier generation.  Indeed, the intro to Popular Science’s special edition 
doubles down on this line of reductionist neuro-philosophy, offering the promise that “[i]n the 
pages that follow, you’ll learn about our body’s most complex organ in the body, the seat of our 
being” (4, poorly copy-edited redundancy in original).  Again, in slightly different language, we 
find the expression of this very specific and tenacious notion of selfhood, of “the seat of our 
being,” residing in the howling tempest of “electrochemical pulses” in “our body’s most complex 
organ.”  Capitalizing on this widely-accepted view of brain-chemical identity, the introduction to 
Popular Science’s special edition closes with a question indebted to the tradition of reliance on 
medical, scientific progress:  “What can science do for your brain?”, before offering the vaguely 
ominous coda: “The answer may blow your mind” (5).   
 The history of neurochemical selfhood and its configurations in post-WWII American 
literature is a “mind blowing” story, but it is much more complicated--and much more interesting-
-than supermarket reading would lead us to believe.  Over the last seventy five years, 
Americans’ conception of who we are at a fundamental level has shifted toward a nebulous and 
abstract space of neurochemicals and synapses and dendrites and endorphins and pills and 
pills and pills.  Previous ontological debates over tensions between the mind and the body, or 
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essence versus being, or the source of an immortal soul, or the psychodynamics of the 
unconscious mind have largely receded to the background in the American cultural imagination, 
replaced, at least in part, by an understanding of the self as a constellation of brain chemicals 
and a belief that scientific, medical advances can offer us unprecedented control over its 
fluctuations.  This transition has undoubtedly brought valuable innovations that have helped 
some people better understand themselves and given them technologies to alleviate their 
psychic distress. Psychopharmacology is not fundamentally an evil enterprise, bent on world 
domination through the dissemination of false narratives and expensive nostrums for imagined 
maladies.  There is, of course, real social value to be gained through rigorous research into 
brain chemistry and psychopharmaceutical intervention into painful emotional states.  But what 
a study like this one offers is some much needed context for these “advances” in human 
understanding, and a check against the marketing of wildly optimistic promises of chemical 
control over the self.  As libertarian philosopher Isabel Paterson wrote in her 1943 book, The 
God of the Machine, “[a] mechanism without a brake . . . is built for self-destruction” (23), and 
the theoretical synthesis of scientific history, ontological philosophy, and literary studies that 
animates this dissertation can be seen to operate as one such brake.  There are clear and 
obvious dangers, many of them articulated and experienced by the subjects in these pages, to 
the unchecked, unbraked advance of blind adherence to neurochemical conceptions of selfhood 
and the control over culture and identity that it enables.  A historically grounded and scientifically 
discursive reading of American literature like this reminds us to look beyond the multisyllabic 
chemical efforts to colonize selfhood, and read scientific and medical advances within the larger 
humanist tradition that has always offered intellectual ballast to stabilize against wild narratives 
of human advancement and technological breakthroughs.   
 Moreover, the addition of “pharmaceutical literacy” to the vocabulary of literary studies 
gives us a tool through which we can make better sense of how writers of twentieth century 
American literature engaged in these particular discourses.  Since the end of WWII, 
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pharmaceuticals have embedded themselves in daily American life, and a thorough examination 
of their impact must recognize the ways in which this phenomenon has altered the ways in 
which we express ourselves, and the language we use when doing so.  By privileging 
pharmacentric reading practices, pharmaceutical literacy exposes the depth to which 
pharmaceutical discourse has penetrated the culture, providing the material for metaphor, the 
referents for characterization, and the terminology required to explore modern notions of identity 
in American literature.  The space of the pill is not simply an inert, corporate, chemical 
construction, but the thriving locus of urgent, subsurface debates about identity and value, about 
productivity and worth, about race and gender, about families and art, about grief and joy.  
Pharmaceutical literacy offers a new and valuable access point for the various subjects of 
literary expression extant in post-WWII America.  Pharmaceutically literate readings uncover the 
work done by advertisers in linking life’s stresses to chemical cures.  They expose the 
communicative power of drug brand names and the types of reputations they carry.  A 
pharmaceutically literate reading sees the neurochemical shorthand at work in modern 
expressions of character.  Such readings identify in literary works the legacy of advertising 
histories, narratives of corporate marketing strategies, and the cyclical rise-and-fall trajectory of 
America’s interest in “wonder drugs.”   
 Pharmaceutical literacy gives literary studies a useful tool for unpacking the vital but 
obscure complexities of modern American identity in the wake of the “golden era” of 
pharmaceuticals, an era that continues to thrive well into the twenty-first century.  We might, for 
example, recall the Beat-fueled buzz around Benzedrine from three-quarters of a century ago 
when we encounter news of the FDA’s 2016 approval of Adzenys XR-ODT, an amphetamine 
marketed to children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) designed to dissolve 
on the tongue leaving a taste of orange candy.  We might also be reminded of the 
configurations of mid-century tranquilizers like Miltown and their promises to alleviate the “Age 
of Anxiety” experienced by the confessional poets, when we encounter promising claims made 
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by the emerging industry of hemp-derived Cannabidiol (CBD) whose products, from oils to 
powders to sexual lubricants,1 purport to alleviate stress, ease anxiety, reduce inflammation, 
and soothe disruptive sleep patterns.  The antidepressant context offered by readings of 1990s 
depression memoirs might help us think through the discourses provoked by the March 2019 
FDA approval of Spravato (esketamine), a nasal spray formulation of notorious veterinary 
anesthetic and club drug, ketamine, designed for fast-acting relief of treatment-resistant 
depression and suicidal ideation.  Perhaps these new products and pharmaceutical 
developments will defy Mickey C. Smith’s law of wonder drug trends and sustain their popularity 
indefinitely.  Perhaps these progressive biotechnologies will permanently succeed in curing 
Americans’ psychological ailments with pharmaceutical cures.  Our chemicals might just be very 
close to solving the whole ontologically-complex riddle of American identity. 
   But probably not.  If history repeats itself, this next generation of 
psychopharmaceuticals is likely to experience a moment of optimistic excitement, followed by a 
backlash as marketing promises and initial enthusiasm fade into concerns about addiction and 
side effects, leading to a period of lowered but stabilized acceptance of these drugs and their 
role in everyday life.  Perhaps then the cycle will continue with the next wonder drug, and so on.  
As this process plays out, these drugs are likely to leave their imprint on American culture, just 
as the wonder drugs of previous eras did, influencing notions of selfhood and the 
pharmaceutical vocabulary of literary works produced during the period.  That these drugs will 
contribute to a sense of identity formulated through neurochemistry seems like a given, as does 
the eventuality that these formulations will in fact reconfirm existing forms of structural 
oppression under the guise of dispassionate medical and scientific progress.   
                                                           
1  CBD infused lube is an exciting market--as it were--for nostrum-adjacent sexual enhancement.  As of this writing, 
$48 will get you a 30 ml bottle of Foria brand “Natural Arousal Oil with CBD & Synergistic Botanicals,” whose 
advertising image of soft pastels and flower-petal-and-marijuana-leaf motif is clearly aimed at women.  For a more 
masculine CBD option, consider “Knob Polish by Jack.” 
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They don’t have to, of course, and one of the goals of a study like this is to model a 
reading practice that exposes these pharmaceutically significant discourses of identity formation 
and provides valuable context for understanding them.  In tracing the history and construction of 
the neurochemical self, in articulating the function and importance of pharmaceutical literacy, 
and in foregrounding the role of pharmaceuticals in the production and reception of American 
literature, this dissertation constructs affiliations and connections beyond cultural and literary 
studies that might mobilize larger inter-disciplinary conversations around American brains, 
American pills, and American letters.  Medical doctors, scientists, and researchers of 
pharmacology and brain chemistry have a lot to gain by understanding how their work 
contributes to popular or literary understandings of selfhood, and literary scholars can likewise 
benefit from understanding the history and science operating behind their philosophical and 
theoretical analyses.  As this work demonstrates, these disciplines are not incompatible, nor are 
they isolated intellectual opponents as is sometimes imagined in popular culture or university 
budget meetings.  Indeed, in attempting to unravel the complexities of the human mystery, 
these fields work best together, when the quantitative is guided by the qualitative, and when the 
abstract and philosophical is rooted in the concrete and technical.      
These are some of the issues I discussed with Eiman Azim, neuroscientist and head of 
the Azim Lab at the Salk Institute for Biological Sciences.  Dr. Azim’s research focuses on 
understanding how the brain handles movement, specifically the function of neural circuitry in 
what is known as motor control, and to talk to him about his research is to have one’s mind 
blown by the wondrous techniques and technologies available to the world-class 
neuroscientist.  Genetic and viral tools for accessing neural pathways.  Anatomical analysis.  
Electrophysiological recording.  Proteins derived from algae inserted into neurons to create 
photosensitive “switches” in the brain, manipulated with millisecond precision via lasers and 
optical fibers.  The brain may be “the body’s most complex organ in the body,” but, as Dr. 
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Azim’s research demonstrates, enormously powerful and exciting forces are being summoned 
to figure out how it works.   
But why?  Why are we conducting such demanding and complicated work trying to 
understand the brain?  Often, as Dr. Azim pointed out, the answer is straightforward and 
pragmatic: to cure disease.  There is no doubt that the most immediate social benefit of motor 
control research would be realized if Dr. Azim were to discover a cure for spinal cord injuries, 
but as he lamented to me, competition for research funding, dwindling budgets, and an aversion 
to philosophical inquiry in some sectors of the neuroscience community force researchers to 
frame their explorations of the brain in terms that exclude overarching considerations of 
consciousness or selfhood, in favor of quantifiable goals that demonstrate significant 
commercial potential.  In many ways, this is entirely justifiable.  Brain research is expensive, and 
given a finite amount of time and resources, it makes some sense to prioritize immediately 
beneficial, commercially exploitable avenues of research.  There are problems with this 
approach as well.  Too much focus on practical application can skew or narrow research, 
slowing development and foreclosing avenues of potential breakthrough.  Moreover, as the 
psychopharmacological field has demonstrated, contextless narratives of progress risk 
reinforcing existing social structures of identity and oppression under a vague cover of scientific 
impartiality.   
According to Dr. Azim, neuroscience is very slowly starting to come around to the idea of 
addressing bigger picture, philosophical questions of consciousness and selfhood, though 
stigmas still present as enormous obstacles for all but the most famous and accomplished 
researchers.  “You’re looked down upon in neuroscience if you ask those questions in a 
laboratory setting--what is consciousness? The stuff we’re really interested in . . . because 
people think ‘how the hell are you going to be quantitative about that?’” (personal interview).  As 
Dr. Azim points out, the exclusion of philosophical inquiry from his field is not due to some lack 
in interest or value in these questions.  In fact, these considerations are “the stuff we’re really 
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interested in,” yet difficulties remain for neuroscientists hoping to grapple with ideas of selfhood 
and consciousness.  Dr. Azim relayed to me horror stories of the faculty at a very prestigious 
university openly snickering in the audience of a neuroscience presentation that dared to ask 
questions of consciousness.  Unless you are an extremely “serious, well-respected scientist,” 
(personal interview) like Francis Crick, former president of the Salk Institute, with a Nobel Prize 
sitting on the mantle at home, expanding beyond the quantitative can be dangerous.   
This, I would submit, is a problem, given the scarcity of Francis Cricks in the world, but, 
as Dr. Azim’s intellectual history illustrates, research can still be guided by these bigger picture 
considerations without explicitly defining them.  Dr. Azim came to neuroscience from an 
undergraduate interest in philosophy, particularly philosophy of science and philosophy of mind.  
There he encountered a frustration at the frequency of questions that “could not be tested in an 
experimental way,” (personal interview) so he began to study molecular biology, eventually 
working his way to neuroscience.  Though Dr. Azim runs a lab that is very much beholden to 
quantitative experimentation, he says that “reading philosophy still to this day informs how I 
think about science” and that deeper philosophical questions about the brain and the self, 
“questions I’m most interested in, questions humanity is most interested in, are still very 
valuable in the lab” (personal interview).  This can be seen in the specific theoretical approach 
Dr. Azim employs in what is called “systems neuroscience.”  Historically, neuroscientific 
research has largely been conducted via a reductionist approach, working down to the 
molecular details of brain function, or, conversely, at very broad, theoretical levels.  Systems 
neuroscience attempts to combine these two scales, getting access to the brain through the 
tools of molecular biology, but analyzing the larger function of neural networks and systems to 
ask bigger questions.  Though the discipline has obvious differences from a study like this 
dissertation, I would argue that systems neuroscience shares an ideological ethos with 
pharmacentric literary readings of the neurochemical self in that both address ontological issues 
one step beyond the typical research in their field.  Furthermore, they share a keen interest in 
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valuing a mix of scientific and humanistic inquiry, differing only in the relative proportions of 
each.  In many ways, these seemingly different worlds of study have a lot to offer each other.  
In this spirit of disciplinary cross-pollination, I asked Dr. Azim if he thinks of himself as a 
neurochemical being, if he views his moods and thoughts and essence as based in 
electrochemical reactions occurring in his brain.  “Absolutely” he tells me flatly, framing his 
explanation in predictably scientific terms, “I wouldn't be so arrogant as to say that I, or we as a 
field in neuroscience, know remotely enough about the brain to say with any certainty that 
[neurochemistry] is all there is, but every piece of evidence I’ve seen doesn’t lead me to believe 
otherwise” (personal interview).  While his response is interesting for this project, in that it more 
or less mirrors my broader claim that the way we view selfhood in 2019 is derived largely from 
scientific developments in neuroscience that date back fewer than 75 years, the circumspection 
evident in his phrasing, his caution about how little we actually know about the brain, is 
especially instructive.  Though he would be too modest to say so, Dr. Azim knows more about 
the brain than all but a tiny handful of people in human history, and yet throughout our 
conversation he makes repeated reference to how little we actually know about the brain.  
Regarding lay misconceptions about “chemical imbalances” and related diagnostic problems in 
the DSM, Dr. Azim suggests that the psychologists who construct that book “are woefully 
misinformed, not because they are doing it wrong--they are working with the best knowledge 
they have--we just don’t have nearly the depth of knowledge of the brain to be able to make 
statements like that” (personal interview).  The tone of these observations stands in stark 
contrast to the triumphant certitude of scientific progress, occasionally explicit but always 
implicit, within the marketing and advertising of psychopharmaceuticals that have been explored 
in this dissertation.  There is, in the final analysis, a dangerous imbalance in the relative volume 
of these forces.  On one hand we encounter the loud, confident messaging of Mickey C. Smith’s 
“wonder drugs,” with their enormous marketing budgets and cultural or literary expressions of 
“biochemical cures” for emotional troubles.  On the other hand, we have the quiet, studious 
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expressions of experts like Dr. Azim who are quick to caution how relatively little we really know 
about the astonishing complexities within us.    
Ultimately, the value of a study like this one lies in putting these competing vectors for 
our attention into something approaching a balance.  In branching out to the sciences, literary 
work can be enhanced, can develop new tools to examine the cultural echoes resounding from 
scientific progress.  Conversely, those in the quantitative fields, people like Dr. Azim, can benefit 
from literary readings to inform the larger humanistic motivations of their work and to understand 
how their research gets repurposed within the specific cultural discourses of industry, medicine, 
and the arts.  In attempting to bridge the divide between the quantitative and the qualitative, the 
histories I’ve examined, from Benzedrine, to Miltown, to Prozac, and the literature they 
influenced, from the Beats, to the confessional poets, to SSRI memoirists, point to a pattern in 
how conceptions of neurochemical selfhood have evolved, and might give us pause as we 
contemplate popular proclamations of identity grounded exclusively in science or in 
culture.  Whether we encounter these conceptions at the grocery store checkout line, in 
conversation with our psychologist, on the label of our pill bottles, in discussion with a 
neuroscientist, or in the pages of literature and philosophy, we would do well to remember how 
much we have left to learn, and the variety of approaches we should consider on the path to 
learning it.   
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